At the outset, the court recognizes the limited scope of judicial review of hospital staffing decisions. "Illinois cases have repeatedly recognized that decisions of private hospitals respecting the termination or curtailment of existing privileges of physicians on their medical staffs are subject only to a limited judicial review whose purpose is merely to determine whether such decisions were rendered in compliance with the bylaws of the institution." Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 273 Ill. App. 3d 536, 538, 210 Ill. Dec. 455, 653 N.E.2d 42 (1st Dist. 1995) (quoting Knapp v. Palos Community Hospital, 176 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1018-19, 126 Ill. Dec. 362, 531 N.E.2d 989 (1989)); Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 129 Ill. 2d 497, 506-07, 136 Ill. Dec. 47, 544 N.E.2d 733 (1989). In Barrows v. Northwestern Mem. Hosp., 123 Ill. 2d 49, 525 N.E.2d 50, 121 Ill. Dec. 244 (Ill. 1988), the Illinois Supreme Court declined to extend judicial review the process of application for privileges, despite the physician's argument that the bylaws provided a right to a hearing. 525 N.E.2d at 52-55.
Consequently, the court must limit its analysis to the question of whether the Hospital followed its bylaws in the process of terminating Vakharia's existing privileges, rather than whether it did so in making its decision to extend privileges for the first time. As such, Vakharia cannot base a breach of contract and bylaws claim on the initial granting of new partial privileges, or failure to process her application for new, full privileges. However, to the extent that failure to place Vakharia on full rotation rescinded the full privileges eventually granted to Vakharia, she may state a breach of contract and bylaws claim.
As to the exclusive provider contract, the court acknowledges that hospitals do have the right to enter such agreements. That right is not dependent upon the bylaws of the hospital. Regardless of the right, though, when entering exclusive provider agreements, hospitals may breach contracts already accorded to physicians under bylaws. Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 273 Ill. App. 3d 536, 538, 210 Ill. Dec. 455, 653 N.E.2d 42 (1st Dist. 1995); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1988). A hospital's bylaws may form an integral part of a separate contractual relationship with members of its medical staff. Id. That contractual relationship may be breached if it is terminated by the institution of an exclusive provider agreement. Although tenuously, Vakharia does allege that she acquired contractual rights under the Bylaws through interim privileges, and that those rights were breached when the Hospital entered the exclusive provider arrangement with Evergreen.
The question then becomes whether each of the Defendants named in Count V may be liable for breach of Vakharia's alleged contractual rights. Vakharia makes no allegation that McIntyre, Roth, or the individual Board or MEC members were parties to any contract between the Hospital and the Staff which was embodied in the Bylaws. As such, she has not pleaded a viable breach of contract and bylaws claim against them. Furthermore, Vakharia has pleaded nothing indicating that the Staff did anything which could constitute breach of her contractual rights under the Bylaws. Accordingly, she cannot sue the Staff for breach of contract and bylaws. Vakharia has, however, pleaded a viable breach of contract and bylaws claim against the Hospital, in that she states that the Hospital violated her contractual rights when it entered an exclusive provider contract with Evergreen.
E. Rule 8
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and mandates a plaintiff to insure that each averment of her pleading is "simple, concise, and direct," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). Industrial Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 902 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Failure to follow Rule 8 may warrant dismissal. Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1990); Industrial Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 902 F. Supp. 805, 814 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
Under federal notice pleading standards, the short, plain statement need not plead particulars, but must merely allege facts sufficient to put defendants on notice of the claims asserted against them.
But if a plaintiff does plead particulars, and they show that he has no claim, then he is out of luck -- he has pleaded himself out of court. Early v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 959 F.2d 75, 78 (7th Cir. 1992); Conn v. GATX Terminals Corp., 18 F.3d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1994); Fryman v. United States, 901 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1990). He is not saved by having pleaded a legal conclusion that if consistent with the facts would establish his right to relief, for he has shown that it is inconsistent with the facts. Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Morris, 777 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985).
Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1994). As discussed above, Vakharia has done so with regard to several of her claims.
Nevertheless, Vakharia presses that courts should prefer "specific" complaints, such as hers, rather than adhering to federal notice pleading standards. (Pl. Resp. Mot. Dismiss at 36.) The court disagrees.
Vakharia has not complied with Rule 8's "short and plain" requirement. In the instant case, the court finds itself drowned in Vakharia's hardly "short" fifty-one pages and far from "plain" 178 paragraphs of "specifics." The Complaint is waterlogged with facts which are of no apparent relevance and void of many facts essential to Vakharia's purported claims.
Accordingly, the court dismisses the remainder of the Complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8.
Accordingly, Vakharia's claims are dismissed with prejudice, with the following exceptions: Counts I and II remain against McIntyre, Zychlin, Roth, the Board members, the Hospital and Evergreen; Count III remains against the Hospital and Evergreen; Count V remains against the Hospital; Count VI remains against the Hospital and Evergreen; and Count VII remains against the Hospital, all of which are dismissed without prejudice. The court reserves ruling on the issue of Rule 11 sanctions until the parties have completed the previously-ordered supplemental briefing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR., Judge
United States District Court