does not alter the popular dictionary definition of damages.
The court does not find the language of section 2-101 of the Tort Immunity Act to support a contrary conclusion. Section 2-101 provides, in part, that "nothing in [the Tort Immunity Act] affects the right to obtain relief other than damages against a local public entity or public employee." While this language suggests that the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to forms of relief other than damages, it does not add to, or detract from, the meaning of the term damages. It speaks merely to the scope of the Tort Immunity Act and not to the definition of damages.
The court also finds that the nature of the remedies sought in the PWC case are of the type contemplated by the term "damages" in the Tort Immunity Act. While the PWC case may be characterized generally as one of equity seeking mandatory injunctive relief, it is unique in the type of relief it seeks. The essence of the injury alleged in the PWC case is a denial of an education for minority students comparable to that afforded to white students in the district. The commensurate relief sought is an education comparable to that afforded to white students. What was lost was equal education, what is sought is equal education. The People Who Care plaintiffs do not seek purely some action on the part of the school district to prevent future injury, or in other words, the classic prospective relief associated with injunctive actions. Rather, much of what the People Who Care plaintiffs request in their lawsuit is compensation for past wrongs, and for this type of past wrong, direct money compensation to the class plaintiffs is not the appropriate remedy. For the school district's stock in trade is education. An equal educational opportunity was denied, and that is what ultimately must be provided through monies received by the tax levies.
This notion finds support in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 53 L. Ed. 2d 745, 97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977). While addressing a different issue, the United States Supreme Court discussed the nature of the relief sought in a school desegregation lawsuit. Id. at 288-90. Although the Court concluded that the relief in these types of cases has sufficient characteristics of traditional equitable remedies to prevent application of Eleventh Amendment immunity against a state defendant, the Court also recognized the compensatory nature of such relief. In that regard, the Court stated that the fact that "the programs are also 'compensatory' in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system." Id. at 290. (Emphasis in original.)
The court here considers this language from Milliken to support its characterization of the relief sought in the PWC case. Clearly, the relief requested has components of both traditional injunctive and compensatory relief. It is the significant compensatory aspects of the remedies sought, however, that bring it within the ambit of the Tort Immunity Act's tax levying provisions.
Such a conclusion is further supported by the legislature's express inclusion of federal constitutional and common law torts within the definition of injury. As discussed above, this court does not regard the inclusion of such language alone as broadening the Tort Immunity Act's scope such that all purely equitable injunctive or prospective relief is embraced within its terms. Nevertheless, clear reference to federal constitutional torts, which torts by any definition encompass school discrimination, reflects an intent to have the Tort Immunity Act apply to such a lawsuit to the extent the relief sought has significant compensatory components, as it does here.
Because the ruling that the funding provisions of the Tort Immunity Act apply to the PWC school desegregation case is a narrow one, based on the unique remedies necessitated by the past discrimination, the concerns expressed by the objectors regarding an unduly expansive reading of the Tort Immunity Act in other cases are unfounded.
Of course, the Illinois General Assembly remains free to amend the Act to expressly prohibit the use of section 9-107 to fund the remedies arising out of a school desegregation lawsuit. The present wording of the Act, however, allows funding of the school desegregation remedies without unnecessary interference by the federal court. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 48-52, 109 L. Ed. 2d 31, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). In fact, under Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court recognized that there may be instances where funding of federal court-ordered remedies might be achieved via existing state law. Id. at 51-52. Doing so both protects the function of the local governmental institution and also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems of segregation upon those who have themselves created the problems. Id. at 51. Under this court's interpretation of the Act, the problems of financing desegregation are addressed via state legislation. See id. at 52. Unlike the circumstances in Missouri v. Jenkins, the legislation at issue here (the Act) does not curtail the power of a school district which is ready, willing and able itself to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights. See id. at 51.
Having concluded that section 9-107 provides the necessary authority for the school district to levy taxes via section 9-102, the court need not reach the alternative argument that section 9-107 in conjunction with section 9-103 provides such authority. Such a position is doubtful, however, as the language of section 9-103 appears to be directed at insurance and self-insurance rather than creating a far-reaching license to raise money to pay for prophylactic methods of loss prevention.
The court also need not address the procedural questions raised by the school district related to the filing of the tax objections.
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motions for summary judgment filed by the tax objectors, grants the motions for summary judgment of the school district and dismisses these three causes in their entirety.
PHILIP G. REINHARD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: February 26, 1996