with counterplaintiffs. Specifically, counterplaintiffs allege that on May 18, 1994, Weber told Servpro's president about his agreement to buy counterplaintiffs' distributorship, and Servpro's president instructed Weber to pay only $ 250,000 for the distributorship. Weber then offered counterplaintiffs only $ 250,000 for the distributorship. (Id. PP 27, 43.) Counterplaintiffs allege that Servpro's and Weber's actions were intended to harm counterplaintiffs, were not related to any legitimate or competitive interests, were not privileged, and caused serious damage to counterplaintiffs. (Id. P 44.)
The court finds that these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for tortious interference with economic expectancy. Accordingly, the court denies Servpro's motion to dismiss Count VII of counterplaintiffs' third amended counterclaim.
C. Lack of personal jurisdiction
The individual counterdefendants had contended that counterplaintiffs' claims against them, set forth in Counts IV and V, must be dismissed pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) because the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the individual counterdefendants. Because the court already has dismissed counts IV and V and dismissed the individual counterdefendants as party counterdefendants, the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is moot, and accordingly is denied.
D. Motion to strike Counts II, IV, V, and VI
moves to strike the fraud-based counts (Counts II, IV, and V) and the conspiracy count (Count VI) on the ground that they are not pleaded with particularity. These motions are moot, in light of the court's rulings with respect to these counts. Accordingly, the court denies Servpro's motions to strike Counts II, IV, V, and VI.
E. Motion to strike ad damnum clauses
Servpro asks the court to strike counterplaintiffs' ad damnum clauses on the grounds that counterplaintiffs have not pleaded any basis for such damages and that the compensatory damage requests bear no relation to any conceivable financial harm.
The court finds that dismissing counterplaintiffs' damages claims at this stage of the proceedings would be premature. Counterplaintiffs will be required to prove both that they were injured and the amount of their damages at trial. Geldermann, Inc. v. Financial Management Consultants, Inc., No. 86 C 4347, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 484, *2 (N.D. Ill. 1995). The amount of damages that should be awarded is a question of fact for the fact-finder. See Arcor, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 960 F.2d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 1992). The court does not find that counterplaintiffs' damages claims are so baseless or frivolous that they deserve to be done away with now and taken out of the hands of the trier of fact.
Accordingly, the court denies counterdefendants' motion to strike the ad damnum clauses in counterplaintiffs' third amended counterclaim.
F. Motion to strike affirmative defenses
Servpro moves to strike all of counterplaintiffs' third amended affirmative defenses to Servpro's first amended complaint on the ground that Servpro is unable to determine the bases upon which the affirmative defenses rest. Neither is the court. Affirmative Defense Nos. 2 through 6 provide no information other than the name of the legal theory on which each affirmative defense is based (e.g., waiver, estoppel, illegality). Affirmative Defense No. 1 provides slightly more information; it states: "[Servpro's] claims are barred by fraud, detailed below with particularity." However, given the court's ruling that counterplaintiffs did not state their fraud-based counts with sufficient particularity to give fair notice of what was at issue in those counts, an affirmative defense based on those same deficient allegations cannot give counterdefendants fair notice of the issues the affirmative defense raises. See Moore, Owen, Thomas & Co. v. Coffey, 992 F.2d 1439, 1445 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 350, 91 S. Ct. 1434, 1453, 28 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1971) (the purpose of FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) is to "give the opposing party notice of the affirmative defense and a chance to rebut it")).
The court concludes that the affirmative defenses raised by counterplaintiffs fail to provide enough information to give counterdefendants notice of the affirmative defenses and a chance to rebut them. Accordingly, Affirmative Defense Nos. 1 through 6 are stricken pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).
For the foregoing reasons, counterdefendants' motion to strike and to dismiss counterplaintiffs' third amended counterclaim and affirmative defenses is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
(a) On the court's own motion, counterdefendants Ted Isaacson and Richard Isaacson are dismissed as party counterdefendants.