Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 21st Judicial Circuit, Kankakee County, Illinois. No. 93-CF-176. Honorable John Michela Judge, Presiding.
Released for Publication November 1, 1995.
Present - Honorable Allan L. Stouder, Presiding Justice, Honorable Tom M. Lytton, Justice, Honorable Kent Slater, Justice. Justice Slater delivered the opinion of the court: Stouder, P.j. and Lytton, J., concur.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Slater
JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Gloria Marion, appeals from the revocation of her probation. On appeal, she argues that the revocation proceeding did not comport with the requirements of due process. We agree.
The record reveals that in June of 1993, the defendant pled guilty to forgery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 17-3(a)(1)) and theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(1)(A)). She was placed on 24 months' probation conditioned upon, among other things, the defendant complying with the Treatment Alternative to Street Crimes (TASC) program. On February 1, 1994, the State filed a petition to revoke probation which alleged that the defendant had been unsuccessfully discharged from TASC.
A proceeding was subsequently held at which a TASC representative noted that the defendant had been unsuccessfully discharged from the TASC program. The defendant and her attorney explained that the defendant was involved in a new program and requested a continuance. The court granted the continuance. The following exchange then took place:
"MR. DICKENSON [The Prosecutor]: Would that be setting or hearing?
THE COURT: Oh, I don't know. I don't think there's any doubt you violated it, is there -- there's no doubt you violated your TASC probation?
DEFENDANT GLORIA MARION: No, sir.
THE COURT: She admits the allegation, it's for sentencing and I'll set it into -- sometime in June."
At the sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Following the denial of her motion to reconsider, the defendant filed the instant appeal.
The defendant argues that the circuit court erred in accepting her admission to the allegations in the petition to revoke probation. The defendant contends that the cursory exchange at the revocation proceeding was insufficient to assure that she knowingly and voluntarily admitted the violation of probation.
We begin by noting that unlike a guilty plea, a probation revocation occurs only after there has already been a conviction. ( People v. Tufte (1995), 165 Ill. 2d 66, 649 N.E.2d 374, 208 Ill. Dec. 318.) Thus, probationers are entitled to fewer procedural safeguards than defendants who have not been convicted at all. ( People v. DeWitt (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 82, 397 N.E.2d 1385, 34 Ill. Dec. 319.) Therefore, at probation revocation proceedings, unlike at guilty plea hearings, the trial court need not comply with all the procedural safeguards of Supreme Court Rules : 401(a) ( People v. Barker (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 57, 338 N.E.2d 385); 402 ( People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, 319 N.E.2d 745); 411 ( People v. DeWitt (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 82, 397 N.E.2d 1385, 34 Ill. Dec. 319); and 605(b) ( People v. Tufte (1995), 165 Ill. 2d 66, 79, 649 N.E.2d 374, 380-381, 208 Ill. Dec. 318). Nevertheless, a probation revocation ...