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ANDERSON-EL v. O'KEEFE

August 22, 1995

MAURICE ANDERSON-EL, Plaintiff,
v.
PHILIP O'KEEFE, a Skokie Police Officer; BRENT FOWLER, a Skokie Police Officer; THOMAS DWORAK, a Wilmette Police Officer, Defendants.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: ELAINE E. BUCKLO

 Defendant Thomas Dworak's motion for summary judgment is before the Court. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is granted.

 Background

 Plaintiff has not filed a memorandum of law in response to the motion for summary judgment, nor has he filed a responsive statement to the defendant's statement of uncontested facts, as required by N.D. ILL. LOCAL RULE 12(N). Accordingly, the plaintiff is deemed to have admitted the following facts solely for purposes of this motion. See Flaherty v. Gas Research Institute, 31 F.3d 451, 453 (7th Cir. 1994); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1994); Schulz v. Serfilco, Ltd., 965 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1992).

 On the night of December 20, 1991, police officers arrested plaintiff, Maurice Anderson-EL ("Mr. Anderson-EL"), in Skokie, Illinois and transported him to the Skokie police station. At the station, Mr. Anderson-EL was escorted to the bathroom, where defendant police officer Philip O'Keefe ("Mr. O'Keefe") repeatedly slapped him, pushed him against a wall, and hit him in the groin. Mr. Anderson-EL was subsequently escorted to an interrogation room, where defendant police officer Brent Fowler ("Mr. Fowler") repeatedly hit and kicked him in the face, chest, and groin. As a result of these beatings, Mr. Anderson-EL claims that he suffered from a bruise on the left side of his head, a scratch on his chest, and soreness of his eye, throat, and testicles. Mr. Anderson-EL remained at the Skokie police station for approximately two hours. *fn1"

 At approximately 3:00 p.m. that afternoon, Wilmette firefighter paramedics James Winter ("Mr. Winter") and Michael McGreal ("Mr. McGreal") arrived at the Wilmette police station to transport Mr. Anderson-EL to Evanston Hospital. Mr. Anderson-EL informed Messrs. Winter and McGreal that he had been beaten by Skokie police officers and complained of a tender scrotum, neck, and head, as well as symptoms of heroin withdrawal. According to the paramedics, Mr. Anderson-EL had normal vital signs and no visible injuries. *fn2" They gave him the highest possible "trauma score," indicating that he had good mobility, that he exhibited no life-threatening conditions, and that he did not require immediate medical attention. The paramedics did not treat Mr. Anderson-EL during the transport, nor did they transport him to the hospital on an accelerated basis.

 At approximately 3:30 p.m., Mr. Anderson-EL arrived at Evanston Hospital, where he was examined by a nurse, a resident, and a physician, Dr. Leonara Gatewood ("Dr. Gatewood"). Dr. Gatewood testified that Mr. Anderson-EL had normal vital signs, that he had no acute distress, and that none of his organs were swollen or otherwise injured. X-rays of his chest indicated that he had no fractures. A range of motion exercise revealed that he had full range of motion in his left shoulder. The nurse observed a small abrasion on Mr. Anderson-EL's chest. The final diagnosis was "musculoskeletal chest pain - abrasion." Mr. Anderson-EL was advised to take Advil or Tylenol every four hours as needed for pain. Dr. Gatewood testified that, in her opinion, Mr. Anderson-EL did not have a serious medical condition and that any delay in his transport to the hospital did not exacerbate his injuries. Mr. Anderson-EL testified that he has never been advised by any other medical professional that the delay exacerbated his injuries. On December 23, 1991, Mr. Anderson-EL was transported to Cook County Jail. He is currently incarcerated at Danville Correctional Center.

 On April 30, 1993, Mr. Anderson-EL brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983 against Messrs. O'Keefe, Fowler, and Dworak; William Miller ("Mr. Miller"), Chief of Police for the City of Skokie; and George Carpenter ("Mr. Carpenter"), Chief of Police for the City of Wilmette. On February 8, 1994, Judge Andersen, to whom this case was then assigned, dismissed the official and individual capacity claims against Mr. Miller and the official capacity claims against Mr. Dworak. On May 4, 1994, Judge Andersen granted plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss Mr. Carpenter from the case. Mr. Dworak now moves for summary judgment on the remaining claims against him.

 Discussion

 Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of submitting affidavits and other evidentiary materials to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). If the movant sustains this burden, the opposing party may not avoid judgment by resting upon the allegations or denials of the pleadings. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., supra, 24 F.3d at 920. Rather, the non-movant must come forward with specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). If the non-movant fails to do so, "then the court must enter summary judgment against [him]." Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., supra, 24 F.3d at 920 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

 Mr. Anderson-EL alleges that Mr. Dworak failed to provide him with timely medical treatment despite his repeated requests for immediate care. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits officials from punishing pretrial detainees prior to a formal adjudication of guilt. Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979)). It is well settled that prohibited punishment includes "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainees." 950 F.2d at 1289-90 (citations omitted). See also Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1991).

 Accordingly, Mr. Anderson-EL must demonstrate that Mr. Dworak acted "deliberately indifferent" to his "serious medical needs" in order to prevail on his Section 1983 claim. Id. He must also demonstrate that the delay in receiving medical care caused him to suffer "substantial harm." See Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Cannon v. Thomas, 419 U.S. 813, 42 L. Ed. 2d 39, 95 S. Ct. 288 (1974); De La Paz v. Danzl, 646 F. Supp. 914, 922-23 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Mr. Dworak argues that summary judgment is appropriate because (1) the alleged injuries did not amount to a "serious medical need" requiring immediate medical care, (2) he did not act with "deliberate indifference" to Mr. ...


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