person in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that they deprived him of his liberty and substantive due process rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Count II, plaintiff alleged that defendants compelled him to be a witness against himself, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, in Count III, plaintiff alleged a state law false imprisonment claim.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted only where it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff is unable to prove any of the facts that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). The court must take all well-pleaded facts and allegations as true, and must view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047, 106 S. Ct. 1265, 89 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1986). Furthermore, plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the complaint. Id.
A. Section 1983 Claims
1. Fourth Amendment
In Count I, plaintiff alleged that there was an unlawful seizure of his person when he was seized and restrained for purposes of interrogation on August 15, 1993. Defendants argue that the seizure was not unreasonable and that it was done with probable cause. Based on the allegations stated on the face of the complaint, this court disagrees.
To state a claim under the Fourth Amendment, plaintiff must show that there was a seizure and that the seizure was unreasonable. Kernats v. O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 1994). The proper standard to determine if the defendants' actions constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is whether "in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). In Count I, plaintiff alleged that when he arrived at work on the day in question, he was ordered, against his will, to get into a car and was taken to a building west of the Loop. Once there, he was placed in a windowless room and instructed to wait. At least one person was stationed outside of the room to ensure that the plaintiff did not attempt to leave and when plaintiff made use of the restroom, he was escorted by one of the defendants. Based on these facts and a standard of reasonableness, the court finds that this does constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Next, the court addresses whether the seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1502, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1987), held that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for investigations of work-related misconduct should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under that standard, "both the inception and the scope of the instruction must be reasonable." Id. First, given the allegations in the complaint, the seizure of the plaintiff was not justified at its inception. Plaintiff made clear in the complaint that the allegations of misconduct were false and that the defendants knew it well before the date of the seizure. Second, the scope of the intrusion was not reasonably related to the seizure that did take place. The detention of the plaintiff in order to coerce a confession out of the plaintiff was unreasonable given the defendants' knowledge on the day of the seizure. Accordingly, the court holds that plaintiff's allegations in Count I state a claim under the Fourth Amendment.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
In Count I, the plaintiff also raised the claim that he was deprived of his liberty and substantive due process rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the plaintiff has a valid claim under the Fourth Amendment, his Fourteenth Amendment claim is superfluous and should be dismissed. Albright v. Oliver, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994); Kernats, 35 F.3d at 1182. In Albright, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant deprived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment -- his "liberty interest" -- to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. The court dismissed the claim after holding that the claim should be more appropriately analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 813. "Where a particular amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'" Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)). The allegations in this case clearly fall under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim should be dismissed.
3. Fifth Amendment
In Count II, plaintiff alleged that while in custody and without Miranda warnings, he was interrogated and compelled to be a witness against himself, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This, however, is not relevant to the plaintiff's case. Plaintiff never received an opportunity to testify against himself; he was never prosecuted criminally. Furthermore, the plaintiff can get no relief under § 1983 because the defendants failed to give him Miranda warnings. A Miranda violation cannot form the basis for an independent civil action because there is no constitutional right to Miranda warnings. Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir. 1968); Johnson v. Carroll, 694 F. Supp. 500, 504 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The remedy under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), is nothing more than the suppression of evidence at a criminal trial. Therefore, given that no criminal trial ever took place in this case, Count II is dismissed.
B. Municipal Liability
Under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), municipalities may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 regardless of fault merely because they employed a tortfeasor. Rather, liability attaches only "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Id. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38. While easier said than done, a plaintiff can establish the existence of such a municipal policy in one of four ways: (1) an official pronouncement of a municipal or legislative body, e.g., a municipal ordinance or official policy; (2) an action by an agent in accordance with delegated authority; (3) an action by an individual with final decision-making authority; or (4) custom or action. Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff in his response, contends that the municipality should be liable because one of the defendants, Inspector General Vroustouris, has final decision-making authority on investigations of employee misconduct.
Under appropriate circumstances, a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for a single decision by a municipal policymaker. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986). However, as the court made clear in Pembaur, not every action by an employee with decision-making authority subjects a municipality to liability:
Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The fact that a particular official-- even a policymaking official-- has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. ... The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable.