The following background facts have been drawn from the parties' Local Rule 12(M) and (N) Statements of Material Facts as to which there is no genuine issue and the accompanying exhibits, see UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS LOCAL RULES Rule 12, as well as the various other pleadings and exhibits submitted to the Court in connection with the pending motions. The Funds are "employee benefit plans" and "plans" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. ("ERISA"). (Plaintiff's Rule 12(M) Statement of Uncontested Facts PP 1, 4). Such Funds have been established pursuant to Collective Bargaining Agreements between Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Union 130, U.A. ("Union"), and employer associations. (Rule 12(M) P 5). Plaintiff is a trustee of the Funds, and is authorized to bring this action on their behalf. (Rule 12(M) P 3).
On or about August 5, 1992, Cox executed both a Contractor's Registration Statement ("Registration"), and an Interim Agreement binding Cox to the June 1, 1992, Collective Bargaining Agreement ("Agreement") with the Union.
(Group Exhibit B, Interim Agreement P 2, Contractor's Registration Statement). In the Registration, Cox ratified the Agreement and agreed to make contributions as provided for in the Agreement. (Contractor's Registration Statement P 4). The Interim Agreement, as well as the Collective Bargaining Agreement, clearly requires that defendant make contributions to the Funds based on the number of hours worked by employees covered by the Agreement, and that defendant submit monthly itemized reports of such contributions. (Interim Agreement PP 3, 4, 7, Agreement, Article 6, §§ 6.7c - 6.7d). The Agreement further requires that Cox allow the Funds to audit his records to ensure Cox's compliance with the Agreement. (Agreement, Article 3).
On June 10, 1994, this Court entered an Agreed Order in favor of Plaintiff and against Cox, requiring that Cox produce all of his books and records to Plaintiff for audit in accordance with Article 3 of the Agreement. (Court Order entered June 10, 1994). Subsequently, the certified public accounting firm of Kaplan & Company conducted an audit of Cox's records on behalf of the Funds. (Exhibit C, Affidavit of Howard J. Kaplan). On October 14, 1994, Kaplan & Company issued its Report of Audit Changes dated August 9, 1994, which revealed that Cox owed to the Funds the amount of $ 137,933.56 in unpaid contributions, and that interest accrued on such amount at the rate of $ 1,601.20 per month after November 15, 1994. (Exhibit C(1), Report of Audit Changes).
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). The opposing party "must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment and may not rest upon allegations or denials of the pleadings." Valentine v. Joliet Township High School Dist., 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1986). The court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Valley Liquors, inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977, 98 L. Ed. 2d 486, 108 S. Ct. 488 (1987), and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 221 (7th Cir. 1990). However, if the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Flip-Side Productions, Inc. v. Jam Productions, Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909, 102 L. Ed. 2d 249, 109 S. Ct. 261 (1988).
II. "Employer" Liability Under ERISA
Cox is an "employer" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. ERISA defines "employer" as "any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of the employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (1995). "Person" means "an individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, mutual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association, or employee organization." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (1995). Defendant entered into the Union Agreement as an employer in association with the Funds, which are employee benefit plans, for the Central Emerald employees.
Defendant asserts that he emphasized his status as president of Central Emerald Sewer Service, Inc. at the time he signed the agreement and, therefore, bound the corporation, rather than himself personally, to make Fund contributions. However, defendant's bald assertion is lacking support from the record. Cox signed his name and stated "President" as his title within the corporation, "Central Emerald," in the Interim Agreement. Two main problems exist with his authorization of this Interim Agreement. First, the Agreement specifically required defendant to print the "Correct Legal Name of Business," yet Cox failed to state the full corporate name as Central Emerald Sewer Service, Inc.. Second, the 1992 Annual Report for Central Emerald Sewer Service, Inc. indicates that Jane E. Cox holds all offices, including president, within the corporation. (Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B). If Cox is not a corporate officer for Central Emerald Sewer Service, Inc., then he had no authority to bind the corporation in the agreement. Therefore, he bound himself, personally, to uphold the Agreement.
In addition, defendant signed the Contractor's Registration Statement without any reference to the corporation. In fact, defendant wrote that the firm name was "Terry Cox" instead of Central Emerald Sewer Service, Inc. on the first line of the Registration. (Contractor's Registration Statement P 1). Defendant accordingly bound himself to contribute to the Funds under the Registration Statement.
Defendant has admitted that he executed both the Contractor's Registration Statement and the Interim Agreement which binds him to the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("Agreement") with the Union. He is thereby obligated to file reports with the Union, make contributions to the Funds, and allow audits of his records to ensure compliance with his obligations. (Agreement, Articles 3 & 6).
Because defendant failed to file required reports and refused to allow the Funds to audit his records, plaintiff was forced to file this suit to obtain such audit and a judgment for any delinquency revealed by the audit. (Rule 12(M) P 15). The Court Order entered on June 10, 1994, required defendant to submit his records to plaintiff for audit in accordance with the Agreement and ERISA. (Court Order entered June 10, 1994).
In accordance with the Court's Order, the certified public accounting firm of Kaplan & Company conducted an audit of defendant's records. (Affidavit of Howard J. Kaplan). On October 14, 1994, Kaplan & Company issued its Report of Audit Changes dated August 9, 1994. The Report revealed that defendant owed to the Funds the amount of $ 137,933.56 in unpaid contributions, plus interest at the rate of $ 1,601.20 per month after November 15, 1994. (Exhibit C(1), Report of Audit Changes).
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145, states the following concerning delinquent contributions:
Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.