The opinion of the court was delivered by: CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR.
CHARLES R. NORGLE, SR., District Judge:
Before the court is the motion for summary judgment of Defendant Indopco Incorporated, doing business as Unichema North American ("Unichema"). For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
Plaintiff Iona E. Johnson ("Johnson") is a former employee of Unichema, where she held the position of Executive Secretary for the Sales Department. Johnson claims that she was denied a promotion because she is black and that she was paid less than non-black secretaries in similar positions in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Unichema hired Johnson as a Grade 04 secretary on November 14, 1988. Her starting salary was $ 19,053 per year. She was promoted to Grade 05 Executive Secretary within ten months and received a 13.67% salary increase. In September 1990, she received a 5.21% salary increase. In April 1991, she received a 4.76% salary increase, and in March 1992, she received a salary increase of 4.6%. In March 1993, she received a 5.2% salary increase.
Johnson had not worked outside of her home for more than ten years prior to her start at Unichema in 1988. In her last paid position, Johnson was earning $ 10,000 per year. As stated above, she was hired as a Grade 04 secretary at an annual salary of $ 19,053. Ms. Sharon Bitterlin, a white woman, was hired as a Grade 04 secretary on April 9, 1990, a year and one-half after Johnson, and received a salary of $ 19,523 per year. She, as compared to Johnson, had been earning $ 17,000 in her last permanent position. Ms. Debra Garrett-Curry, a black woman, was hired on July 6, 1992, as a Grade 05 Executive Secretary at an annual salary of $ 27,144. In the position she held immediately prior to her employment by Unichema, Garrett-Curry was earning $ 24,000 per year. Ms. Debra Chaney, a white woman, was transferred to Unichema from Lever Brothers Company in New York, an affiliate of Unichema, in October 1991 as a Grade 05 Executive Secretary. She received the same salary at Unichema that she received at Lever Brothers, $ 28,971 per year.
Johnson does not know how any of her peers' compensation was established or the quality of their performance on the job. Johnson denies that she does not know how her peers' compensation was established. She also denies that she does not know the quality of their performance on the job; however, she does not cite to any specific evidence in the record to support her denial. In an attempt to get around the requirements of Local Rule 12(N), she cites generally to her entire thirty-seven paragraph affidavit as support for her denial. Local Rule 12(N) of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois states that a party opposing summary judgment must file:
A concise response to the movant's [12(M)] statement that shall contain . . . a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon . . . .
Local Rule 12(N)(3)(a). All material facts properly set forth in the movant's 12(M) Statement will be deemed admitted if not properly controverted by the non-movant's 12(N) statement. Local Rule 12(N)(3)(b). The Seventh Circuit has consistently upheld strict application of Local Rule 12(N). Rosemary B. v. Board of Educ., 52 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 1994); Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 453, 455 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994). "District courts are not obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes . . . ." Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1994).
Johnson's citation to her entire affidavit to support her denial of the fact that she does not know how any of her peers' salary were established or the quality of their performance falls short of the requirements of the Local Rule. It is clear that Johnson understands how to properly satisfy Rule 12(N) because in most of her 12(N) Statement, she cites to specific paragraphs of her affidavit to support her factual assertions. The court should not have to read an entire affidavit or deposition to glean which facts asserted in it contradict the movant's assertions. Thus, the court deems Unichema's assertions regarding Johnson's peers' compensation and performance as admitted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Salima v. Scherwood South, Inc., 38 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 1994); Transportation Communications Int'l Union v. CSX Transp., Inc., 30 F.3d 903, 904 (7th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is not a discretionary remedy and must be granted when the movant is entitled to it as a matter of law. Jones v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 1994). Even though all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion, Associated Milk Producers, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, 27 F.3d 268, 270 (7th Cir. 1994), presenting only a scintilla of evidence will not suffice to oppose a motion for ...