for security services. Additionally, the CHA does have its own police force established pursuant to 310 ILCS 10/8.1(a), Pratt v. Chicago Housing Authority, 848 F. Supp. 792, 793 (N.D. Ill. 1994). That police force is a distinct entity, and the contract security guards provided by companies such as T-Force are separate from it. (See Rogers Dep. at 23, 32.)
Moreover, all of the evidence presented indicates that the authority granted to the contract security guards was very limited. Thus, indicating that T-Force security guards, Byles included, were not authorized to exercise police power. The contract itself has no language which could give rise to the inference that the CHA intended to delegate its police powers to T-Force.
In addition, William T. Rogers ("Rogers"), the Deputy Director of the CHA security force testified that the primary duty of a contract security guard in the lobbies is to control access in and out of the building and to give people information and assistance. The contract security guards, as contrasted with the CHA police, are not involved in protective sweeps of the buildings. (Rogers Dep. at 23).
Wade cites to two memoranda from the CHA to all contract security guard companies providing guards to the CHA as support for the proposition that Byles was imbued with general police powers. In those memoranda, the CHA insists that training be given to all guards regarding the use of deadly force. (Pl.'s Ex. H.) Wade argues that these memoranda establish that Byles was empowered to use deadly force in the same fashion as any peace officer would be. However, there is nothing in either memorandum to support such an interpretation. Both merely indicate that the guards are to be given training on the use of deadly force. This is consistent with Byles's deposition testimony which demonstrates that he was not empowered to use deadly force in any way beyond that of any private citizen. Byles testified that he was instructed by his superior that he could only use deadly force in self-defense or in the defense of his coworker. (Byles Dep. at 70, 74.) In addition, he testified that he was only authorized to detain people for criminal trespass until the police came.
(Byles Dep. at 86.) This limitation clearly contrasts with the police power granted through 310 ILCS 10/8.1(a) which gives Housing Authority police forces the power to arrest persons for violations of federal and state statutes, county and city ordinances, and housing authority rules. 310 ILCS 10/8/1(a).
Additionally, the CHA memorandum listing the lobby security guards' duties makes clear that those duties are extremely limited. That memorandum, in summary, described the guards' duties as enforcing the visitation policy, reporting emergencies, and aiding residents in the immediate vicinity of the lobby. (Pl.'s Ex. C.) The memorandum sent from the Director of Contract Security to the Chief Administrator of Development Operations clearly indicates that, in contrast to the CHA Police Department, the contract security guards do not perform vertical patrols within the buildings. (Pl.'s Ex. B.) The facts presented show the contract security guard employed at the lobby of the CHA building had no more authority to use police power than would doormen employed in any number of residential buildings in the City of Chicago. The only fact that remotely justifies the inquiry on this issue in this case is that the landlord in this instance is the CHA instead of a private real estate developer or condominium association.
Wade's argument based on West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988) is not well-founded. In West, the Supreme Court held that a doctor providing medical care to an inmate was a state actor. The Court reasoned that because the state had a Constitutional obligation to provide inmates with medical care, those employed to provide that care were state actors, id. at 55, and the fact that the Respondent was a employed pursuant to contract as opposed to being a state employee did not change that conclusion. Id.
Wade argues that like the defendant in West, the CHA had an affirmative obligation to insure that its residents were not subject to illegal searches and seizures. Thus, police acting on the behalf of the CHA were charged with the responsibility of adhering to Fourth Amendment standards. However, his contention that he was subject to such seizure is based upon the presumption that the CHA had delegated general police powers to T-Force, and that, therefore, at the time of the shooting, Byles was a state actor. As discussed above, this was not the case. Therefore, his argument fails.
Without argument developing the point, Wade also asserts that the CHA affirmatively assisted, encouraged, and directed Byles and T-Force to engage in the challenged activity qualifying Byles as a state actor under the exception outlined in Flagg Bros. Inc. v Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978). However, to come within this exception, the plaintiff must "adduce sufficient facts to show that the State affirmatively assisted, encouraged, or directed the private party to engage in the challenged activity . . . ." Letisha, 855 F. Supp. at 948. Mere acquiescence is not enough. Id.
Wade has not adduced any facts which lend themselves to the inference that the CHA affirmatively encouraged or directed Byles to engage in the challenged activity of allegedly shooting Wade without justification. The mere fact that Byles was employed as a guard to implement the CHA visitation policy does not give rise to the inference that it encouraged the allegedly unlawful actions.
Wade has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Byles was acting under color of state law when he shot Wade. Accordingly, the court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count I of the Complaint. Because the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Count I was the sole basis for federal jurisdiction in this case, the court dismisses the remaining claims brought under various state law theories. The court takes no position as to the potential merit of those claims, and Wade is free to pursue relief in the state court.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of Defendants Byles and T-Force for summary judgment is granted. All remaining claims, Counts II through IV, are dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR., Judge
United States District Court