and immediately after Yom Kippur, 1990, given that defendant admitted that its business varied by season.
75. Meyer demonstrated that, when looking at the revenues generated on Saturdays before and after September 29, 1990, the revenues generated by estheticians and manicurists did not increase as the number of estheticians and/or manicurists staffed on a particular Saturday increased.
76. For instance, defendant's esthetician revenues on Saturdays on which it staffed five estheticians (August 25, $ 3,061; September 1, $ 1,803; September 8 $ 1,848; and October 6, 1990, $ 1,525), did not vary significantly from Saturdays on which defendant staffed four estheticians (August 11, $ 1,658; August 18, $ 2,422; September 15, $ 1,778; September 22, $ 1,640; September 29, $ 1.742, and each Saturday from October 13 through November 24, ranging from a low of $ 1,172 on November 3 to a high of $ 2,025 on November 17), except for August 25. Professor Meyer believed the large increase in revenue on August 25 was attributable to the price discount defendant had offered.
77. In fact, defendant at times generated more revenue on Saturdays when it staffed its facility with four estheticians than when five estheticians were on duty. For example, the esthetician revenue in Chicago on Yom Kippur 1990, September 29, when four estheticians were on duty, $ 1,742, was greater than that of Saturday, October 6, $ 1,525, when five estheticians were on duty.
78. Defendant's records further reflect that of the seven Saturdays preceding September 29, 1990, during which time defendant employed five estheticians only four of the five estheticians worked on four of those Saturdays (August 11, August 18, September 15 and September 22); defendant staffed its facility with all five of its estheticians on only three of those Saturdays (August 25 September 1 and September 8).
79. It was Meyer's opinion that the fact that defendant required all five of its estheticians to work on only three of the seven Saturdays preceding Yom Kippur 1990 undercut any claim by defendant that it would have incurred a financial loss by accommodating Tomilina's and Glukhovksy's request or that defendant in fact incurred a financial loss by Tomilina's and Glukhovsky's absence on September 29 after failing to accommodate their requests.
80. Similarly, Meyer testified that defendant's manicurist revenues on Saturdays on which it staffed three manicurists (each Saturday from August 11 through September 22 and October 6) did not vary significantly from Saturdays on which defendant staffed two manicurists (September 29 and October 13).
81. In fact, defendant at times generated more revenue on Saturdays when it staffed its facility with two manicurists than when three manicurists were on duty. For instance, defendant's manicurist revenue in Chicago on September 29, when two manicurists were on duty, was $ 512; the previous Saturday, September 22, three manicurists were on duty and defendant received $ 371 in revenue from services performed by manicurists, and on October 6, defendant received $ 490 in manicurist revenue.
82. Meyer also testified that, while there is no evidence that defendant incurred any financial loss as the result of Tomilina's and Glukhovsky's absence on Yom Kippur 1990, defendant could have ensured that any loss that defendant might have expected to incur from their absence on Yom Kippur would have been eliminated or minimized by accommodating in advance their requests for Yom Kippur off from work.
83. Meyer testified that defendant could have easily accommodated the religious practices of Tomilina and Glukhovsky by reassigning or rescheduling in advance any customers then booked to be serviced by them, without incurring any financial loss, and such accommodations are regularly offered by firms similar to defendant for religious and non-religious reasons alike.
84. In his opinion, by refusing to accommodate Tomilina's and Glukhovsky's request to take Yom Kippur off from work, defendant actually increased the possibility that defendant would encounter a loss of revenue.
85. Defendant offered evidence of the financial loss it suffered because of Tomilina's and Glukhovsky's absence on September 29, 1990. Defendant's business accountant, Mel Cantor, relied on (1) testimony of Ilona of Hungary employees who recalled that September 29 was an exceptionally busy day; (2) he then assumed that because it was an exceptionally busy day, every manicurist and every esthetician was fully booked that day (or at least as busy as on Ilona of Hungary's busiest recent Saturdays); (3) he then calculated the revenue that would have been generated by three fully-booked manicurists and five fully-booked estheticians (or at least the revenue generated on the busiest Saturdays); and (4) he subtracted the actual revenues on September 29 from the maximum possible revenue. In addition, he considered that the product sales that normally accompany service revenue were lost. Cantor believed that total lost revenue due to Tomilina's absence was approximately $ 320 and to Glukhovsky, approximately $ 616. Deducting Tomilina's $ 60 salary and Glukhovsky's $ 107 salary and commissions, the net loss to the company, Cantor testified, was $ 769.
86. The total income of the Chicago salon for the 1990-91 fiscal year was $ 623,068.20 (Pl. Exhibit 78).
87. Cantor believed that certain inefficiency results from any employee absence which could result in a complete loss of revenue. For example, a client unable to be serviced on the day requested might choose another salon (although Ilona of Hungary considers itself unique); or, while one customer might reschedule or transfer to another person in the salon, another might simply skip that appointment.
88. Three other Ilona of Hungary employees in Chicago were of the Jewish religion. Only one had asked for the day off, but the Meszaroses believed that if they had granted the day to Tomilina or Gluklovsky, fairness would have required them to grant it to others who might have asked. Cantor testified that this would have caused even greater harm to Ilona of Hungary than the absence of only two employees.
89. Cantor's testimony regarding the financial loss incurred by defendant pertained only to the loss incurred by defendant as the result of its failure to accommodate Tomilina's and Glukhovsky's religious practices. Cantor did not explain whether or to what extent defendant would have incurred a financial loss or other hardship if it had accommodated Tomilina's and Glukhovsky's religious practices by allowing them the day off when they requested it.
90. Defendant put forth no evidence that it would have incurred any hardship, financial or otherwise, had it accommodated Tomilina's and Glukhovsky's requests for time off from work to observe Yom Kippur 1990 in advance.
91. The Meszaroses did not consider any alternatives which would have reasonably accommodated either Tomilina's or Glukhovsky's religious practices.
92. Defendant treated Tomilina's and Glukhovsky's request for a Saturday off for religious reasons differently from the way it treated numerous requests made by other employees for Saturday's off for non-religious reasons. Apart from sickness leave, employees who did not work for personal reasons other than their religious beliefs were not fired and suffered no adverse employment consequences as the result of their absences. For example:
(a) On Saturday, December 16, 1989, defendant allowed Constance Russell, an esthetician at its Costa Mesa facility to take time off from work for non-religious reasons. Defendant did not terminate Constance Russell for her absence on December 16, 1989.