Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Honorable Fred G. Suria, Jr., Judge Presiding.
Presiding Justice Greiman delivered the opinion of the court: Rizzi, J., and Cerda, J., concur.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Greiman
PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial, defendant Ezell Lesure (a/k/a Lezure) was convicted of unlawful use of a firearm by a felon and sentenced to five years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree and thus reverse his conviction.
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to quash defendant's arrest and suppress evidence. The hearing on the motion was held simultaneously with the bench trial. When defense counsel objected to portions of testimony as hearsay, the trial judge indicated that any hearsay evidence would be admitted solely for consideration of the motion to suppress and not for the purposes of the trial.
Officer Richard Coughlan testified that about 12:20 p.m. on August 18, 1991, he responded to a report of a man with a gun at 5417 South Carpenter. Coughlan, who was patrolling near 5300 South Carpenter, arrived at the location a short time later where he was met by Mr. Matthews. Matthews told Coughlan that a man named Ezell, who was driving a yellow Cadillac, had just pointed a rifle at him and threatened to kill him. Matthews then accompanied Coughlan and his partner to 5244 South Morgan where, in an alley behind that address, Coughlan observed a yellow Cadillac. When Matthews identified the car as the one driven by Ezell, Coughlan and his partner proceeded up the back stairs of the building and onto a second-floor rear porch. Coughlan, who then observed defendant and a young woman sitting at a table inside the building, asked the defendant his name. When defendant responded by identifying himself as Ezell Lesure, Coughlan entered the building and arrested defendant for aggravated assault.
Coughlan testified that after arresting defendant, he asked Diane Copeland, who had identified herself as the lessee of the premises, for her consent to search the apartment. According to Coughlan, Copeland granted the officers consent to search the apartment and read and signed the consent-to-search form presented to her. Coughlan then recovered a rifle found between two mattresses located in a bedroom of the apartment.
Defendant was then taken to the police station, read his Miranda rights and asked if he wanted to make a statement. According to Coughlan, defendant then stated that because Matthews had failed to pay defendant money he owed him, defendant went to Matthews' house with a gun.
Diane Copeland testified that on August 18, 1991, at approximately 12:20 p.m. four men entered her apartment and began to search the premises. Copeland stated that the men did not identify themselves or request permission to search the apartment. One officer retrieved a rifle which Copeland said belonged to her brother. Copeland testified that after defendant was arrested and removed from the apartment, one of the officers returned to the apartment and threatened to take her children if she did not sign a consent-to-search form.
The parties stipulated that defendant had been convicted of armed robbery on November 27, 1984, and sentenced to six years in prison.
After hearing the testimony, the trial court noted the existence of exigent circumstances and denied defendant's motion to quash his arrest. The court then granted defendant's motion to suppress the gun finding that the consent-to-search form had been signed after the search. The court further found that the State had proved defendant guilty of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon beyond a reasonable doubt based upon defendant's admission to the police of his possession of the gun.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti aliunde defendant's statements.
It is well established that a confession alone is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. (E.g., People v. Willingham (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 352, 358, 432 N.E.2d 861, 59 Ill. Dec. 917.) To sustain a conviction the State must prove: first, that a crime occurred, i.e., the corpus delicti, and second, that the crime was committed by the person charged. ( People v. Cloutier (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 483, 503, 622 N.E.2d 774, 190 Ill. Dec. 744.) Where the defendant's confession is part of the proof of the corpus delicti, the State must also adduce corroborating evidence independent of the defendant's own admission. ( Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d at 503.) The independent, corroborating evidence need not rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt but must tend to confirm the defendant's own statement. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d at 503.
Section 24-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 makes it a felony for a person to knowingly possess any firearm if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state or any other jurisdiction. (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1992).) To convict under this section, the State must prove that the defendant possessed a prohibited firearm and that the defendant had received a prior ...