that the employer's proffered reasons are "phony."
16. Since Williams did not convince the trier of fact that it is more likely than not that the employer did not act for its proffered reasons, the employer's decision remains unresolved and the inferences from the prima facie case are successfully dissolved. Oxman v. WLS-TV, 12 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 1993).
17. Therefore, since Williams produced no evidence to support his claim that Defendant Postal Service terminated him due to his age, the court finds for Defendant Postal Service with regard to Count IV.
18. With regard to Count II, Williams also failed to satisfy the elements of a prima facie case of termination based on sex as required by McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 492.
19. For the same reasons as above, Williams failed to show both that his performance met the employer's legitimate expectations, the second element, and that someone of another sex filled his position, the fourth element of the prima facie case.
20. Moreover, even if Williams did meet the prima facie case, which he did not, he failed to show that the employer's reasons for terminating him were pretextual. As previously discussed, the only evidence in the record shows that Williams was fired due to the events on August 23, 1986, as well as a history of insubordination.
21. Williams simply produced no evidence to support his claim that Defendant Postal Service terminated him due to his sex. As a result, the court finds for Defendant Postal Service with regard to Count II.
22. With regard to Counts III and V, in which Williams alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for the filing of EEOC complaints, the record is devoid of evidence of retaliation.
23. Specifically, Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation in either count.
24. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action subsequent to the protected activity; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. Koelsch v. Beltone Elec. Corp., 1995 WL 42862, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 6, 1995); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989).
25. Although the first two elements are satisfied, Williams failed to establish a causal relationship between the filing of the EEOC complaint and the termination. The adverse action, the termination of Williams, was not related to the alleged protected expression, the filing of the EEOC complaints. Rather, the termination was solely due to Williams' prior history of insubordination as well as the events of August 23, 1986.
26. Thus, the court finds for Defendant Postal Service with regard to Count III and V.
27. With regard to Count I, the court finds that the actions of Grant, although improper, did not rise to a level of sexual harassment.
28. To prevail under a hostile environment theory, the evidence must show that the employer "permitted unwanted sexual advances that create an offensive [and] hostile working environment." Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994).
29. "Concrete psychological harm is not a necessary predicate to maintain a cause of action [for sexual harassment]." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993).
30. The alleged harassing conduct is to be judged by both an objective and subjective standard. R.R. Donnelley, 42 F.3d at 444. In other words, for conduct to rise to the level of unlawful sexual harassment, a reasonable person, as well as Williams himself, must perceive the alleged harassing conduct as an alteration of the conditions of the employment so as to create a hostile work environment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB V. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
31. "Title VII is not directed against unpleasantness per se, but only against discrimination in the conditions of employment." Koelsch v. Beltone Elec. Corp., No. 94-2506, 1995 WL 42862, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 6, 1995) (citing Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994)).
32. The court finds that a reasonable person may find the actions of Grant unpleasant, but such a reasonable person would not perceive the actions as "sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
33. The court further finds that although Williams "may have found [his] employment environment unpleasant," Williams' demeanor at trial demonstrates that he did not find it offensive and he certainly did not find it was hostile as defined by the statute.
34. Grant's conduct was simply not so severe or pervasive as to render Williams's work environment "hostile."
35. The Seventh Circuit has previously found similar acts as not rising to the level of a hostile environment. See, e.g., Koelsch, 1995 WL 42862 (finding that a male co-workers' conduct consisting of rubbing his foot against a plaintiff's leg, grabbing plaintiff's buttocks, asking plaintiff to accompany him for drinks or dinner on several occasions, and telling sexually suggestive and derogatory jokes in the presence of the plaintiff was not tantamount to sexual harassment under the hostile work environment theory); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that incidents of non-consensual touching, attempts to kiss the plaintiff, distributing "I love you" signs around the plaintiff's work area, and asking the female co-worker out on dates was not so severe and pervasive as to create liability for sexual harassment).
36. Thus, the court finds for the Williams with regard to Count I.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Marvin T. Runyon, Postmaster General of the United States, and against plaintiff Richard Williams as to all counts.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR., Judge
United States District Court
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Decision by Court. This action came to trial before the Court. The issues have been tried and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is entered in favor of defendant Marvin T. Runyon, Postmaster General of the United States, and against Plaintiff Richard Williams as to all counts.
April 4, 1995