officers and the officials at the CCDOC in order to further a conspiracy. Without a factual basis, plaintiff's conclusory allegation that he slept on the floor does not state a claim for a conspiracy between the CCDOC named defendants. Therefore, plaintiff's conspiracy theory must fail.
4. Official Capacity
Claims against government officers in their official capacity are actually claims against the government entity for which the officers work. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114, 105 S. Ct. 3099 (1985). Claims for money damages which are asserted against government officials in their official capacity are considered to be suits against the governmental entity that employs the officer. The State is not a "person" that can be sued under § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). Municipalities and other local subdivisions of the state, however, are considered persons for purposes of suit under § 1983. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). In cases involving state rather than municipal or local officials, a local policy or custom must be proven to establish liability. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878, 105 S. Ct. 873 (1985). In no case is respondeat superior a recognized theory under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to succeed on an official capacity claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the action alleged to be under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right and can be definitively linked to the governmental entity's policy or custom. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. See also Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991). Where there is no formal written policy, a showing of a pattern or custom of unconstitutional conduct will suffice. Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th Cir. 1981). To establish a government policy or custom, the plaintiff must allege a specific patter or series of incidents that support the general allegation of a custom or policy. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1986). One allegation of unconstitutional conduct does not show that a policy, practice or custom exists. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822, 823, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985). Thus, acts by individual supervisory employees are not automatically indicia of policy or established practice. Gray v. County of Dane, 854 F.2d 179, 184 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff fails to point to any conduct by the defendants approving or condoning any policy or regulation that promoted inmates sleeping on the floor during the winter months. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not allege that any of the defendants were personally involved in having him sleep on the floor. Nor does the plaintiff allege a pattern of conduct by the supervisors to allow inmates to sleep on the floor in the cold winter months. Plaintiff merely alleges that the supervisors' failure to deal with the overcrowding problem constitutes a decision or a custom.
These vague and conclusory allegations do not state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Weighing all of the facts in the pleadings together and not simply viewing each incident in isolation, plaintiff has not adequately stated a claim for a violation of his constitutional rights. Even under the liberal standards applicable to pro se claimants, plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Therefore, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to dismiss Mr. Askew's Complaint with prejudice. This case is terminated. Each party is to bear their own costs.
United States District Judge
March 22, 1995.