since he submitted grievance reports to them and they visited his wing periodically. Finally, Paramedic Flood and Officer Houser are alleged to have intentionally taken specific action against plaintiff.
B. Objective Component
While prisons are prohibited from denying inmates the minimal necessities of life, they need not provide a comfortable environment in which to live. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988) (prisoners "cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel"). Rather, extreme deprivations must be alleged in order to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and claims of inadequate medical care only arise where there has been deliberate indifference to "serious" medical needs. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992). We address Landfair's allegations in seriatim.
1. Sleeping Conditions
Reading Landfair's complaint generously, he contends that he was housed in cells with two other inmates and forced to sleep on a mattress on the floor. Generally, claims by inmates that they are forced to sleep on the floor are dismissed at this stage, since "'the Constitution is indifferent as to whether the mattress a detainee sleeps on is on the floor or in a bed.'" Chavis v. Fairman, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1850, No. 92 C 7490, 1994 WL 55719, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1994) (quoting Lynch v. Sheahan, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7749, 92 C 1087, 1992 WL 132525 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1992)); Hines v. Sheahan, 845 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (N.D. Ill. 1994). However, in his original complaint Landfair contends that the sanitary conditions at the CCJ coupled with the sleeping arrangements led him to contract meningitis. While we express serious doubts as to the veracity of Landfair's allegation, contracting such a serious disease would clearly satisfy the objective prong of Wilson v. Seiter. Accordingly, we cannot dismiss his claim at this stage.
2. Inadequate Supplies
Plaintiff bemoans "the lack of cleaning supplies, the lack of clean clothing changes. . ., the lack of clean linen . . . . [and the failure to provide] the minimum amount of medical care, towels, toilet paper, toothpaste, toothbrush or a means to even wash the soiled or smelly clothing that we are forced to wear." Amended Complaint, at 5(1). Although plaintiff's allegations are sparse and lack any factual detail, we cannot conclude that they are so insufficient as to fall below the liberal pleading requirements of pro se prisoners. To be sure, simply because plaintiff did not receive what he believes to be the "minimum" amount of supplies does not render his confinement unconstitutional. See Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1988) (failure to provide toilet paper for five days, and failure to provide soap, toothbrush and toothpaste for ten days not unconstitutional condition of confinement). However, because Landfair's complaint does not indicate how long he went without such supplies, it is possible that the deficiency continued for such an extended period of time as to warrant constitutional recognition. While Landfair eventually may be unable to prove that the conditions at the CCJ amounted to an "extreme deprivation," we cannot say at this point that he will be unable to present any set of facts entitling him to relief on this claim. See Watson v. Sheahan, No. 93 C 1871, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3249, at *14-16 (N.D. Ill. March 18, 1994). Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss these claims is denied.
3. Shower Conditions
Plaintiff next complains that deficiencies with the plumbing in the showers at the CCJ caused him to develop athlete's foot.
While no doubt uncomfortable, athlete's foot cannot be considered an injury serious enough to satisfy the objective component of Wilson v. Seiter. Cf. Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1988) (failure to provide toilet paper for five days, and failure to provide soap, toothbrush and toothpaste for ten days not unconstitutional condition of confinement). Indeed, we would be hard pressed to characterize plaintiff's condition as amounting to an "extreme deprivation." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992).
Landfair also contends that only three showers were available for the entire wing. While this circumstance is unfortunate, we cannot say that it crosses the line of unconstitutionality. Indeed, this Circuit has held that providing prisoners only one shower per week does not offend the Constitution. Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 102 L. Ed. 2d 248, 109 S. Ct. 260 (1988). Absent any indication that the CCJ fell below this standard, Landfair's claim must be dismissed.
4. Medical Treatment
Landfair claims that defendant Flood refused to provide him with his prescribed foot soak medicine, aspirin or cold tablets. Plaintiff also claims that on two occasions his prescription was incorrectly dated, and at one other time it did not contain a physician's signature. In order to raise a constitutional challenge to the medical treatment received at the CCJ, plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976); Salazar v. Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 237-38 (7th Cir. 1991). Although plaintiff has properly alleged deliberate indifference, his complained of injury--athlete's foot--did not present a risk of "serious injury or death." See Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1457-58 (7th Cir.) (delay in treating tooth ache and ear infection not sufficiently serious), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 102 L. Ed. 2d 133, 109 S. Ct. 162 (1988). Nor does he contend that Defendants' actions aggravated his condition to such a degree as to risk serious injury or death.
So too with his contention that he received misdated or unsigned prescriptions. Aside from the strong possibility that such conduct would only amount to negligence, see Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1988) (negligence alone insufficient to state a claim), there is no indication that these actions satisfied the objective component of Wilson v. Seiter. Because Landfair's allegations about his medical treatment do not indicate that he was at risk of incurring serious injuries or death, Defendants' motion to dismiss these claims is granted.
Plaintiff asserts that food delivery at the CCJ is unsanitary, since spillage remains on the food carts for several days and foreign objects are in the food. Prisons are required to "provide nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it." French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817, 93 L. Ed. 2d 32, 107 S. Ct. 77 (1986). However, plaintiff's complaint does not indicate that the conditions of the food service "present[ed] an immediate danger to [his] health and well being." Absent any indication that the CCJ food presented such a threat, Landfair cannot maintain his claim. See Chavis, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1850, 1994 WL 55719, at *3.
6. Exposed Electrical Wires
Plaintiff asserts that live electrical wires were exposed in the restroom and dayroom of his tier. However, he also admits that these wires were repaired in May 1994. Absent any indication that these wires caused plaintiff serious injury, or presented a imminent risk of such injury, the fact that wires were merely exposed does not raise a constitutional claim. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is granted.
7. Retaliation by Officer Houser
Landfair maintains that after he filed a grievance report against Officer Houser for not allowing a paramedic to visit his wing, she retaliated against him by revoking various privileges and shaking-down the residents of the wing, and informing them that Landfair was to blame. Defendants contend that even if such retaliation did occur, plaintiff has failed to allege the deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981). Such an interest may only arise out of the Due Process Clause itself or state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 74 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983). While it is true that pre-trial detainees may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt, Salazar v. Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 241-42 (7th Cir. 1991), not all acts taken against them violate the Constitution. Rather, pre-trial detainees must risk sufficiently serious injury in order to invoke the Constitution.
Landfair does not present us with the kind of allegations that implicate the Due Process Clause. His claim that defendant Houser restricted television and telephone privileges on the wing does not rise to the level of serious punishment, nor do his claims that he was prevented from receiving visitors or shopping before being transferred to Joliet. While his claim that his life was placed in danger by virtue of defendant Houser's statements to the other inmates might rise to the level of a violation, there is no allegation that he actually suffered an injury or that an attack was imminent. Without more, plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim based on these allegation, and therefore we grant Defendants' motion to dismiss.
C. Equitable Claims
Finally, we address plaintiff's request for equitable relief. Because his claims arise out of his pretrial detention at the CCJ, Landfair is bound by the consent decree entered in Duran v. Elrod, No. 74 C 2949 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 1982), despite the fact that he was not at the facility when the decree was entered. Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1208, 115 L. Ed. 2d 978, 111 S. Ct. 2805 (1991). Equitable claims arising out of violations of the consent decree must be presented through a contempt proceeding before the supervising court. Martin, 917 F.2d at 339. Accordingly, Landfair's claims for equitable relief must be dismissed.
For the reasons state above, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part. It is so ordered.
MARVIN E. ASPEN
United States District Judge