blanket argument that "the number of hours claimed by all of the
Plaintiff's counsel are duplicative and unreasonable." Defendants
cite no authority in support of their argument.
The total fees charged for the listed interoffice
communications total $1,613.50 (excluding the two entries we
discussed in part "C" and the August 15, 1994 entry, see
footnote 9). These communications include, among other things,
memoranda to the file and to other attorneys regarding pertinent
issues in the case and discussions regarding settlement offers,
various aspects of the case, various motions filed, trial
preparation, post verdict issues, and other pertinent issues.
Such communications are standard practice and are billed to a
client in the normal course of business. Surely, Defendants'
counsel is not suggesting that they do not engage in similar
communications and/or bill such costs to their respective
clients. The fees allocated to the interoffice communications are
not excessive, duplicative, or unreasonable, thus, they are
G. Post-Trial Fees
Defendants offer a blanket objection to all fees occurring
between August 29 and December 6, 1994. Defendants fail to cite
to a specific item and, as usual, they do not cite any authority
supporting their objection. The fees incurred between August 29
and December 6, 1994, total $1,753.50 and primarily concern the
preparation of the memorandum establishing Plaintiff's
entitlement to an award of attorneys' fees and related issues.
Apparently, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to
compensation for attorney fees occurring after judgment on the
underlying case. However, a prevailing plaintiff is indisputably
entitled to fee awards for time spent litigating and preparing
their claim for fees. Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th
Plaintiff is also requesting compensation for costs incurred in
the amount of $2,499.54. As noted above, the awarding of costs is
within the discretion of the district court. Estate of Borst,
979 F.2d at 517; SCA Services, Inc. v. Lucky Stores,
599 F.2d 178, 180 (7th Cir. 1979). The only costs Defendants dispute are
the transportation expenses of $730.00 for witness Tina
Brockhouse and Westlaw research charges of $430.68.
Regarding the transportation expenses of witness Brockhouse,
Plaintiff has not complied with the provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1). See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.,
482 U.S. 437, 445, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 2499, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987) ("We
hold that absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization
for the taxation of the expenses of a litigant's witnesses as
costs, federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in
28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920."); Knop v. Johnson, 712 F. Supp. 571,
589 (W.D.Mich. 1989); Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v.
Hollister, Inc., No. 84-C-6113, 1992 WL 199826, U.S.Dist. LEXIS
11882 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 6, 1992). In order to be compensated for
Brockhouse's transportation expenses, Plaintiff must submit a
"receipt or other evidence of actual cost" and must also provide
evidence that the rate charged for her airfare was "the most
economical rate reasonably available." 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1).
Since Plaintiff has not provided the Court with such evidence,
we must deny this portion
of his request.*fn13 The amount Plaintiff seeks for costs
incurred is reduced by $730.00.
Regarding the $430.68 charged for Westlaw research, we conclude
such costs were reasonably incurred and are indisputably
recoverable by a prevailing party. Indeed, computerized research
costs are the type of costs normally billed to a paying client.
Defendants' only argument to the contrary is that "Westlaw
research charges are not appropriate under the guidelines."
Defendants cite no authority supporting that argument. Their
argument is completely meritless and, since we conclude the costs
were reasonably incurred, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the
amount of $430.68 for such costs. In re Continental Illinois
Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d at 570 ("The judge refused to
allow the lawyers to bill any of their out-of-pocket expenses
of using a computerized legal research service (LEXIS). * * *
This was another clear error."); Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc.,
945 F.2d 969, 976 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Computer-assisted research
fees — in theory reduce the number of attorney hours otherwise
needed for (presumably) more time-consuming manual research and
are therefore compensable."); BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading
Co., 839 F. Supp. 528, 533-34 (N.D.Ill. 1993) ("The Court
concedes that legal research costs incurred using a computerized
research system such as LEXIS are recoverable.").
Thus, since Plaintiff failed to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1821,
his total costs incurred of $2,499.54 will be reduced by $730.00
(the cost of witness Brockhouse's travel). Plaintiff is entitled
to recover $1,769.54 for costs incurred.
Plaintiff also requests an evidentiary hearing on the issues
associated with this order. However, as evidenced by our
discussion above, we see no reason for an evidentiary hearing,
thus, Plaintiff's motion for an evidentiary hearing is denied.
Based on our discussion, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys'
fees in the amount of $42,319.50 and $1,769.54 for costs
Ergo, Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and cost
incurred is ALLOWED to the extent such motion is consistent with
Plaintiff's motion for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.