The Honorable Justice Freeman delivered the opinion of the court: Chief Justice Bilandic, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justices Miller and Heiple join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Freeman
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Aubrey McCauley, was indicted for first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1). Following a pretrial hearing, the trial court suppressed evidence of a lineup identification of defendant and any statements he had made after an attorney, retained by his family, was present at the police station, unsuccessfully requesting to consult with him. The State took an interlocutory appeal, and the appellate court affirmed (228 Ill. App. 3d 893). We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315). Several amici curiae, including the Chicago Council of Lawyers, the MacArthur Justice Center, the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, the Ad Hoc Committee to Support the Illinois Bill of Rights, Illinois Attorneys for Criminal Justice and various public defender agencies and associations have filed briefs in support of defendant. We now affirm in part and reverse in part for reasons which follow.
The following evidence was presented at the pretrial hearing. Detective Robert Kocan testified that on November 20, 1988, at about 5:30 p.m., Chicago policeofficers brought defendant to a third-floor interview room in the Area 3 Violent Crimes section of the Chicago police station located at 39th and California Streets. Defendant was brought to the station by police in connection with a shooting death which had occurred the previous day. At around 6 p.m., Detectives Kocan and Thomas Byron began interviewing defendant after first advising him of his Miranda rights. Defendant did not ask for a lawyer or say that his family was obtaining one for him. He responded to the detectives' questioning by giving an alibi statement. Kocan and Byron then notified Sergeant Fred Bonke, their supervisor, who was in his third-floor office, that they were leaving the station to interview witnesses in connection with defendant's statement. The detectives left defendant in custody in the interview room and left the station between 6 and 6:30 p.m.
Attorney William O. Walters testified that, shortly before 7 p.m. on that same evening, he received a telephone call from members of defendant's family. Walters immediately telephoned a police station located at 61st and Racine Streets as well as the Area 3 police station to learn where defendant was being held. Police officers, answering the telephone at each station, told Walters that defendant was not present there. At 7 p.m., Walters proceeded to the 61st Street station and was again told by an unidentified police officer that defendant was not present and that Walters should perhaps call the Area 3 station. At about 7:30 p.m., Walters telephoned Area 3 and was told by another unidentified officer that defendant was also not there. Walters, nonetheless, proceeded to the Area 3 station, spoke to the desk sergeant and asked to speak with defendant. The desk sergeant telephoned upstairs to the third floor and advised Walters that an officer would come downstairs to speak with him. According to Walters, the time was 7:40 p.m.
Sergeant Bonke came downstairs, shortly. Walters identified himself as defendant's attorney and asked to speak with defendant. According to Walters, Bonke told him that he could not speak with defendant and refused as well to tell defendant that Walters was present. Bonke told Walters that defendant had not asked to see a lawyer. Bonke and Walters then disagreed as to whether defendant's constitutional rights were being violated by the denial of access. Walters also asked Bonke whether defendant had been arrested. Bonke responded that defendant was voluntarily at the station and was not the target of the investigation. Bonke said that he would call Walters if defendant became the target. Walters testified that this conversation occurred at 7:50 p.m. He remained at the police station for about 10 more minutes, but left at 8 p.m. when it appeared that police would do nothing more.
Bonke testified that he was called downstairs from his third-floor office sometime after 7 p.m. According to Bonke, he conversed with Walters and advised him that defendant had not been charged and that, to Bonke's knowledge, defendant had left the station with the two detectives and that there probably would be a lineup. Bonke denied telling Walters that he could not speak with defendant and denied that Walters asked him to tell defendant that Walters was present. Bonke could not say that he actually knew the detectives were interviewing defendant before they left the station because he was not closely involved. Bonke, however, knew that defendant was a suspect. Bonke also claimed that he had not seen defendant, nor did he know in which interview room he was being held.
Sometime between 8 and 8:15 p.m., Detectives Kocan and Byron returned to the Area 3 station. No one told them that Walters had been at the station. After being unable to locate alibi witnesses, the detectivestold defendant that his alibi did not "check out." They prepared for defendant to participate in a lineup. At around 10 p.m., defendant was placed in a lineup and a witness identified him. At about 11 p.m., the detectives and an assistant State's Attorney interviewed defendant, and he responded by repeating his earlier alibi statement. At about 1 a.m., Kocan was successful in locating defendant's alibi witnesses, who did not support him. A short time later, an assistant State's Attorney approved charges against defendant.
The trial court found that Walters was credible and that Bonke was not. The trial court suppressed evidence of the lineup identification of defendant and any statements he made after Walters was prevented from conferring with him.
On review, the appellate court affirmed the suppression of defendant's statement and lineup identification on the basis that police violated defendant's right against self-incrimination under article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10).
The issues present in this appeal are whether the trial court properly suppressed defendant's (a) statement and (b) lineup identification as resulting from a violation of either Federal or State constitutional protections where police denied a retained attorney access to his defendant-client and failed to inform the defendant-client that the attorney was present and available, seeking to consult with him.
The State argues that where a custodial suspect is unaware that an attorney has been retained to represent him, a valid waiver of the right to counsel may be found under both the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution and section 10 of article I of the IllinoisConstitution, despite that police do not inform the suspect that the attorney is present and available, seeking to consult with him. The State argues that this court's interpretation of our State constitutional right to counsel under section 10 must be guided by Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. 412, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 106 S. Ct. 1135. The State urges that we reverse the trial court's order suppressing defendant's statement, on the basis of Burbine and People v. Griggs (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 1, 178 Ill. Dec. 1, 604 N.E.2d 257.
Defendant responds that where police have failed to inform a custodial suspect that his attorney is present and available, seeking to consult with him, there cannot have been a valid waiver of the right to counsel found under section 10, and the suspect's subsequent statements are properly suppressed. Defendant contends that Burbine represents a regressive interpretation of fifth amendment protections, which this court should not rely on in interpreting section 10. According to defendant, People v. Smith (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 179, 66 Ill. Dec. 412, 442 N.E.2d 1325, and Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d 1, 178 Ill. Dec. 1, 604 N.E.2d 257, reject the Federal constitutional analysis developed in Burbine and, thus, necessarily speak for our State constitutional guarantees. Defendant further contends that the police conduct violated his State constitutional rights of due process.
A defendant's right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and by article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. This right includes the right to an attorney. A defendant may waive these rights provided that the waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. ( People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 50, 74, 125 Ill. Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360.) In determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to an attorney, a court must consider the totality of the circumstance, including the characteristics of the defendant and the details of the interrogation, without onecircumstance or factor controlling. ( People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 27, 54-55, 143 Ill. Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174. ) The State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his or her rights. See Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 51.
In Moran v. Burbine, the United States Supreme Court decided the validity of a custodial suspect's waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel under circumstances similar to those presented here. The issue presented was whether a custodial suspect's waiver was valid where either "police misinformed an inquiring attorney about their plans concerning the suspect or because they failed to inform the suspect of the attorney's efforts to reach him." ( Burbine, 475 U.S. at 420, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 420, 106 S. Ct. at 1140.) In Burbine, an attorney, retained by the defendant's sister, telephoned the police station where the defendant was being held and stated that she would act as the defendant's counsel in the event police decided to question him. Police misrepresented to the attorney that the defendant would not be questioned. Applying traditional waiver principles, the Court held that neither deliberate deception of a custodial suspect's attorney by police nor their failure to inform him of his attorney's efforts to contact him was conduct relevant to the validity of his waiver of fifth amendment rights. The Court reasoned that a custodial suspect's capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish constitutional rights could "surely" not be affected by events of which he was unaware. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.) While the Court conceded that the withheld information would have likely affected the defendant's decision to waive his constitutional rights, it was not information which was essential to his "comprehension" of those rights. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
The Court further expressed a belief that the level of police culpability in withholding information from custodial suspects was irrelevant to the question of a knowing waiver. "Such conduct is only relevant to the constitutional validity of waiver if it deprives a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them." (Emphasis added.) Burbine, 475 U.S. at 423, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 422, 106 S. Ct. at 1142.
Thus, under Burbine, in determining the validity of a custodial suspect's waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel, the relevant and narrow inquiry is whether his ability to understand or comprehend his rights has been compromised by the lack of information or the police conduct in withholding that information. Because very few, if any, forms of withheld information, police conduct, or outside events can conceivably compromise a custodial suspect's ability to understand or comprehend, Burbine necessarily decided, for purposes of waiver under Federal constitutional law, any question concerning the level of police culpability, the manner in which the attorney was retained, or the suspect's awareness of that fact.
Burbine is controlling here in terms of any Federal constitutional basis for suppressing defendant's statements. Defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was therefore valid and suppression of defendant's statements was insupportable on fifth amendment grounds.
The day is long past in Illinois, however, where attorneys must shout legal advice to their clients, held in custody, through the jailhouse door. In this case, we determine that our State constitutional guarantees afforded defendant a greater degree of protection. Our State constitutional guarantees simply do not permit police to delude custodial suspects, exposed to interrogation, into falsely believing they are without immediatelyavailable legal counsel and to also prevent that counsel from accessing and assisting their clients during the interrogation. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 10.) It is apparent that when police are allowed to withhold information from custodial suspects that their attorneys are present and immediately available to offer assistance, enormous pressure builds upon the police to secure statements from those suspects before they either exercise their right to an attorney or somehow learn of their attorneys' presence. Further, by preventing those attorneys from accessing and assisting their clients, police improperly interfere with the suspects' right to their attorneys' presence as well as the attorney-client relationship, itself. The incommunicado interrogation and surrounding coercive environment likely to result from this objectionable practice is exactly the sort of scenario previously condemned bythe United States Supreme Court in Escobedo and Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 457, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 714, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1619 ("this atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation"); Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 487, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 984, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 ("it 'would be highly incongruous if our system of justice permitted the district attorney, the lawyer representing the State, to extract a confession from the accused while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him, was kept from him by the police'").
Three decisions inform our waiver analysis, People v. Smith (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 179, 66 Ill. Dec. 412, 442 N.E.2d 1325, People v. Holland (1987), 121 Ill. 2d 136, 117 Ill. Dec. 109, 520 N.E.2d 270, and People v. Griggs (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 1, 178 Ill. Dec. 1, 604 N.E.2d 257. These decisions, along with the 1970 Constitutional Convention proceedings demonstrate that requirements under our State constitutional guarantee (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10) differ substantially from the Federal and support suppression of defendant's statements under the circumstances presented here. Regardless of the United States Supreme Court's current views on waiver of the right to counsel under the Federal Constitution, the law in Illinois remains that "when police, prior to or during custodial interrogation, refuse an attorney appointed or retained to assist a suspect access to the suspect, there can be no knowing waiver of the right to counsel if the suspect has not been informed that the attorney was present and seeking to consult with him." Smith, 93 Ill. 2d at 189.
We also reject the notion that little regard should be accorded to defendant's due process claim. Illinois courts have long recognized that the State due process guarantee (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2) is implicated whenever the State engages in conduct towards its citizens deemed oppressive, arbitrary or unreasonable. (See G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 11 (1969) (commenting on historical development of Illinois constitutional due process concepts); see also People v. Lewis (1952), 413 Ill. 116, 122, 108 N.E.2d 473 (failure of authorities to provide counsel, under the circumstances, violated due process under Illinois constitution); People v. Price (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 46, 179 N.E.2d 685 (deliberate denial of counsel, failure to inform of right to counsel, and mental compulsion rendered confession involuntary and violated State due process guarantee).) The United States Supreme Court, in Burbine, recognized that a defendant's Federal due process rights might even be violated in instances where police conduct is sufficiently egregious. (See Burbine, 475 U.S. at 432, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 428, 106 S. Ct. at 1147 (finding that police deception more egregious than falsely telling a nonpresent, telephoning defendant's lawyer that the defendant faced no imminent interrogation could rise to level of Federal due process violation).) Contrary to the view expressed by the State, we believe defendant sufficiently asserted a due process claim of error by arguing that the policeshould have allowed attorney Walters to consult with him. We further believe that the police conduct here violated State constitutional due process.
We address first the validity of defendant's waiver. It is unquestionable that State courts have the authority to interpret their respective constitutional provisions more broadly than United States Supreme Court interpretations of similar Federal constitutional provisions. (See Oregon v. Hass (1975), 420 U.S. 714, 719, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 575-76, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1219.) The United States Supreme Court expressly recognized that its Burbine decision was at odds with decisions by the majority of State courts, including Smith, as well as the policy recommendations of the American Bar Association. ( Burbine, 475 U.S. at 427-28, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 106 S. Ct. at 1144.) The Court consequently stated, "Nothing we say today disables the States from adopting different requirements for the conduct of [their] employees and officials as a matter of state law." (Emphasis added.) Burbine, 475 U.S. at 427-28, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 106 S. Ct. at 1144.
A close review of Smith, Holland and Griggs reveals that Illinois accepted this invitation and developed different requirements which are supported under our State constitution and its laws.
Well before the Supreme Court decided Burbine, this court, in Smith, addressed the issue of whether a custodial suspect's statements were properly suppressed as violative of the right to counsel during custodial interrogation. (See Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 66 Ill. Dec. 412, 442 N.E.2d 1325.) In Smith, police told an associate of counsel retained by the defendant that she could not see the defendant because he was undergoing withdrawal from drugs. In deciding whether the defendant's waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel was knowing and intelligent, Smith relied extensively not on Federal precedent, but on asister State's interpretation of State constitutional law. (See State v. Haynes (1979), 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272.) In Haynes, the police prevented an attorney, retained by the custodial suspect's wife, from conferring with him. The Oregon Supreme Court, as a result, adopted a rule that where police "'have failed to admit counsel to a person in custody or to inform the person of the attorney's efforts to reach him, they cannot thereafter rely on defendant's "waiver" for the use of his subsequent uncounseled statements or resulting evidence against him.'" (See Smith, 93 Ill. 2d at 187-88, quoting Haynes, 288 Or. at 72-74, 602 P.2d at 278-79.) Smith found persuasive the Oregon Supreme Court's reasoning that under State law police possessed no authority to prevent or delay communication between an arrested person and his retained lawyer, and also that a custodial suspect's decision to waive counsel's assistance was likely to be affected by the withheld information. Smith also found persuasive at least one other State-law decision which reached a similar conclusion under its own State constitution. See State v. Matthews (La. 1982), 408 So. 2d 1274; Smith, 93 Ill. 2d at 188 (citing cases).
Smith's analysis also relied to a more limited extent on previous statements by the United States Supreme Court indicating that police prevention of a custodial suspect's attorney from consulting with him, under certain circumstances, constituted a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d at 188-89, quoting Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 465 n.35, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 718 n.35, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1623 n.35 (referring to Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 1758); see also Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 167-68 (Clark, C.J., specially concurring) (providing historical background to State-law decisions which are at odds with Burbine).
This court held in Smith, relying primarily on State authorities:
"When police, prior to or during custodial interrogation, refuse an attorney appointed or retained to assist a suspect access to the suspect, there can be no knowing waiver of the right to counsel if the suspect has not been informed that the attorney was present and seeking to consult with him." Smith, 93 Ill. 2d at 189.
Because of the scope of its holding, Burbine, however, necessarily overruled Smith sub silentio as grounded in the fifth amendment and, therefore, Federal constitutional law. Recall that Burbine essentially holds that unless a custodial suspect's "capacity" or "ability" to "comprehend" his abstract fifth amendment right to an attorney is affected, no form of police conduct towards the suspect's attorney, personally retained or otherwise, present or otherwise, or their failure to inform the suspect of the attorney's efforts to reach him can invalidate the suspect's waiver of those rights. (See Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422, 423, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 421, 422, 106 S. Ct. at 1141, 1142.) Burbine conceded that while such conduct or information, if known by the suspect, might affect the suspect's "decision" to waive his rights, this was not "knowledge" essential to his "ability" to "understand" the "nature" of his rights. (See Burbine, 475 U.S. at 423, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 422, 106 S. Ct. at 1142.) Burbine clearly conflicts with Smith, as standing on Federal law, in terms of both the relevance of police conduct and of information that retained counsel is available.
Moreover, while Burbine may be factually distinguishable from Smith in several respects, those distinctions carry absolutely no legal significance for purposes of deciding a knowing waiver under the fifth amendment. (In Burbine, the defendant was unaware of counsel's retention and counsel did not request access to the defendant, nor was counsel ever present at the police station. In Smith, the defendant retained an attorney whose associate was present at the policestation and requested access to the defendant, but was denied.) Burbine makes clear that, under the Federal Constitution, nothing the police do or no information a suspect has or is deprived of can be relevant unless it affects the suspect's "ability" or "capacity" to comprehend or understand the nature of his rights. A distinction based on a suspect's knowledge of whether he personally retained an attorney or knew an attorney was retained, or whether the attorney was on the telephone or at the door of the interrogation room asking to consult with the suspect, simply has no basis under Federal law.
In response to the Supreme Court's express invitation to the States to adopt different requirements as a matter of State law ( Burbine, 475 U.S. at 427-28, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 106 S. Ct. at 1144), State courts uncomfortable with Burbine's reasoning rejected it and formulated requirements resting on State constitutional grounds. State v. Stoddard (1988), 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d 446; Bryan v. State (Del. 1990), 571 A.2d 170; Haliburton v. State (Fla. 1987), 514 So. 2d 1088; People v. Wright (1992), 441 Mich. 140, 490 N.W.2d 351; State v. Reed (1993), 133 N.J. 237, 627 A.2d 630.
In Holland, the defendant requested that this court follow Smith, rather than Burbine, to decide a claimed violation under article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution. In deciding the State constitutional claim, the court declined to apply Smith, finding that Smith and Burbine were factually distinguishable, but that the facts of Holland were consistent with those of Burbine. The court relied on two points: as in Burbine, relatives had hired the attorney so that the defendant was unaware that the attorney had been retained; and, as in Burbine, the attorney had simply telephoned police, asking to be contacted if the defendant was questioned. The Holland court found Smith distinguishable becausethe defendant there had personally retained the attorney, and the attorney's associate had been present at the jailhouse. The Holland court held that the defendant's waiver was valid, as in Burbine, on the basis that the case factually tracked Burbine, more so than Smith. In Griggs, this court would later state that the facts of Holland were distinguishable from those of Smith because, unlike Smith, there had been no "wrongful denial of attorney access and no reason to apply the rule of Smith to the facts presented in Holland." Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d at 24.
Parenthetically, Holland's factual reliance on Burbine is problematic. Burbine holds that a knowing waiver of the right to counsel only implicates a suspect's abilities and capacities to understand the nature of his rights; information affecting a suspect's decision to waive those rights is irrelevant. Given such a broad, conceptually based holding, Burbine's application to a given case cannot depend on factual variables such as the manner or the suspect's awareness of the attorney's retention, the attorney's mode of communicating with police, or whether police denied him access to the suspect. The problem with Holland is that it adopts Burbine's conclusion (the waiver was knowing and therefore valid) based simply on a finding that certain legally insignificant facts in Burbine were similar. The full import of Burbine's holding was apparently not appreciated or considered by Holland. Simply put, the fifth amendment holding in Burbine is much broader than its facts, and Holland, seemingly, did not recognize this. See Burbine, 475 U.S. at 413-14, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 416, 106 S. Ct. at 1136-37.
Returning to the subject of legal grounds, it is significant that this court did not overrule Smith. This fact is significant because, after the Burbine decision, there is no basis on which Smith can stand as a Federal law decision. In deciding the defendant's article I, section 10, claim, Holland merely distinguished Smith on its facts, thus confirming its continued viability and standing on State-law grounds. It is also significant that the Holland court expressed no unwillingness to apply Smith, under article I, section 10, to instances where an attorney was denied access to his client. (Cf. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 169, 172 (Clark, C.J., specially concurring) (noting that the majority's "attempt to distinguish Smith preserves for later consideration the issue of whether our State Constitution grants a broader privilege against self-incrimination in cases where the attorney is actually present").) Clearly, considering this court's refusal to overrule Smith as well as the Supreme Court's invitation to the States, Smith's rule was intended to be preserved as an appropriate State-law requirement under our own constitution. Cf. Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d at 37 (Miller, C.J., dissenting) (describing Smith as being "preserved and narrowed" by Holland); Bryan v. State (Del. 1990), 571 A.2d 170 (relying on Weber v. State (Del. 1983), 457 A.2d 674, a pre-Burbine decision, as grounded in that State's constitution); Roeder v. State (Tex. App. 1988), 768 S.W.2d 745 (relying on Dunn v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), 696 S.W.2d 561, a pre-Burbine decision, as grounded in that State's constitution).
Griggs presented this court with a second opportunity to reexamine Smith and Burbine. In Griggs, the indications that this court intended to preserve Smith's requirements for police conduct as State law became even stronger. In this regard, Griggs bears close examination, not only in terms of its substance, but also in terms of the grounds supporting the decision. Griggs is grounded in State law.
First, Griggs' analysis relied almost entirely on State decisional law. Griggs referred extensively to pre-Burbine and post-Burbine State-constitutional-law decisions, reaching conclusions contrary to Burbine, but similar to Smith. (See Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d at 25-28.) Griggs not only expressly reaffirmed Smith and relied extensively on its reasoning, but also quoted, at length, benchmark language from Haynes, a pre-Burbine State-law decision. (See Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d at 25-29; see also Note, Developments in the Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324, 1389-90 (1982) (describing "retroactive incorporation," a process whereby a State court adopts as a matter of State constitutional law its own earlier Federal constitutional interpretation).) Griggs, furthermore, declined to follow Burbine, relying on State-law authorities and the views of the Burbine dissenters to reject Burbine's basic premises. ( Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d at 25, 27-28.) Simply in terms of the authorities it relied on, Griggs constitutes a State-law decision. See Lohraf, United States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: A Call for State Courts to Develop State Constitutional Law, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 311, 342 (recommending that State courts rely on State-specific factors, opinions of other State courts and the incorporation as State law of prior State decisions that relied on Federal law to avoid Supreme Court review of divergent opinions); see also Michigan v. Long (1983), 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1214, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (when State-court decisions clearly based on State law that is adequate and independent, Supreme Court will not review decision).
Griggs is also a State-constitutional-law decision in terms of the substance of its analysis. In Griggs, this court unequivocally rejected Burbine's fundamental premises that police interference with an attorney's access to a custodial-suspect client is irrelevant to waiver of the right to counsel during custodial interrogation; and that the information that a retained attorney is available is simply helpful and ...