MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Carl Rittmeyer brings this one count complaint against defendant Advance Bancorp, Inc. ("Bancorp"), alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Presently before us is defendant's motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
Beginning in 1986, plaintiff Rittmeyer was the Controller of Concordia Federal Bank for Savings ("Concordia"). Two years after his coming on board, Concordia was declared insolvent and taken over by the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC"). Rittmeyer was retained as Controller of Concordia during the period of RTC control from 1988 to 1990. In May 1990, certain assets and liabilities of Concordia were purchased by Advance Bank, s.b. ("AB"), a 100%-owned subsidiary of Bancorp. At this time Rittmeyer was asked by James A. Fitch, President of Bancorp and then-acting President of AB, to stay on as Controller of AB for the same salary as he was receiving at Concordia ($ 58,000 per year). Plaintiff accepted this offer, and worked for AB for almost two years.
In January 1992, James Fitch, as President of Bancorp, hired Rittmeyer to be Treasurer and Controller of Bancorp at the same rate of compensation that he was receiving at AB.
In May of the following year, Rittmeyer inquired with James Fitch about the possibility of a raise and advancement--specifically, promotion to President of Bancorp. The parties disagree as to what was actually said at this and subsequent meetings,
but there is no dispute that plaintiff's request for a raise and a promotion was rejected. On September 20, 1993, Rittmeyer--who was 51 years of age--met with Fitch and Bancorp's Human Resource Director, Judy Rita. At this meeting Fitch told Rittmeyer that he was being terminated as Controller of Bancorp but would remain on the payroll until the end of the month. On October 22, 1993, plaintiff filed a charge of age discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. Prior to any disposition of this charge, plaintiff filed the instant action on January 11, 1994.
At all relevant times, Bancorp--a bank holding corporation-- owned 100% of the stock of AB and South Central Bank ("SCB"). Bancorp's only office is in Homewood, Illinois, and it employed 12 and 10 employees in 1992 and 1993, respectively. AB is an Illinois chartered savings bank with thirteen separate locations in Illinois and a nine member Board of Directors. SCB is an Illinois chartered commercial bank with four separate locations and a Board of ten Directors. Although the banks operate out of separate offices, they do coordinate certain services such as payroll and employee benefits pursuant to an agreement executed in July 1993 ("Agreement"). In pertinent part, the Agreement provides that:
The administration of employee policies and benefits plus payroll services are provided for all employees of all affiliates by the staff at Bancorp. The payroll cost of this staff will be prorated to Bancorp, South Chicago Bank and Advance Bank based on the number of employees at each affiliate. Bancorp supervises the payroll for all affiliates and the affiliates are reimbursed as appropriate. Bancorp makes provision for certain employee benefits such as Employee Medical Care plans, Profit Sharing Plan, etc. The cost of these benefits will be apportioned to each affiliate, based on the enrollment of employees.
Agreement, at 4. The Agreement provides for all services to be performed on a fee-for-service basis.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue of material fact and. . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." This standard places the initial burden on the moving party to identify "those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the facts must be read in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). However, where the moving party has met its initial burden, the non-movant may not simply "rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings" to survive summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Bancorp makes three arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment. First, it contends that Rittmeyer's action should be dismissed because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Second, Bancorp argues that we lack jurisdiction to hear this case because during 1992-93 it did not employ at least twenty persons as required for cases filed under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). Third, defendant asserts that Rittmeyer cannot establish that he was terminated due to his age, and therefore it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because we agree with Bancorp's second argument as to the propriety of our jurisdiction, we need only address that issue.
Plaintiff Rittmeyer has the burden of demonstrating that the jurisdictional requirements of the this court are met. See America's Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns of Abilene, L.P., 980 F.2d 1072, 1074 (7th Cir. 1992). A claim under the ADEA may only lie against an employer," which is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). Bancorp claims that is does not fit this definition of an employer, since it only employed twelve people in 1992 and ten people in 1993 (the year Rittmeyer was terminated). Instead of disputing these figures, plaintiff counters that the judicially created "single employer" doctrine should be applied to include the employees of AB and SCB as part of Bancorp. Under the single employer doctrine, two nominally separate businesses may be so intertwined as to lead a court to consider them one entity for the purposes of the ADEA. Rogers v. Sugar Tree Products, Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 1993). If the employees of AB and SCB are included in Bancorp's total, then defendant would be an "employer" subject to the requirement of the ADEA.
In the context of a parent-subsidiary relationship, "when the parent exercises such extensive control over the subsidiary's operations and personnel decisions that, in effect, the two corporations are one, courts are willing to consider the parent along with the subsidiary as the employer subject to the applicable statute." Rogers, 7 F.3d at 582; see also Frishberg v. Esprit de Corp., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 793, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (highly interrelated companies can be held jointly responsible for acts of immediate employer), aff'd, 969 F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit recently reiterated the factors to consider when applying the single employer doctrine in the context of the ADEA:
(1) Interrelation of operations, i.e., common offices, common record keeping, shared bank accounts and equipment.