Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Honorable Ralph Reyna, Judge Presiding.
Released for Publication December 16, 1994. Petition for Leave to Appeal Denied February 1, 1995.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Cahill
JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial David Bates was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, and aggravated battery. He appealed, and this court found he was arrested without probable cause. We remanded the case for a hearing to determine if defendant's statement to the police implicating him in the crime was sufficiently attenuated from his illegal arrest to be admissible. ( People v. Bates (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 288, 578 N.E.2d 240, 161 Ill. Dec. 113 (Bates I).) On remand, the trial court found attenuation and denied defendant's motion to suppress his statement. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
The State bears the burden of proof in an attenuation hearing. ( People v. White (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 194, 222, 512 N.E.2d 677, 111 Ill. Dec. 288.) A confession made after an illegal arrest is admissible if it is not obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest. ( Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254.) In Brown, the supreme court set out four elements to consider when evaluating an otherwise valid confession following an illegal arrest: (1) the proximity in time between the arrest and confession; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; (3) the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct; and (4) whether Miranda warnings are given. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04.
Here, the trial court at the attenuation hearing received in evidence the transcript of the motion to suppress the confession before defendant's trial. That testimony appears in Bates I at 218 Ill. App. 3d 288.
The State then called Detective Bajenski as its only witness. Bajenski testified that he spoke to defendant between 11 and 11:30 a.m. on October 29, 1983, and advised him of his Miranda rights. Bajenski testified that he confronted defendant with evidence linking him to the crime. He told defendant that a gun and drugs had been recovered, that a witness, Corey Burns, had incriminated him, and that co-defendant Banks was in custody and implicated him. Bajenski also told defendant that various "citizens on the street" stated they had seen defendant and Banks at the scene of the crime. Bajenski testified that when confronted with this information, defendant denied any knowledge of the crime.
Defense counsel then moved to admit two reports prepared by the Office of Professional Standards of the Chicago Police Department. Known as the Goldston and Sanders reports, they survey the alleged systematic abuse of suspects in custody at Area 2 police headquarters, where the defendant in this case was interrogated. The reports name several police officers involved in cases of abuse. Some of those officers participated in defendant's arrest and interrogation. Defendant argued that the reports were relevant to the third element under Brown: the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct.
The trial court refused to consider evidence which went to the issue of police misconduct and refused to admit the Goldston and Sanders reports. The court reasoned:
"If there was some misconduct, the appellate court [in Bates 1 ] found there was none, then you might be entitled to those [reports]. But reading the appellate court record with regard to the attenuation hearing, the two criteria I have to deal with [are] the intervening factors and the proximity of the statement from the arrest."
Defendant then testified and essentially repeated his testimony from the suppression hearing. He also denied that he had a conversation with Detective Bajenski while in custody.
The court found that there was sufficient attenuation to admit the confession because: (1) defendant was given Miranda warnings, (2) he confessed more than 16 hours after his arrest, (3) he "was not coerced into making a statement at any time," and (4) the statement of Corey Burns incriminating the defendant was an intervening circumstance.
We will reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( People v. Booker (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 384, 568 N.E.2d 211, 154 Ill. Dec. 211.) Here we find that the opposite Conclusion is evident and ...