The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOHN A. NORDBERG
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss certain claims of the Plaintiff Jeffrey Reed's Amended Complaint.
On June 3, 1991, Lamont Field was shot and killed at or near 5400 South Paulina Street, Chicago, Illinois. (Amended Complaint at P 5.) Thereafter, City of Chicago police officers John Griffin, W. Murphy, Stanley Kroll, A. Christophersen, J. Stehlik, Stanley Turner and James Green began investigating the death of Lamont Field. Id. at P 6. Allegedly, the prime suspect for the shooting was Gavin Bryant. Id. at P 7. On June 12, 1991, Defendants Turner, Kroll and Murphy went to Bryant's home and questioned him about the shooting of Lamont Field. Id. at P 9. Bryant allegedly denied his guilt and pointed the finger at Plaintiff. Id. at P 10. Without further investigation and without an arrest or search warrant, Defendants Turner, Kroll and Murphy went to Plaintiff's home on June 12, 1991 and placed him under arrest for the murder of Lamont Field. Id. at P 11. Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that Defendants Griffin, Christophersen, Stehlik and Green participated in the investigation of the death of Lamont Field and collaborated with Defendants Turner, Murphy and Kroll in arresting Plaintiff. Id. at P 13.
On June 12, 1991, Plaintiff was charged with the murder of Lamont Field and because he was unable to post bond, he remained incarcerated for the entire time the criminal case was pending, approximately twenty-three months. Id. at P 15. On May 5, 1993, after a full trial on the merits, Plaintiff was acquitted on the charge of first degree murder. Id. at P 22.
Based on the alleged facts recounted above, Plaintiff brings two claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Count I charges that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his right to be free from unlawful arrest, search and seizure, wrongful confinement and detention and malicious prosecution in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Count II charges that Plaintiff's confinement after his arrest was oppressive and shocking to the conscience, and thus in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Count III brings a claim for malicious prosecution under Illinois state law and Count IV brings a claim based on Defendants' negligent conduct and the special duty Defendants owed Plaintiff.
Defendants seek to dismiss the claims in Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint for three reasons: (1) the unlawful arrest and search and seizure claims are time barred;
(2) the unlawful confinement and detention claims are properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment; and finally (3) the malicious prosecution claim is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. As to Count II, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful confinement and detention in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Finally, with regard to Count III, Defendants ask this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's request for costs and attorney's fees because an award of litigation expenses is not permitted under Illinois law.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court views all of the facts alleged in the complaint, as well as any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mosley v. Klincar, 947 F.2d 1338, 1339 (7th Cir. 1992). Dismissal is appropriate only if it is clear that there is no relief that can be granted under any set of facts that can be proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
Unlawful Confinement and Detention
In support of his assertion that an unlawful confinement and detention claim is cognizable under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff relies on two Supreme Court cases, Heck v. Humphrey, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) and Albright v. Oliver, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994). This Court agrees with Defendants that neither Heck nor Albright support the Plaintiff's assertion.
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 114 S. Ct. at 2372. The Heck court went on to note that, when a prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must determine whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Id. Since the Plaintiff in the present case has been neither convicted nor sentenced, the Supreme Court's opinion in Heck is inapplicable.
In Albright, the Supreme Court was presented with the narrow question of whether a plaintiff could maintain a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution on substantive due process grounds. 114 S. Ct. at 812. The plaintiff in Albright was arrested for selling look-alike drugs. He was bound over for trial at a preliminary hearing, although ...