hearing, to which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies. Specifically, the Garcia majority stated, because the seizure of a person ends after the Gerstein hearing, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the only applicable constitutional provision." Id. at 970 n. 6. The Garcia majority noted further that the Supreme Court's opinion in Albright "casts considerable doubt on the application of substantive due process," after the Gerstein hearing, id. (citing 114 S. Ct. at 814 (Scalia, J., concurring), but the Garcia majority did not conclude that Albright instructs that the Fourth Amendment applies after a Gerstein hearing.
Despite the doubt, cast by the Supreme Court, on the applicability of substantive due process after a Gerstein hearing, the court in Garcia proceeded to analyze the plaintiff's unlawful confinement claim under the rubric of substantive due process. The Garcia court's application of substantive due process to the plaintiff's claim of unlawful confinement might be explained by the fact that the Supreme Court's opinion in Albright addressed only a claim of malicious prosecution and not a claim of unlawful confinement or detention.
Although this Court acknowledges the dicta in Albright regarding the application of the Fourth Amendment to alleged constitutional violations after a Gerstein hearing and the doubt cast on the application of substantive due process, this Court is bound by the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Garcia which confirms the line drawn at the Gerstein hearing and the application of substantive due process to a claim of unlawful confinement occurring after a Gerstein hearing. Consequently, the claims in Count I which allege that Defendants' unlawful detention and confinement of Plaintiff violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
As previously noted, Albright holds that a plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution on substantive due process grounds. 114 S. Ct. at 812. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not base his malicious prosecution claim on substantive due process grounds, but rather on the Fourth Amendment.
Writing for a plurality of four justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that a claim for malicious prosecution must be judged under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 811. However, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, such a holding does not indicate that a claim for malicious prosecution is viable under the Fourth Amendment. Because the plaintiff in Albright did not raise a Fourth Amendment claim, the plurality opinion did not address whether the Fourth Amendment does, in fact, provide protection from malicious prosecution and what the contours of such protection are, should it be found to exist. Id. at 813-14. The discussion in the plurality and concurring opinions in Albright regarding the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to a claim of malicious prosecution is mere dicta in an otherwise narrow decision regarding substantive due process. Thus, this Court's determination as to whether Plaintiff can sustain a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment must be guided by relevant Seventh Circuit precedent.
Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Albright, the Seventh Circuit in Smart v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 34 F.3d 432, 1994 WL 467322 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 1994), held that, where malicious prosecution results in an arrest or other seizure of the plaintiff, there is an infringement of liberty, which is cognizable under the Fourth Amendment (as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth), and not under the due process clause directly. In the present case, Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant and indicted for murder the same day. Thus, the Defendant's seizure of Plaintiff ended after his Gerstein hearing, at which a grand jury presumably determined that there was probable cause to charge Plaintiff with the murder of Lamont Field. See, Garcia, 24 F.3d at 970 n. 6. As Defendants' seizure of Plaintiff ended after Plaintiff's probable cause hearing, the Fourth Amendment is no longer applicable and Plaintiff cannot bring a malicious prosecution claim based on the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Although unclear, the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint seem to suggest that his Gerstein hearing may have been defective because he was denied an opportunity to present witnesses to counter the testimony of Defendants Turner, Kroll and Murphy. Plaintiff alleges that he was indicted for murder, solely on the basis of Defendants Turner, Kroll and Murphy's statements. Amended Complaint at PP 11, 18. Plaintiff's contention can be easily dismissed as the Seventh Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require that probable cause hearings be adversarial in nature. Garcia, 24 F.3d at 969 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121-22, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975)). Thus, Plaintiff's inability to present witnesses in his own behalf does not render his Gerstein hearing unreliable.
Other than the inability to present witnesses on his own behalf, Plaintiff does not indicate any other reason why his Gerstein hearing would be rendered unreliable. Thus, because Defendant's seizure of Plaintiff ended after Plaintiff's Gerstein hearing, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the only applicable constitutional provision. See, Garcia, 24 F.3d at 970 n. 6. As Garcia holds that substantive due process governs after a Gerstein hearing and as Albright holds that a claim of malicious prosecution cannot be based on substantive due process, this Court must dismiss Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim.
Defendants request that this Court dismiss Count II because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful confinement and detention in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
The Due process Clause requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of the law. Lile v. Tippecanoe County Jail, 844 F. Supp. 1301, 1306 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979)). Both the length and conditions of the pretrial confinement must serve legitimate regulatory purposes of the state. Bergren, 811 F.2d at 1143 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963)).
Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested, without a warrant, and charged with the first degree murder of Lamont Field on June 12, 1991. Amended Complaint at PP 11, 14. According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff protested his arrest and maintained that he was innocent of the crime with which he was charged. Id. at P 16. However, even if Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant, the subsequent grand jury indictment proves that there was probable cause for the arrest. Lee v. Village of River Forest, No. 85 C 10583, 1987 WL 12928 (N.D.Ill. June 22, 1987)(citing Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932)).
As already noted, Plaintiff's contention that he was indicted solely on the basis of Defendants' testimony does not render his probable cause hearing unreliable. The Seventh Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require that probable cause hearings be adversarial in nature. Garcia, 24 F.3d at 969 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121-22, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975)). Moreover, probable cause has traditionally been decided by a magistrate judge on hearsay and written testimony and the Supreme Court has approved these informal modes of proof. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120. Finally, Plaintiff's eventual acquittal on the murder charge does not establish that the Defendants lacked probable cause to detain. See Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883, 891 (7th Cir.1986).
Plaintiff's alleged facts do not support his claim that he was unlawfully detained and confined in violation of his substantive due process rights and this Court is not required to accept legal conclusions alleged in the pleadings. See Carl Sandburg Village Condo. Ass'n No. 1 v. First Condo. Develop. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir.1985). Consequently, even if the Court views all of the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, as well as any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim that he was unlawfully detained and confined in violation of his substantive due process rights. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II is granted.
Count III states a claim for malicious prosecution under Illinois state law. The dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims disposes of all federal claims before this Court and the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Although a federal court may exercise pendent jurisdiction, this Court is mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, then the state claims should be dismissed as well. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1972). Accordingly, Count III is dismissed without prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is granted.
JOHN A. NORDBERG
United States District Judge
DATED: October 26, 1994