and institute disciplinary measures to deter discriminatory acts. Thus, the threat of termination, suspension and demotion faced by supervisory employees who make discriminatory decisions prevents such employees from eluding punishment for their' discriminatory acts and encourages such employees to eventually alter their behavior thus furthering the remedial purposes of Title VII, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Since Defendants Robert Maeyama and John Lancaster cannot be sued in their individual capacity and suing these Defendants in their official capacity is the same as suing the Village of Park Forest, Counts I through VIII of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are dismissed as to Defendants Robert Maeyama and John Lancaster.
Retaliatory Employment Practices
Defendants assert that under Illinois law, a claim for retaliatory employment practices cannot be brought against a supervisory employee because the supervisory employee is not the plaintiff's employer. Unfortunately, the parties have not cited and this Court, through its own research efforts, cannot find an Illinois Supreme Court case addressing the issue of whether a supervisory employee can be held personally liable for retaliatory employment practices.
In Morton v. Hartigan, 145 Ill. App. 3d 417, 495 N.E.2d 1159, 1161-62, 99 Ill. Dec. 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986), the court held that a plaintiff's supervisor was not a proper party defendant in a retaliatory discharge action because the supervisor was not the plaintiff's employer, but rather the employer's agent. See also Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 203 Ill. App. 3d 57, 560 N.E.2d 1043, 1047, 148 Ill. Dec. 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 145 Ill. 2d 492, 584 N.E.2d 104, 164 Ill. Dec. 892 (Ill. 1991); Motsch v. Pine Roofing Co., Inc., 178 Ill. App. 3d 169, 533 N.E.2d 1, 6, 127 Ill. Dec. 383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988). The Morton court derived support for its decision from the Illinois Supreme Court's admonition against expanding the tort of retaliatory discharge in Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 88 Ill. Dec. 628 (Ill. 1985).
The Second District has declined to follow the First District's holding in Morton. See Bragado v. Cherry Electric Products Corp., 191 Ill. App. 3d 136, 547 N.E.2d 643, 647, 138 Ill. Dec. 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 2nd Dist. 1989); Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 190 Ill. App. 3d 592, 546 N.E.2d 791, 796, 137 Ill. Dec. 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 2nd Dist. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 568 N.E.2d 870, 154 Ill. Dec. 649 (Ill. 1991). The Fellhauer court acknowledged the Illinois Supreme Court's admonition in Barr against the undue expansion of the tort of retaliatory discharge. Id. However, the Fellhauer court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Barr addressed the definition of what constituted a clearly mandated public policy for the purposes of defining the scope of the tort of retaliatory discharge, but did not address who is a proper party defendant to a suit for retaliatory discharge. Id. The Fellhauer court noted further that under normal tort doctrine, if the acts of the agent render the principal liable, such acts also render the agent liable. Id. Thus, the court in Fellhauer concluded that, as the Illinois Supreme Court's admonition in Barr was not meant to limit traditional tort doctrine, the plaintiff could name his supervisor as a defendant in a retaliatory discharge action. Id.
As this Court finds the rationale of Fellhauer more persuasive than that of Morton, this Court holds that a plaintiff can name his supervisor as a defendant in a retaliatory discharge action. Accordingly, this Court denies Defendant Robert Maeyama's and Defendant John Lancaster's Motion to Dismiss Count IX of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as it applies to them.
Motion to Strike the Damages Claims in Counts I through VIII
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3)(B) (Supp. 1994), states as follows:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party . . .