evidence demonstrates that the employment decisions were based on the IRS' belief that Randle had lied on his employment applications. The district director -- the person who made the decision to fire Randle -- testified that Randle was dismissed because of inconsistencies on his employment application, not because of his disability. See Def. Ex. A., Wintrode Dep. at 4-5, 8. Similarly, the chief of the examination division -- the person who originally proposed Randle's dismissal and who decided not to select Randle for the revenue agent position -- testified that Randle was passed over for promotion because of the proceedings against him. See Def. Ex. 7, Jurovich Testimony at 57-58. In fact, the chief of the examination division testified that he was not even aware of Randle's disability at the time he decided not to select Randle for the position. Id. at 67.
Randle fails to present evidence to contest the defendants' evidence. Instead, Randle responds by asserting that he completed the employment forms truthfully. See, e.g., Randle Aff., PP 17-27. Randle's assertion, if true, would not raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Even if Randle did attempt to complete his employment application honestly, it is undisputed that the officials responsible for his promotion and his dismissal believed that Randle had withheld pertinent information. Randle presents no evidence suggesting that the IRS officials responsible for his lack of promotion and dismissal were motivated by his disability; in opposing the summary judgment motion, Randle cannot merely rely on the allegations in his complaint. See Randle v. Bentsen, 19 F.3d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1994).
Thus, despite Randle's contention that he did not intend to lie on his employment forms, it is undisputed that he was not discriminated against "solely by reason of . . . his disability." 29 U.S.C. § 794; see also Landefeld v. Marion General Hospital, Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1181-82 (6th Cir. 1993) (summary judgment proper on rehabilitation act claim when undisputed evidence established that decisionmaker was unaware of plaintiff's disability). Even if Randle intended to complete his employment application honestly, he fails to present evidence suggesting that the decisionmakers took adverse actions against him because he is disabled. Thus, he cannot establish a prima facie rehabilitation act claim.
In Count III of the second amended complaint, Randle claims that the defendants violated FOIA by withholding documents he requested. FOIA requires federal agencies to make documents "available for public inspection." See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(2). It is undisputed that Randle requested documents, that some documents were produced, and that other documents and portions of documents were withheld. Accordingly, the burden falls on the defendants to demonstrate that the documents it withheld are exempt from disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152, 107 L. Ed. 2d 462, 110 S. Ct. 471 (1989).
The defendants argue that they were justified in withholding documents pursuant to two FOIA exemptions. Agencies are exempted from producing "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" that "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," or that "could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)C) and (b)(7)(D). Although most FOIA exemptions must be construed narrowly, the confidential source exemption is applied "robustly." See Brant Const. Co. v. EPA, 778 F.2d 1258, 1262 (7th Cir. 1985).
The defendants meet the burden of justifying their nondisclosures through the submission of a Vaughn index. Under Vaughn v. Rosen, 157 U.S. App. D.C. 340, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, 39 L. Ed. 2d 873, 94 S. Ct. 1564 (1974), agencies can justify the withholding of documents by submitting an affidavit: (1) describing withheld documents and the reasons for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail; and (2) demonstrating that the withheld information falls within the claimed exemption. See also Scherer v. Kelley, 584 F.2d 170, 175-76 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 964, 99 S. Ct. 1511, 59 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1979). In addition, the Vaughn index must not be controverted by other evidence in the record. See Stein v. Dept. of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1253 (7th Cir. 1981). The defendants' certified index of withheld documents describes each document at issue with particularity; describes with reasonable specificity the information withheld; asserts FOIA exemptions for each document; and explains the basis of asserted exemptions. See Def. Ex. 14.
Randle responds by noting that FOIA generally mandates broad disclosure. See, e.g., FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621, 72 L. Ed. 2d 376, 102 S. Ct. 2054 (1982). Randle also attacks the sufficiency of the defendants' Vaughn index. In particular, Randle contends that the defendants have failed to adequately describe the withheld documents or to justify nondisclosure. However, the court finds that the Vaughn index submitted by the defendants is sufficient; the defendants adequately describe the documents and the reasons for their nondisclosure. In particular, the defendants establish that nondisclosure was warranted under the confidential source exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D), by attesting that sources agreed to provide information under the condition of confidentiality. See Kimberlin v. Dept. of Treasury, 774 F.2d 204, 208-09 (7th Cir. 1985).
The defendants establish that nondisclosure of particular documents was justified. Thus, the defendants demonstrate that they responded to Randle's FOIA request in a responsible and conscientious manner. See Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom Miller v. Webster, 456 U.S. 960, 72 L. Ed. 2d 484, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment on Count III is granted.
For the foregoing reasons defendants Lloyd M. Bentsen, et al.'s motion for summary judgment is granted. Judgment is entered for defendants and Lloyd M. Bentsen, the United States Secretary of Treasury, and Margaret M. Richardson, Commissioner of the United States Internal Revenue Service, and against plaintiff Roosevelt Randle.
Suzanne B. Conlon
United States District Judge
August 18, 1994