not so argue. Indeed, as asserted by the defendants, the detriment each incurred was required by law of all charitable organizations. Therefore, the characterization defendants place on their donations -- that the funds constituted a duty or responsibility on their parts -- does not rise to the level of legally cognizable consideration.
Second, promissory estoppel does not act as a substitute for consideration in this case. Promissory estoppel applies where a promise is made which induces reasonable reliance by the promisee. Bank of Marion, 311 N.E.2d at 140. In such case, promissory estoppel may be a substitute for consideration thus enabling the promisee to sue on the promise. Id. This is not such a case. In this case, defendants do not even assert a promise upon which they reasonably relied. The most defendants aver is that "Douglas, either explicitly . . . or implicitly . . . indicated that the contributions were to be used for specific purposes". (Mem. of Certain Defs. in Supp. of their Mot. for Summ. J., at 9) This "indication" cannot constitute consideration. Defendants' argument that their unspecified reliance on some uncited promise constitutes consideration in this action is rejected.
Furthermore, as the Receiver notes, only valuable consideration will negate a charge of fraudulent conveyance under the Illinois statute as interpreted by Illinois courts. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Franz, 475 F. Supp. 92, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (court compared the monetary value of the property conveyed to legal value of consideration received by grantor); Gamble, 612 F. Supp. at 1276 (same); Thompson v. Williams, 6 Ill. 2d 208, 215, 127 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1955) (same); Reagan v. Baird, 140 Ill. App. 3d 58, 487 N.E.2d 1028, 1034-35, 94 Ill. Dec. 151 (4th Dist. 1985) (same); Effingham State Bank v. Blades, 139 Ill. App. 3d 259, 487 N.E.2d 431, 435, 93 Ill. Dec. 764 (5th Dist. 1985) (same); Hormberger v. Blackwell, 241 Ill. App. 398, 401 (4th Dist. 1926) (same); Oswald v. Nehls, 233 Ill. 438, 84 N.E. 619, 622 (1908) (love and affection is not adequate consideration); Cairo Lumber Co. v. Ladenberger, 313 Ill. App. 1, 39 N.E.2d 596, 599 (4th Dist. 1941) (same); see also Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1990) (under similar Texas law, court focuses on monetary, not spiritual, consideration to decide if conveyance to a charitable trust was fraudulent). The purpose for this seems clear. Only consideration of substantially equivalent value leaves the debtor in a financially similar position after the conveyance. A conveyance made for consideration of nominal or no monetary value leaves the debtor in a much weakened financial position which hinders his creditors. See United States v. Kitsos, 770 F. Supp. 1230, 1235-36 n.14 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("relevant determination is whether full value has been given"). This is precisely the scenario the statute attempts to prevent. Recognizing consideration of no monetary value as a defense to a fraudulent conveyance would emasculate the statute. The Receiver has shown that, as a matter of law, the defendants gave no consideration for the transfers at issue.
Lastly, defendants argue that plaintiff's claims for fraudulent conveyance must fail because the exclusive remedy is retrieval of the property transferred but that defendants no longer possess the actual funds. (Mem. of Certain Defs. in Supp. of Their Mot. for Summ. J., at 12-13) Thus, defendants argue, plaintiff's claims must fail. We disagree. See Tcherepnin v. Franz, 489 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("well-settled" that creditor may elect to recover property itself or its cash value). A personal judgment against the transferee is appropriate.
For all the foregoing reasons, the court grants the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment on his claims for fraudulent conveyances against defendants African Enterprise, Inc., Bethany Evangelical Free Church, Heart Cry International, Hindustan Bible Institute, Inc., International Students, Inc., Proclamation International, and World Vision, Inc. Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the Receiver's claims for fraudulent conveyance are denied.
C. Unjust Enrichment
Also asserted by the Receiver against each defendant is a claim for unjust enrichment. Because the court has found that the Receiver is entitled to judgment on his fraudulent conveyance claims, however, we need not pass upon the claims for unjust enrichment. All parties' motions are denied as to the claims for unjust enrichment.
For the reasons expressed, the Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Hindustan Bible Institute, Inc., International Students, Inc., and Proclamation International, Inc. and the Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment Against African Enterprise, Inc. and Bethany Evangelical Free Church, and the Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Heart Cry International and World Vision, Inc. are granted. The Motion of Certain Defendants for Summary Judgment and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Proclamation International Inc. and Bethany Evangelical Free Church are denied. Judgment is entered on Counts I, IV, XIX, XXII, XXV, XXXVII and XLVI of the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in favor of the Receiver Steven S. Scholes and against defendants African Enterprise, Inc., Bethany Evangelical Free Church, Heart Cry International, Hindustan Bible Institute, Inc., International Students, Inc., Proclamation International, Inc., and World Vision, Inc., in the following amounts.
Defendant Judgment Amount
African Enterprise, Inc. $ 166,000.00
Bethany Evangelical Free Church $ 26,880.00
Heart Cry International $ 12,485.00
Hindustan Bible Institute, Inc. $ 74,989.25
International Students, Inc. $ 120,450.00
Proclamation International, Inc. $ 51,228.13
World Vision, Inc. $ 57,500.00
The court finds that there is no just reason for delay, and therefore the clerk is directed to enter final judgment against the defendants pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
JAMES H. ALESIA
United States District Judge
Date: JUN 21 1994