Indeed, a case with virtually identical facts as those in the present case was referenced by the Seventh Circuit in Schnellbaecher. In Evans v. Meadow Steel Prods., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1391 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("Evans II"), the court dismissed the unnamed parent company from the plaintiff's Title VII action, even though the parent had received notice of the EEOC charge and had participated in conciliation proceedings on behalf of its subsidiary. Earlier the court had denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that, because the parent company received a copy of the EEOC charge, it necessarily had been investigated by the EEOC. Evans v. Meadow Steel Prods., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 250, 255 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("Evans I"). Once the parent company informed the court that it received the EEOC charge and participated in the EEOC proceedings only in a representative capacity for its subsidiary, however, the court granted the parent's motion to reconsider and dismissed that party from the action. Evans II, 579 F. Supp. at 1393. The court concluded that receipt of the EEOC charge, as well as the appearance on behalf of its subsidiary, did not satisfy the requirements that the unnamed defendant have notice and a chance to conciliate on its own behalf. Id.6
Like the parent company in the Evans decisions, Roadway may have had notice of plaintiff's EEOC charge and participated in conciliation proceedings. Roadway did not have notice that it was subject to a discrimination action and, thus, did not have the opportunity to conciliate on its own behalf. Consequently the Eggleston exception, as clarified in Schnellbaecher, does not apply to the present case, and Roadway is dismissed with prejudice from Count I of plaintiff's Complaint.
B. Dismissal of Plaintiff's State Law Claims (Counts II and III)
Defendant offers two arguments in support of its motion to dismiss plaintiff's retaliatory discharge (Count II) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III) claims. First, Roadway contends that plaintiff's state law claims against it should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Second, defendant contends that even if this court retains jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims, it should nevertheless dismiss the claims because plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
1. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction
Because no federal claims remain against Roadway, the remaining state claims against the defendant fall under what once was called "pendent party jurisdiction." Pendent party jurisdiction refers to the joinder of a federal claim against one defendant with a state claim against another defendant. Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 187 (7th Cir. 1984). Before a 1990 statutory development, federal courts looked with disfavor at allowing pendent party jurisdiction, based upon the principle that federal courts have limited jurisdiction and the fact that there is generally an alternative forum available to the plaintiff. See generally Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1181-82 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing viability of pendent party jurisdiction after Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 104 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1989)).
Nevertheless, the doctrine has been brought back to life by being included in what is now called "supplemental jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1367, gives federal courts the power to hear claims lacking an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
This statutory provision effectively overruled Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 104 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1989), and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 2413, 49 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1976), which had foreclosed pendent party jurisdiction. American Pfauter, Ltd. v. Freeman Decorating Co., 772 F. Supp. 1071, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Moreover, the grant of jurisdiction appears to be mandatory by its term "shall have supplemental jurisdiction," thereby limiting the court's discretion to refuse to take such jurisdiction to only certain specified circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) & Practice Commentary at 834. A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,