Appeal from Circuit Court of McLean County. No. 91CF807. Honorable Ronald C. Dozier, Judge Presiding.
Released for Publication March 21, 1994. Petition for Leave to Appeal Denied October 6, 1994.
Honorable Robert J. Steigmann, J., Honorable John T. McCULLOUGH, P.j., Honorable Frederick S. Green, J.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Steigmann
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In November 1991, the State charged defendant, Stephen P. Ground, by information with burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 19-1(a)). Later that month, defendant was indicted on the count of burglary and a count of theft of property having a value in excess of $300 (felony theft) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 16-1(a)(1), (b)(4)). In January 1993, the trial court conducted a bench trial and found defendant not guilty of burglary but guilty of felony theft. In April 1993, the court sentenced defendant to probation and imposed various conditions thereof. Defendant appeals, raising as his sole ground for reversal the trial court's failure to grant his motion to dismiss based on his claim that he was not provided a speedy trial, as required by section 103-5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 103-5(b)).
We discuss the facts of this case only as they relate to defendant's speedy trial claim. On November 14, 1991--after the State charged defendant by information on November 10, 1991, but before he was indicted on November 26, 1991--defendant's counsel filed an entry of appearance, which reads in its entirety as follows:
Now comes the Defendant, STEPHEN P. GROUND, by his Attorneys, BURGER, FONBELLE, ZACHARY & RATHBUN, P.C., and enters the appearance of said Defendant and the appearance of said attorneys as counsel of choice herein. Defendant waives arraignment and enters a plea of not guilty to the charge of Burglary as charged in the Complaint filed herein.
Defendant having by these presents waived arraignment hereby requests immediate trial by jury.
Defendant further requests that the bond heretofore furnished in this cause be and remain in full force and effect pending final Disposition of this cause.