exposed himself to plaintiff and subjected plaintiff to
unwelcome sexual advances, sexual comments containing sexual
innuendos, and propositions for sexual behavior).
By contrast, Illinois Appellate Courts have affirmed
dismissals of intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims alleging facts more outrageous than alleged in this
case. See e.g., Miller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the
U.S., 181 Ill. App.3d 954, 130 Ill.Dec. 558, 537 N.E.2d 887 (1
Dist. 1989) (plaintiff alleged she was surrounded by co-workers
who touched her breast, and made vulgar sexual advances to
her); Morrison v. Sandell, 112 Ill. App.3d 1057, 68 Ill.Dec.
556, 446 N.E.2d 290 (4 Dist. 1983) (toilet tissue and human
waste matter was placed in a drawer the plaintiff would open).
Here, Plaintiff's most extreme claim (against these
Defendants) is that her resume was not forwarded for an
available job opening at another agency and that she was
subjected to unspecified threats, a verbal quarrel, and
unspecified changed conditions of employment by Defendant Judd.
Thus, the Court cannot find them "extreme or outrageous" at
Accordingly, Plaintiff's cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Springfield
Mayor Langfelder, Murphy, Judd, and Cimarossa is DISMISSED
(4) Negligent infliction of emotional distress
Defendant Langfelder next moves to dismiss Count VII entitled
"Negligent infliction of emotional distress."
However, Mayor Langfelder offers no authority in support of
his argument that he did not have a duty to Plaintiff, or did
not breach a duty to Plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff alleged
that Mayor Langfelder breached his duty by retaliating against
her when she filed a complaint with the EEOC.
Accordingly, Defendant Langfelder's motion to dismiss Count
VII is DENIED.
(5). Negligent retention
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's cause of action
for negligent retention (Count VIII) should be dismissed
because Plaintiff failed to allege that the harassment
continued beyond the time she made complaints to Defendants
Cimarrosa and Murphy.
The Court finds that Defendants' argument is simply not true.
Plaintiff's Complaint contains numerous allegations against
Mayor Langfelder, Judd, and Robinson after she complained to
Cimarrosa and Murphy.
Ergo, in accordance with the above order, Defendants' motion
to dismiss (d/e 2) is ALLOWED IN PART.
Counts I, II, and IV of Plaintiff's Complaint are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.
Count III, which the Court will assume at this time is an
"official capacity" cause of action is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as to all Defendants except the City of Springfield.
Count V is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE only against
Defendants Murphy and Cimarossa. The Court finds that only
these Defendants are protected by qualified immunity. Count V
remains in force against the other Defendants.
Count VI is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Defendants
Langfelder, Judd, Cimarossa, and Murphy.
Count IX is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Count X is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to all Defendants
except Defendant Robinson.