deadline imposed by § 3610 is not a per se time limitation as it contains a qualification in the term "impracticable." Scott 788 F. Supp. at 1558.
In determining that the 100-day limit was not jurisdictional, the court found the absence of statutory sanctions on HUD for violation of the time limits persuasive as to Congress' intent. The Scott court also considered the term "impracticable" to be a qualifier which takes the section out of the realm of mandatory provisions and prevents it from being construed as a jurisdictional provision. Id.
Other decisions, although not factually identical, are in accord with the Curlee and Scott decisions. In Baumgardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992), a complaint was filed against a rental agent based on gender discrimination. HUD did not commence the investigation until five months after the complaint was filed. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, based on HUD's failure to complete the investigation within 100 days, as well as failure to comply with other procedural requirements. The administrative law judge found for the plaintiff and awarded damages. On appeal, the court held that "delay by HUD in investigation beyond 100 days does not constitute a violation of section 3610 nor the regulations thereunder. . . . There is an implied 'good cause' basis for extending the period for investigation beyond 100 days." Baumgardner, 960 F.2d at 578.
Similarly, in United States v. Forest Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Tex. 1993), a complaint, and two subsequent amended complaints, were filed against the defendant landlord for discrimination based on physical disability. Shortly after the last amended complaint was filed, HUD notified the parties that the investigation was not complete. HUD issued charges against the landlord more than nineteen months after the original complaint was filed, and four months after the last amended complaint was filed. Defendants moved for summary judgment, based in part on the fact that The Forest Dale court held that the statutory framework of section 3610 "explicitly allows HUD to extend its investigation of complaints beyond 100 days provided that HUD notifies the parties and states the reasons for the delay". Forest Dale, 818 F. Supp. at 966.
IV. Analogous Statutes
Aside from the plain language of the Act itself, the purpose of the Act, and the persuasive precedent supporting our finding that the 100-day limit does not present a jurisdictional bar or statute of limitations, analogous language in other statutes has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be non-jurisdictional. In fact, the Supreme Court's holding that similar language in the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act was not jurisdictional is perhaps the most compelling of the authorities cited in this opinion.
In Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 260, 90 L. Ed. 2d 248, 106 S. Ct. 1834 (1986), the Court held that the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act's (CETA) mandate that the Secretary of Labor "shall" issue a final determination as to the misuse of CETA funds within 120 days did not constitute either a jurisdictional prerequisite or a statute of limitations. In so finding, the Court quoted the "great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided." Brock, 476 U.S. at 260 (quoting United States v. Nashville, C. & St L. R. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125, 30 L. Ed. 81, 6 S. Ct. 1006 (1886)). That statement of policy is equally applicable in the present case. As the Court noted in Brock, "we would be most reluctant to conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public rights are at stake." Brock, 476 U.S. at 260.
Despite the overwhelming weight of authority contrary to their motion, the Defendants have one final arrow in their quiver. They argue, without supporting authority, that because Beethoven Partnership has entered bankruptcy since the HUD complaint was filed, it is prejudiced by HUD's delay. As an initial matter, we note that "[a] litigant who fails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by showing why it is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary authority, forfeits the point." Pelfresne v. Village of Williams Bay, 917 F.2d 1017, 1023 (7th Cir. 1990); Bob Willow Mtrs. v. General Mtrs. Corp., 872 F.2d 788, 795 (7th Cir. 1989). This court has neither the time nor the inclination to do the Defendants' research for them. Pelfresne, 917 F.2d at 1023; Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 703 (7th Cir. 1986); Paulitz v. City of Naperville, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 554, No. 89 C 8855, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ill. January 24, 1994).
Further, we are unpersuaded by the merits of the argument that, because the bankruptcy proceeding has taken away some of the Defendants' flexibility in settling the matter, HUD's delay has unduly prejudiced them. A similar argument could be made against any creditor that did not present its claim until the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and we reject it.
We hold that the 100-day limit of section 3610 is neither a jurisdictional bar nor a statute of limitation. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
PAUL E. PLUNKETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: February 1, 1994