claims on summary judgment." Id. at 818. This standard takes into account the fact that if the law at the time of the alleged offense was not clearly established, "an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful." Id.
Government officials will be shielded from liability for damages when their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818. In the Seventh Circuit, the phrase "clearly established" means that the "right must be sufficiently particularized to put potential defendants on notice that their conduct probably is unlawful." Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1987) quoting Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir. 1986). Until this right has been sufficiently particularized to "put potential defendants on notice that their conduct is unlawful," the right will not be deemed established. Id. The acts of which Tucker complains occurred in 1986, and so we will address any constitutional violations which may have occurred in light of the established law at that time. With this high threshold in mind for overcoming summary judgment motions in the qualified immunity setting, we will proceed to Tucker's three claims.
First, Tucker asserts that his civil rights were violated because he was not given adequate medical treatment while in the Kendall County jail. In the Seventh Circuit, the standard imposed upon state officials for providing medical care to pretrial detainees is one of "deliberate indifference." Salazar v. Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1991); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1985); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976). Tort law negligence, gross negligence or recklessness does not meet the "deliberate indifference" standard; rather, the standard requires intentional or criminally reckless conduct, implying culpable knowledge by the offender. Salazar, 940 F.2d at 238; Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652-53.
In the context of the 8th and 14th Amendments, the question that must be asked to establish the "deliberate indifference" standard is: "Is the act punishment?" Salazar, 940 F.2d at 240. If the act is meant to be punishment, then the standard has been met and the state official should be liable for his actions despite any claims of qualified immunity. Id. An additional requirement for a claim of "deliberate indifference" is that the inadequately treated injury must have been "serious." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
In Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1147 (7th Cir. 1984), the plaintiff pretrial detainee had allegedly suffered a broken nose, three broken teeth, and an injured eye in an attack by other inmates. Matzker told jail authorities about his injuries, but they did not bother to treat those injuries for three months. Id. Thus, the jail authorities knew that Matzker had sustained serious injuries, yet ignored those injuries. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that Matzker's claim met the "deliberate indifference" standard. Salazar, 940 F.2d at 240.
By contrast, Salazar presented the opposite situation in which a drunk driver was arrested at the scene of an accident and was taken directly to prison after refusing to be examined by paramedics. 940 F.2d at 235. In the prison cell, Salazer exhibited strange behavior such as lying on the floor but the officers attributed this behavior to his drunkenness. Id. at 236. A few hours later, he had died in his cell from an internal injury that was not outwardly visible to others. Id. The court held that the officers had not met the "deliberate indifference" standard because they had no reason to know of the plaintiff's internal injury and the plaintiff had not complained about it to them. Id. at 241.
In order to determine whether Randall and Speenburgh are protected by the qualified immunity doctrine, we must establish whether their actions amounted to a violation of the "deliberate indifference" standard. Salazar, 940 F.2d at 238; Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652-53. Our task becomes more complicated when we attempt to decipher the facts which have been established from the lengthy 12(m) and 12(n) statements submitted by the parties. Of course, we are aware that the disputed facts must be viewed in the best light for Tucker. But, we are mindful also, that the Seventh Circuit has stated: "we accept all well-pleaded facts alleged in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff's] favor. We do not, however, ignore facts alleged in the complaint that undermine [plaintiff's] claim nor do we assign any weight to unsupported conclusions of law." Crane v. Logli, 992 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir. 1992).
Tucker's initial injuries occurred in a bar fight prior to his detention in the Kendall County jail. Before being brought to Kendall County, Tucker was brought to a hospital for treatment. The doctor who treated him at the time did not find any broken bones or internal injuries. After diagnosing his condition as "blunt trauma", the doctor sent instructions with Tucker to Kendall County that allowed for Tucker to receive ice and aspirin for a few days. Assuming that the prison officials in Kendall County saw these instructions, as we must under this standard, we must then determine whether failure to give further treatment to Tucker violated his constitutional rights.
We find this case most similar to the facts in Salazar as well as another Seventh Circuit case, Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1991). The prison officials were aware that Tucker had already been seen and treated by a hospital doctor. He was not admitted for serious injuries, was not given any prescription medications to take, nor was he displaying any obvious signs of serious injury. We must ask: would a reasonable person believe that Tucker's injuries created a serious or life threatening risk of needless pain or lingering disability if not treated at once? Id. at 972.
In Davis, the defendant suffered a scraped elbow and a cut in his temple when he was arrested. The police did not give Davis immediate medical attention. The Seventh Circuit stated in Davis:
Just as the Constitution does not demand that police obtain medical care for prisoners whose injuries appear to be slight but turn out to be serious, so the officers must obtain medical care when the wound reasonably appears to be serious even if the risk turns out to have been small. Police can only act upon appearances; anything else is gambling with another person's life, a wager the Constitution does not permit arresting officers to undertake. Whether the injury is actually serious is a question best left to a physician.