their adjudicatory function. See, e.g., Walker, 769 F.2d at 398 (declining to follow Third Circuit's example in distinguishing between a board's adjudicatory and administrative actions). To be sure, a more limited scope of absolute immunity would subject parole boards, like judges themselves, to endless litigation directed at defining the boundaries of "judicial" acts. See Thompson, 882 F.2d at 1185-86; Walker, 769 F.2d at 399. In turn, parole boards and judges would be motivated to avoid retaliatory litigation, rather than to make difficult, sometimes unpopular decisions. Thompson, 882 F.2d at 1185-86. ("It is sufficient to say that judicial decision-making without absolute immunity would be driven by fear of litigation and personal monetary liability.").
Despite Walrath's assertions to the contrary, recent Supreme Court decisions do not cast doubt on the Seventh Circuit's understanding of absolute immunity. Walrath's suggestion that the Seventh Circuit has failed to appreciate the "functional analysis" as set forth by the Supreme Court is unfounded. In support of his claim, Walrath cites to Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991) and to Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993), in which the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's grant of absolute immunity to prosecutors. In Burns, the Court noted that "most Courts of Appeals have held that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for 'investigative' or 'administrative' acts," but observed that the courts "have differed in where they draw the line between protected and unprotected activities." Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 1938. Quite expressly, then, these decisions were intended to clarify the boundaries of prosecutorial immunity.
Unlike parole board members and officers, however, the Seventh Circuit has never held that a government attorney's job, in its entirety, is functionally comparable to the judiciary. Instead, in recognition of the wide-ranging roles performed by prosecutors and other public counsel, the Seventh Circuit has routinely distinguished between adjudicatory, investigative, and executive tasks in determining whether absolute immunity applies to challenged conduct. See, e.g., Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906, 109 S. Ct. 3215, 106 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1989); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647, 123 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1993). Rather than exposing any legal deficiency, then, the Seventh Circuit's analysis of immunity as it pertains to parole boards simply reflects this circuit's assessment that, as opposed to other public officials, parole board members and officers engage virtually exclusively in quasi-judicial activities. We are thus unpersuaded by Walrath's contention that Seventh Circuit precedent in the area of absolute immunity is suspect.
In his complaint, Walrath challenges the USPC's issuance of an arrest warrant based on a perceived violation of parole, its decision to delay the revocation hearing, and its ultimate revocation of his parole -- an action that was purportedly contrived to cover up other constitutional violations committed during the course of proceedings against Walrath. Each of these actions involve, or are closely and inextricably tied to, the USPC's central adjudicative task of determining whether Walrath's parole should properly be rescinded. See Trotter, 748 F.2d at 1182. See also Thompson, 882 F.2d at 1185 (absolute immunity attaches to parole board's scheduling decisions). Absolute immunity thus precludes Walrath's suit against the individual defendants.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the complaint against the individual defendants. It is so ordered.
MARVIN E. ASPEN
United States District Judge