The opinion of the court was delivered by: CHARLES P. KOCORAS
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the government's motion for summary judgment of forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (6), and (7). For the reasons that follow, we grant the motion.
This is a drug-related forfeiture action. The plaintiff is the United States Government. The government alleges that the defendant properties were acquired or improved with proceeds from illegal drug activity and/or were used to facilitate felony drug offenses. This Court (Grady, J.) found probable cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture and issued an order April 4, 1989 on the government's ex parte motion, allowing the government to seize the defendant property.
Clara Penny ("Penny") was the only owner to file a verified claim to the defendant property. She filed claims as an individual and as the president of West Side Building Corporation.
Penny's husband, Jonathan Penny, did not file a claim within the allotted time and therefore, a default judgment of forfeiture of his interests in the defendant assets was entered by this Court on August 15, 1990.
Penny stated several defenses in her answer to the verified complaint. Penny stated that two parcels of real estate and two vehicles were acquired before the effective date of the forfeiture statute; that three parcels of real estate were not purchased by Penny or West Side Building Corporation but were gifts from Penny's father; and that one vehicle was not purchased by Penny or West Side but was a gift to Penny and her husband.
Further, she stated that two vehicles were purchased with funds from Penny's credit union.
Penny responded to interrogatories on July 26, 1990. The government deposed Penny April 7, 1992. At the deposition, Penny asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to all questions relevant here. Penny states that her reason for doing so was that she was told that she was the subject of a grand jury investigation, that indictments had been returned, and that her testimony could be used against her in a criminal proceeding. Penny's Response, at 5. Penny was not, in fact, indicted, but her husband was. Jonathan Penny was convicted on September 10, 1993 in a jury trial on both counts of a two-count indictment. The indictment charged violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Jonathan Penny was found guilty of selling, distributing, or dispensing narcotics and conspiracy to do the same.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Only those disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law properly prevent a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). A genuine issue exists if there is "sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 249.
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that no such issue of material fact exists. When a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been made, the opposing party must then "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Cooper v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The opposing party is entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the underlying facts, but not every conceivable inference. De Valk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326, 329 (7th Cir. 1987). It is in consideration of these principles that we turn to the present motion for summary judgment.
At the outset, we wish to acknowledge the candor displayed in Penny's brief regarding unfavorable precedent. While this integrity should not be cause for comment, ...