was placed in the custody of the Sheriff, the Sheriff immediately released Sitar. Moreover, when the warrant was recalled on July 1, Sitar appeared in a courtroom for Elk Grove Village cases. He also appeared in that courtroom on July 5. These were additional opportunities for Elk Grove police officials to learn that the warrant had been recalled and should be cleared from LEADS. Furthermore, even if the Sheriff had an additional procedure of sending monthly reports to each police department advising it of recalled warrants for that department from the prior month, it would not have helped Sitar; he was arrested in the same month that his warrant was recalled. Sitar's situation is unlike Miller's. In Miller's case, the Sheriff's own records showed that a warrant was pending. In Sitar's case, the Sheriff's system was available to provide accurate information to prevent Sitar's arrest on the LEADS information. In Sitar's case, the conduct of the Sheriff cannot be found to be a proximate cause of Sitar's arrest. The Sheriff is entitled to summary judgment on Sitar's claim.
On October 13, 1986, plaintiff Keith Ruehman was arrested by an Illinois State Trooper and charged with aggravated assault, driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and four additional traffic offenses. The same day, Ruehman was released on two separate bail bonds. When Ruehman failed to appear in court on October 29, 1986, his bond was ordered forfeited and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The warrant was entered into SPWA on November 3, 1986. Ruehman appeared pro se in the Fifth Municipal District on January 6, 1987. The judge orally ordered that the arrest warrant be recalled, but no written order to that effect was completed. The written entry was: "MÅ MTV-BF E&C, Tran to Chicago Ridge, Room C 1-7-87." This entry means: "Motion defendant; motion to vacate bond forfeiture entered and continued; transfer to Chicago Ridge, Room C 1-7-87." The next day, Ruehman appeared before a judge at the Chicago Ridge Court House and that judge vacated the bond forfeiture. When that judge asked whether the warrant had been recalled, Ruehman and his counsel informed the judge that the warrant had been ordered recalled when Ruehman appeared on January 6. The second judge did not order the warrant recalled. A written order vacating the bond forfeiture was entered. On February 11, 1991, Ruehman was arrested by Chicago Ridge police and transferred to the Illinois State Police.
The next day, Ruehman was ordered released and a recall order was entered. The same day, a Sheriff's warrant clerk cleared the warrant from SPWA.
The Sheriff argues that the warrant was never recalled because no written order was entered to that effect. The judge's oral ruling, however, should suffice. In any event, the vacating of the bond forfeiture the following day would have, as a matter of law, resulted in the recall of the warrant as well, Ruehman's bond having been reinstated. See Coclanes v. City of Chicago, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5187, 1993 WL 124754 *2 (N.D. Ill. April 20, 1993). As of January 7, at the latest, there was no longer a valid warrant for Ruehman's arrest.
Ruehman argues that the Sheriff is responsible for ensuring that his records of warrants are accurate. He argues that the Sheriff cannot merely rely on information forwarded from the Clerk since the Sheriff knows that the Clerk's records frequently are inaccurate. There is no contention by Ruehman that the Sheriff had means of being directly aware of the oral recall order. He does not contend that the courtroom deputy, who provides security, should have been required to forward information about the recall order to the FWD. Ruehman, therefore, must rely on the Sheriff being constitutionally required to validate his records in order to ensure that SPWA is accurate. As previously discussed in connection with Miller's claim, in light of known deficiencies, the Sheriff is constitutionally required to validate SPWA in an attempt to prevent persons from being falsely arrested on recalled warrants.
Ruehman's arrest occurred prior to the time that the Sheriff began comparing SPWA to the Clerk's monthly list of recalled warrants.
But even if that practice was in place in 1987, it would not have helped Ruehman because the Clerk's records did not reflect that the warrant had been recalled. It is also not established that comparing the monthly list would result in a warrant being cleared by the eleventh day of the following month; Ruehman having been arrested on the eleventh day of the month following his warrant being quashed. The only other validation procedure that Ruehman points to is comparing original case files to SPWA's list of active warrants. Such a procedure would be consistent with LEADS procedures. It would have shown that Ruehman's warrant had been recalled because the warrant was marked with a large R and the warrant having been recalled would have also been evident from seeing that the bond forfeiture had been vacated. Ruehman points to no evidence as to how often such a validation would be conducted. Certainly it would not be conducted on a daily or weekly basis. It might also be unreasonable to conduct such a validation on even a monthly basis.
On the other hand, it might be a reasonable practice if the Sheriff limited such validations to warrants that have been pending for certain lengths of time or longer. Nothing that Ruehman submits supports that a reasonable validation practice based on comparisons to case files would have resulted in Ruehman's warrant being removed from the system a little over a month after it had been recalled. Therefore, the Sheriff is entitled to summary judgment on Ruehman's claim because the deficient practices supported by plaintiff's submissions have not been shown to be causally related to Ruehman's arrest.
In sum, the injunctive claims against the Sheriff are dismissed as moot and all other claims against the Sheriff are dismissed except plaintiff Miller's damages claim against the Sheriff in his official capacity. On that claim, summary judgment for liability is granted for Miller. At the next status hearing in this case, Miller and the Sheriff shall report on what additional procedures will be necessary to resolve the issue of Miller's damages.
III. VILLAGE OF DOLTON
The only plaintiff with a claim against the Village of Dolton is Miller.
In February 1989, Miller was arrested by Dolton police for driving on a revoked license. When arrested in January 1990 on the incorrectly listed warrant, Miller was turned over to the Dolton police who verified that an active warrant was listed on LEADS and SPWA. Both Miller and Dolton have moved for summary judgment on Miller's claim against Dolton.
As is discussed in § I, supra, any claim for injunctive or declaratory relief is now moot in that Miller no longer has any quashed warrants still listed as active on LEADS or SPWA. The claim for injunctive relief against Dolton will be dismissed as moot.
Dolton argues that it is not responsible for Miller being arrested on a recalled warrant. It argues that it relies on information supplied by the Sheriff and that it cannot be responsible for the Sheriff or Clerk of the Circuit Court failing to provide Dolton with information that Miller's warrant had already been recalled. While Dolton had certain validation procedures in place, Miller argues that Dolton did not have adequate procedures for independently verifying the information provided by the Sheriff. Miller argues that Dolton should have periodically compared its list of active warrants with the records of the State's Attorney and that it also should have periodically checked the records of the Circuit Court Clerk.
In light of the deficiencies of the Clerk's and the Sheriff's warrant records, it may be appropriate for Dolton to more rigorously validate the active warrant cases it has listed on LEADS. But even assuming this would be an appropriate precautionary measure, Miller's claim against Dolton does not support a constitutional violation. In order to be a constitutional violation, Dolton's conduct must be deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of citizens. It must be shown that "the need for more or different" procedures "is so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
Miller argues that Dolton's knowledge of the following shows that Dolton was deliberately indifferent.
1. [Dolton's] responsibility for warrants it enters into LEADS;