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RUEHMAN v. VILLAGE OF PALOS PARK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION


November 22, 1993

KEITH RUEHMAN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
VILLAGE OF PALOS PARK, et al., Defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLIAM T. HART

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiffs in this case claimed that they were named in arrest warrants that have been quashed or recalled but are still listed as active on municipal and state computer data banks. The crux of plaintiffs' federal claims are that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment *fn1" or due process rights have been violated in that defendants have failed to adequately maintain the computer networks so as to prevent the arrest and detention of persons on warrants that are no longer valid. Plaintiffs originally sought to represent a class and requested both damages and injunctive relief. This case has involved at least 11 plaintiffs and 25 defendants. Following rulings on various motions, settlement of some disputes, amendments to the complaint, the withdrawal of some claims, and the withdrawal of the claim for class certification, the number of remaining parties is substantially less. *fn2" The remaining plaintiffs are Keith Ruehman, Alan Miller, Joseph Brown, Michael Curtan, Dean Hyde, and Jean Sitar. The remaining defendants are the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Aurelia Pucinski), the Village of Dolton, the Village of La Grange, the City of Chicago, and the Sheriff of Cook County (Michael Sheahan). Only official capacity claims remain and the remaining claims against one defendant is only for injunctive relief. Various motions are pending, most of which are motions for summary judgment.

 On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1988); Jakubiec v. Cities Service Co., 844 F.2d 470, 471 (7th Cir. 1988). The burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Id. at 473. The nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The movant need not provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing the nonexistence of such essential elements. Id. at 324. Also, it is not sufficient to show evidence of purportedly disputed facts if those facts are not plausible in light of the entire record. See Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1991); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852, 102 L. Ed. 2d 110, 109 S. Ct. 137 (1988). As the Seventh Circuit has summarized:

 

The moving party bears the initial burden of directing the district court to the determinative issues and the available evidence that pertains to each. "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); id. at 325 ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'--that is, pointing out to the district court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case"). Then, with respect to issues that the non-moving party will bear the burden of proving at trial, the non-moving party must come forward with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions and designate specific facts which establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. The non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue. Id. The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).

 Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992).

 I. CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

 In Ruehman I, at 12-17 (*5-7), it was held that Pucinski was qualifiedly immune from any damages claim against her in her individual capacity. In Ruehman II, at 4-5 (*2), it was held that the official capacity damages claims against Pucinski could not be pursued because the Clerk of the Circuit Court was not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). *fn3" Plaintiffs were not precluded from pursuing their injunctive claims against Pucinski, those claims having previously been held to involve a justiciable case or controversy for those plaintiffs who still had recalled warrants listed as active on a computer system. See Ruehman I, at 29-30 (*11-12).

 Pucinski moves for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief because none of them currently have any recalled warrants that are incorrectly listed as active on one of the computer systems. Plaintiffs do not dispute this factual contention and concede that they no longer have standing to seek injunctive relief. Plaintiffs, however, argue that they have standing to amend their complaint and seek declaratory relief.

 Just as plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief, they also lack standing to seek declaratory relief. Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 493 U.S. 1012, 107 L. Ed. 2d 729, 110 S. Ct. 708 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035, 110 S. Ct. 756, 107 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1990). The "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception does not apply where there is no expectation that these same plaintiffs are the ones against whom any repeated violation will be committed. Id. Also, any repeated violations will not necessarily evade review because a class potentially could be certified that would be unlikely to lose its standing once certified. See 868 F.2d at 967-68; Ruehman I, at 29-30 (*11-12) (holding that, as of that time, plaintiffs had standing to pursue injunctive relief); Hvorcik v. Sheahan, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12406, 1993 WL 348569 *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1993) (certifying the same class as was originally sought to be certified in Ruehman, but with only the sheriff as a defendant). *fn4" The remaining claims against Pucinski will be dismissed as moot. *fn5" Pucinski will be dismissed from the case.

 II. SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY

 Three plaintiffs still have pending claims against Sheriff Sheahan in his official capacity: Ruehman, Miller, and Sitar. Each of these plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment as to liability against the Sheriff and the Sheriff has moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against him by these plaintiffs.

 As is discussed in § I, supra, any claim for injunctive or declaratory relief is now moot in that these plaintiffs no longer have recalled warrants incorrectly listed as active on a computer system. The claim for injunctive relief against the Sheriff will be denied as moot.

 A. Eleventh Amendment

 In reliance on Scott v. O'Grady, 975 F.2d 366, 371-72 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 124 L. Ed. 2d 643, 113 S. Ct. 2421 (1993), Sheahan contends that the damages claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment in that the Sheriff is acting as an agent of the state when processing warrants, which are orders of the state court. This argument has already been rejected twice. See Ruehman I, at 18 (*7); Ruehman II, at 5-6 (*2). Another judge in this district has also rejected the same argument made by the Sheriff in another case involving an arrest on a recalled warrant. Hvorcik v. Sheahan, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7476, 1993 WL 192948 *2 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1993) ("Quite unlike the action implicated in Scott, Sheahan's activities that are the gravamen of the [Second Amended Complaint]--those relating to the establishment and maintenance of records as to outstanding warrants--do not represent the purely ministerial enforcement of the orders of the state judiciary (they are not the fulfillment of a 'statutory, non-discretionary duty' as Scott, 975 F.2d at 371 described what was at issue there).") If the Sheriff's alleged misconduct was merely the enforcement of a warrant, then the holding of Scott would likely apply to bar such a claim since that would likely be construed as the enforcement of the court's order to arrest a particular person. The alleged misconduct in this case, however, is the failure by the Sheriff to properly track which warrants are still pending and which warrants have been recalled. That is not the enforcement of a state court warrant of arrest.

 The Sheriff also relies upon an August 29, 1983 memorandum issued by the presiding judge of the Sixth Municipal District. *fn6" That memorandum sets forth certain procedures for Sheriff's employees in the warrants office and Sheriff's employees who provide courtroom services. It is disputed whether this 1983 memorandum was in effect in 1991 when plaintiff Miller was arrested on a recalled warrant. In any event, the memorandum is not an order of the court. It is clear from the memorandum that it is merely reporting the procedures that the various agencies involved have agreed to implement in light of recommendations made by the Sixth Municipal warrant study committee. This memorandum does not convert any undertaking by the Sheriff to follow these procedures into the implementation of a court order. Additionally, the memorandum still leaves to the Sheriff's discretion the actual implementation of the computer tracking system and other procedures. General Order No. 8-89, which the Sheriff also relies upon, provides that police officers are to check with the Warrant Division prior to bringing prisoners for bond hearings and that the Warrant Division will complete a form noting any outstanding warrants. The order states nothing about tracking warrants or quash and recall orders and says nothing about the computer system. General Order No. 8-89 does not in any way control or limit the Sheriff's discretion in setting up a warrant tracking system. The damages claims against the Sheriff are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

 B. Sheriff's Practices

 In his motion for summary judgment, the Sheriff asserts that the evidence does not support the existence of any unconstitutional custom or policy. In neither its supporting brief nor Local Rule 12(m) Statement of Material Facts, does defendant point to any of the facts relevant to this issue. Instead, the primary focus of his argument is the lack of a causal relationship between any custom or policy and each plaintiff's arrest. Thus, defendant does not satisfy his initial summary judgment burden of "directing the . . . court to . . . the available evidence that pertains to each" issue. Selan, 969 F.2d at 564. Accord Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The issue of the nonexistence of a custom or policy is not raised by the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment.

 In response to plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, the Sheriff again argues that the facts do not support the element of causation. While not expressly conceding that it is uncontested that the Sheriff had deficient and deliberately indifferent procedures for tracking warrants, the Sheriff's brief contains no argument to the contrary. The Sheriff's response to plaintiffs' Local Rule 12(m) Statements presents disputes as to some of the factual details, but does not contest the general description of the practices of the Sheriff's office. Set forth below in general terms are the practices of the Sheriff that are supported by the submission of plaintiffs, with any factual disputes presented by the Sheriff and supported by adequate submissions resolved in the Sheriff's favor. *fn7"

 There are two computer systems for tracking warrants that are pertinent to plaintiffs' claims against the Sheriff. The Sheriff maintains the Cook County Sheriff's Police Warrant Computer System ("SPWA"). The state maintains the Illinois State Police Law Enforcement Data System ("LEADS"). Police departments throughout the state have access to LEADS, but only the Sheriff has direct access to SPWA. Other police departments may make telephone inquiries regarding SPWA listings. The Circuit Court Clerk also has a computerized system for tracking warrants. The Sheriff and other police departments do not have direct access to the Clerk's system.

 Deputy sheriffs are assigned to the courtrooms of Circuit Court judges. The deputy sheriffs provide security for the courtroom. The deputy sheriffs are not responsible for providing the Sheriff's office with information about court orders entered in the courtrooms to which the deputies are assigned. The Sheriff's Fugitive Warrants Division ("FWD") is the division of the Sheriff that is responsible for tracking the status of warrants. One or more warrant clerks are assigned to the various municipal districts of the Circuit Court of Cook County. The warrant clerks are responsible for entering information on the SPWA and for also reporting certain information to LEADS.

  Judges of the Circuit Court have deputy court clerks assigned to their courtrooms. The Circuit Court Clerk has a quash and recall order form that consists of four copies. When a judge signs such an order, the deputy court clerk is initially responsible for processing it. The court clerk completes the quash and recall form, which is to be signed by the judge. The blue copy is provided to the defendant. The original white and the pink and yellow copies are attached to the file jacket. The file is to be forwarded to the Clerk's verification department by the end of the day. The verification clerk will check to make sure that the numbers on the order match up with the case file. The original is then placed in the file and the pink and yellow copies are placed in baskets for pick up by the Sheriff. The verification clerk also notes the disposition code for non-traffic warrants and forwards it to the computer room for entry into the Clerk's computer. The Clerk's computer system had no disposition codes for traffic warrants.

 It takes two to five days for the quash and recall order to be forwarded to the Sheriff's basket for pickup. Most commonly it takes three days. After being picked up by the Sheriff's office, it is the responsibility of the Sheriff's warrant clerks to enter the recall order into SPWA. The Sheriff also maintains files with copies of active warrant orders.

 There are approximately 125,000 active warrants listed on SPWA. It is estimated that 50 to 75 per cent of these are from traffic cases. Each month, the Clerk provides the Sheriff with a list of all quash and recall orders entered in non-traffic cases that month. Since 1988, the Sheriff has compared the Clerk's monthly list to the list of active warrants on SPWA. Each month, 49 to 100 non-traffic warrants are found that are listed as active despite having been quashed. The SPWA is then updated to reflect that the warrant has been quashed. No similar cross-checking is done with traffic warrants because the Clerk does not provide a report for traffic warrants.

 It is known that the Clerk's office frequently fails to forward quash and recall orders to the Sheriff. Other than the cross-checking from the quash and recall report for non-traffic warrants, *fn8" nothing is done to remedy this known problem. The deputy sheriffs assigned for courtroom security are not required to report to the warrant clerks about quash and recall orders. No attempt is made to compare the State's Attorney's records of pending warrants with those listed on the SPWA. Except for the cross-checking described, the Sheriff's FWD does not clear a warrant unless it receives its copies of the quash and recall order from the Clerk.

 The FWD is headquartered in the Criminal Courts Building located at 26th and California in Chicago. There are no FWD supervisory personnel at the suburban courthouses and the supervisors rarely visit the warrant clerks assigned to suburban courthouses. The warrant clerks receive no special training from the FWD and there is no training manual for the SPWA system. There are no written procedures of the FWD as to how quash and recall orders are to be received from the Clerk's office. The work of warrant clerks is not reviewed or audited and there is no formal review process for evaluation of warrant clerks' SPWA work. The Illinois State Police provide LEADS training for at least some warrant clerks and certify clerks to work on LEADS.

 The Sixth Municipal District has the largest volume of warrants of the suburban districts. In July 1989, one of the Sixth District's two warrant clerks was on sick leave. The other clerk had been on the job for only six months at that point in time. She remained as the only Sixth District warrant clerk until October 1989. During that time period, the Sixth District had as many as 1500 warrants waiting to be entered into the computer. At least some warrants were being entered into SPWA as new warrants after the quash and recall orders had already been entered.

 Sheriff warrant clerks are responsible for entering warrants and recall information onto LEADS for felonies, violations of probation, violations of conditional discharge, and violation of supervision. Such information for misdemeanor and traffic cases can only be entered by the law enforcement agency issuing the warrant. The Sheriff cannot directly remove such warrants from LEADS. The other agencies rely on the Sheriff forwarding information about court orders issuing and recalling warrants. *fn9" When warrants in such cases are recalled, the Sheriff makes a computer printout indicating the warrant has been recalled and places the printout in a box for pickup by the issuing agency. Agencies often delayed in picking up copies of cancelled warrants or the cancelled warrants were misdirected. In 1992, the Sheriff began keeping records of when the other agencies picked up orders and had the other agencies sign acknowledgements that the warrants had been picked up.

 Prior to 1988, reports of outstanding warrants listed on SPWA would be sent out to various police departments. The police departments would report some incorrect information to the Sheriff and incorrectly listed warrants would be removed from SPWA. Beginning in 1988, such reports were sent only to police departments that specifically requested them.

 The LEADS Manual provides that local agencies should validate their records of warrants listed on LEADS, including comparing their records with those of the State's Attorney or Circuit Court Clerk. In 1988, the Illinois State Police conducted an audit of FWD procedures related to LEADS. Compliance with LEADS regulations and policies was found to be "poor." One recommendation for compliance was:

 

Ensure that each LEADS/NCIC record is supported by an investigative document, active warrant or complaint. The [FWD] should seek 24 hour access to the Circuit Clerk's computer file, which would enable the [FWD] to detect quash notices entered into this file but not yet picked up from the clerk's office. It is strongly recommended that the [FWD] obtain a copy of the police report, complaint, or other forms of documentation to obtain accurate caution and weapon information which should be included in the LEADS/NCIC record for officer safety. Records that do not have warrants to support their existence should be removed from LEADS/NCIC.

 A LEADS audit was again conducted in February 1993. The Sheriff was again found to have failed to comply with LEADS requirements for validation and comparing records with second parties. *fn10"

 C. Miller

 The uncontested facts as to plaintiff Alan Miller's arrest are as follows. In February 1989, Miller was arrested by Dolton Police and charged with driving with a revoked license. Miller was sentenced to court supervision, but violated the terms of his supervision and, in August 1989, was ordered to serve seven days in jail. Miller failed to report for his jail term and, on August 31, 1989, Judge McBride of the Sixth Municipal District issued a warrant for Miller's arrest. On September 7, 1989, Judge McBride quashed and recalled the warrant after Miller surrendered and began serving his seven-day sentence. This sentence was served at the Cook County Jail which is run by the Sheriff. A quash and recall order was completed, but the copies for the Sheriff remained in the Clerk's file instead of being delivered to the Clerk and forwarded to the Sheriff. At the time there was a backlog in the Sixth District for entering warrants into SPWA. The warrant that had been issued on August 31 and recalled on September 7 was entered into the computer as active on September 20, 1989. The information as to the issuance of the warrant having been forwarded by the Sheriff to the Dolton Police, on September 23, the Dolton Police entered the warrant on LEADS.

 On January 23, 1990, Miller was stopped or arrested by Oak Forest Police who had found the active warrant listed on LEADS. Miller informed the Oak Forest police officer that the warrant had been quashed and recalled by Judge McBride and produced an uncertified copy of the quash and recall order that had been provided to him upon being released from serving the seven-day term. The Oak Forest Police transferred Miller to the custody of the Dolton Police who confirmed that the warrant was listed as active on LEADS and who also contacted the Sheriff who verified the warrant was listed as active on SPWA. Having been arrested around 1:30 in the morning, Miller was held in custody overnight. At 3:08 a.m. on January 23, Dolton entered recall information into LEADS since Miller was in custody. When Miller appeared in court later that day, he informed the judge that he had served his sentence and that the arrest warrant had been quashed. The court file was obtained, which verified this information. At that time, it was discovered that the Sheriff's copies of the quash and recall order were still in the court file. Miller was released and the same day the arrest warrant was cleared from SPWA.

 The Sheriff argues that Miller's arrest was not caused by any unconstitutional practice of the Sheriff. The Sheriff argues that he is not responsible for the Clerk failing to deliver the Sheriff's copies of the quash and recall order. *fn11" Miller argues that the Sheriff knew that the Clerk's procedures for forwarding quash and recall orders to the Sheriff were deficient and that the Sheriff acted with deliberate indifference in failing to ensure that there was an adequate procedure for informing warrant clerks of the granting of quash and recall orders. Miller also argues that whether the Clerk forwarded the Sheriff's copies of the quash and recall order is immaterial because the Sheriff had actual knowledge of that order in that a Sheriff's employee provided Miller with his copy of the quash and recall order and it was the Sheriff who held Miller in custody for his seven-day sentence served at Cook County Jail.

 Miller was placed in the Sheriff's custody and Sheriff's employees actually had a copy of the quash and recall order. There is no procedure in place for clearing warrants based on the fact that the Sheriff has the person in his custody nor are County Jail personnel responsible for checking to see if warrants have been cleared for persons confined at the Jail. Under such circumstances, the Sheriff's office has actual knowledge that the warrant has been served and that the warrant no longer need be listed as active. Under those circumstances, failing to clear the warrant from the computer system so as to prevent rearrest on the same warrant would constitute deliberate indifference to the person's rights absent there being another means for clearing the warrant. There are, however, other means. Bringing the arrestee to court after his or her arrest is the place where documents are to be generated to clear the warrant off the computer systems. Also having County Jail personnel generate such documents would be a duplication of effort and would only be applicable to those actually detained in the Sheriff's custody. Failing to have procedures to forward information from jail personnel to the FWD could not, by itself, be deliberate indifference to arrestees' constitutional rights if there is another adequate system in place to track recalls of warrants. Therefore, even though it is undisputed that County Jail personnel had knowledge that Miller's warrant was executed and no longer needed to be active, it still must be determined if relying on the Clerk to forward copies of quash and recall orders is an inadequate system.

 Arrest warrants are issued by the court and quashed and recalled by the court. LEADS and SPWA are intended to be systems by which law enforcement agencies can have quick and accurate access to information about court orders. Therefore, it is facially reasonable to rely on the courts to provide the basic information that is to be input into the systems. The Clerk's office has in place a procedure for forwarding to the Sheriff information that warrants have been recalled. It is not a foolproof system. Some quash and recall orders are never forwarded to the Sheriff, but how many is unknown; the Sheriff does not keep statistics that identify how many or why recalled warrants remain listed as active. The uncontested evidence does show, however, that large numbers of recalled warrants are incorrectly listed as active on SPWA. *fn12" The cause of this may be incorrect data entry by warrant clerks, failure to receive copies of quash and recall orders, or other reasons.

 Regardless of the cause of inaccuracies, it is evident that some means of eliminating errors is necessary in order to maintain SPWA (and other systems that rely on it) as a reasonably accurate system. LEADS regulations call for validating data on LEADS by comparing it to other sources such as the Clerk's records, State's Attorney's records, and original case files. Despite known deficiencies in SPWA, the only regular validation performed is comparing SPWA's records with the Clerk's monthly report of recall orders. If the Clerk's report covered all warrants, that might be sufficient. The Clerk's report, however, only covers non-traffic warrants. No calculated attempt is made to eliminate traffic warrants (the type of warrant issued for Miller's arrest) that are incorrectly listed as active. The undisputed evidence is that there are large numbers of incorrectly listed traffic warrants, that the Sheriff's office had knowledge of this deficiency, and that there was no procedure in place for eliminating incorrect listings. Accordingly, it must be held that the Sheriff's policy in not maintaining accurate records of traffic warrants was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of persons being subjected to arrests and detention on recalled warrants. See Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 366-67 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 604, 102 S. Ct. 2226, 72 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1982); Mairena v. Foti, 816 F.2d 1061, 1065 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005, 108 S. Ct. 697, 98 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1988); Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1326 (7th Cir. 1993); Ruehman I, at 27-28 (*11).

 A proximate cause of Miller's arrest was the failure of the Clerk to forward copies of the quash and recall order to the Sheriff's basket. Had the order been properly forwarded, the warrant would have been cleared from SPWA and LEADS and the arrest would not have occurred. *fn13" Therefore, the Clerk's action is a "but for" cause of the arrest. The arrest in this case occurred four months after the warrant was recalled. Despite the Clerk's error, if the Sheriff had regularly audited his records, the warrant would have been cleared from the system. *fn14" If proper validation procedures had been in place, the warrant also would have been cleared from LEADS since the Sheriff would share such information with the issuing agency just as it sends computer printouts of recalled warrants to issuing agencies. In any event, in Miller's case, the Dolton Police specifically called the FWD to verify that the warrant was still listed as active on SPWA. The Sheriff's failure to keep accurate records, therefore, was a proximate cause of Miller's arrest. *fn15"

  Because the undisputed facts support the existence of a custom or policy that was deliberately indifferent to the illegality of persons being arrested on recalled warrants and because the undisputed facts also show that this custom or policy was a proximate cause of plaintiff Miller's arrest and detention, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment that the Sheriff is liable to him for damages. The issue of the amount of damages remains to be resolved.

 D. Sitar

 On January 20, 1991, plaintiff John Sitar was arrested by the Elk Grove Village Police on charges of driving under the influence of alcohol, illegal transportation of an alcoholic liquor, and operating a motor vehicle after his license was revoked. An arrest warrant was issued on April 11, 1991 after Sitar failed to appear for a hearing. A Third Municipal District warrant clerk entered the warrant on SPWA and the Elk Grove Police Department entered it on LEADS. As of June 28, 1991, Sitar was incarcerated at Cook County Jail. The warrant was cleared from SPWA on that date. On July 1, 1991, Sitar appeared before a judge who recalled the warrant. The original arrest warrant was stamped "warrant recalled" and filed by a Sheriff's warrant clerk. The Elk Grove Village Police did not clear the arrest warrant from LEADS. On July 31, 1991 at 3:00 p.m., Sitar was arrested by Arlington Heights police based on the warrant being listed on LEADS. Sitar was held at the Elk Grove Village jail until 11:00 a.m on August 1. After being transported to the Rolling Meadow Court House, Sheriff's police released Sitar without a court appearance. Elk Grove police removed the warrant from LEADS on August 1.

 As of 1991, the Sheriff did not require police departments to sign log books or acknowledgements that copies of cancelled warrants were received. There is no documentation that the cancelled warrant was received. Neither is there any conclusive evidence that the cancelled warrant was not received. Based on evidence of the Sheriff's and Elk Grove Police Department's usual practices in that time period, it will be a factual dispute to be resolved by the trier of fact as to whether the cancelled warrant was delivered to the Elk Grove Police Department. Sitar is not entitled to summary judgment because it is essential to his claim that it be shown that the Sheriff failed in delivering the cancelled warrant and the facts must be resolved otherwise on Sitar's motion.

 It still must be considered whether, even resolving the factual dispute in Sitar's favor and assuming that the Sheriff failed to properly deliver the cancelled warrant, the Sheriff would still be entitled to summary judgment. On the Sheriff's motion, it must also be assumed that the Sheriff's procedures for delivering copies of cancelled warrants to other police agencies was deficient since plaintiff presents evidence to support that contention and the Sheriff does not argue that the uncontested facts are otherwise. The focus of the Sheriff's argument is on whether he can be considered a proximate cause of Sitar's arrest.

 The Sheriff properly cleared the Sitar warrant from SPWA. The Sheriff, though, had no authority to clear the warrant from LEADS. The Elk Grove Police Department initially listed the warrant on LEADS and it was the agency that had authority to clear the warrant from LEADS. When Sitar was arrested by Arlington Heights police, they verified the warrant on LEADS. They, as well as officials at the Elk Grove Jail, could also have sought out verification from the Sheriff. Had either done so, it would have learned that SPWA showed that the warrant had been recalled. Once he was placed in the custody of the Sheriff, the Sheriff immediately released Sitar. Moreover, when the warrant was recalled on July 1, Sitar appeared in a courtroom for Elk Grove Village cases. He also appeared in that courtroom on July 5. These were additional opportunities for Elk Grove police officials to learn that the warrant had been recalled and should be cleared from LEADS. Furthermore, even if the Sheriff had an additional procedure of sending monthly reports to each police department advising it of recalled warrants for that department from the prior month, it would not have helped Sitar; he was arrested in the same month that his warrant was recalled. Sitar's situation is unlike Miller's. In Miller's case, the Sheriff's own records showed that a warrant was pending. In Sitar's case, the Sheriff's system was available to provide accurate information to prevent Sitar's arrest on the LEADS information. In Sitar's case, the conduct of the Sheriff cannot be found to be a proximate cause of Sitar's arrest. The Sheriff is entitled to summary judgment on Sitar's claim.

 E. Ruehman

 On October 13, 1986, plaintiff Keith Ruehman was arrested by an Illinois State Trooper and charged with aggravated assault, driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and four additional traffic offenses. The same day, Ruehman was released on two separate bail bonds. When Ruehman failed to appear in court on October 29, 1986, his bond was ordered forfeited and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The warrant was entered into SPWA on November 3, 1986. Ruehman appeared pro se in the Fifth Municipal District on January 6, 1987. The judge orally ordered that the arrest warrant be recalled, but no written order to that effect was completed. The written entry was: "MÅ MTV-BF E&C, Tran to Chicago Ridge, Room C 1-7-87." This entry means: "Motion defendant; motion to vacate bond forfeiture entered and continued; transfer to Chicago Ridge, Room C 1-7-87." The next day, Ruehman appeared before a judge at the Chicago Ridge Court House and that judge vacated the bond forfeiture. When that judge asked whether the warrant had been recalled, Ruehman and his counsel informed the judge that the warrant had been ordered recalled when Ruehman appeared on January 6. The second judge did not order the warrant recalled. A written order vacating the bond forfeiture was entered. On February 11, 1991, Ruehman was arrested by Chicago Ridge police and transferred to the Illinois State Police. *fn16" The next day, Ruehman was ordered released and a recall order was entered. The same day, a Sheriff's warrant clerk cleared the warrant from SPWA.

 The Sheriff argues that the warrant was never recalled because no written order was entered to that effect. The judge's oral ruling, however, should suffice. In any event, the vacating of the bond forfeiture the following day would have, as a matter of law, resulted in the recall of the warrant as well, Ruehman's bond having been reinstated. See Coclanes v. City of Chicago, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5187, 1993 WL 124754 *2 (N.D. Ill. April 20, 1993). As of January 7, at the latest, there was no longer a valid warrant for Ruehman's arrest.

 Ruehman argues that the Sheriff is responsible for ensuring that his records of warrants are accurate. He argues that the Sheriff cannot merely rely on information forwarded from the Clerk since the Sheriff knows that the Clerk's records frequently are inaccurate. There is no contention by Ruehman that the Sheriff had means of being directly aware of the oral recall order. He does not contend that the courtroom deputy, who provides security, should have been required to forward information about the recall order to the FWD. Ruehman, therefore, must rely on the Sheriff being constitutionally required to validate his records in order to ensure that SPWA is accurate. As previously discussed in connection with Miller's claim, in light of known deficiencies, the Sheriff is constitutionally required to validate SPWA in an attempt to prevent persons from being falsely arrested on recalled warrants.

  Ruehman's arrest occurred prior to the time that the Sheriff began comparing SPWA to the Clerk's monthly list of recalled warrants. *fn17" But even if that practice was in place in 1987, it would not have helped Ruehman because the Clerk's records did not reflect that the warrant had been recalled. It is also not established that comparing the monthly list would result in a warrant being cleared by the eleventh day of the following month; Ruehman having been arrested on the eleventh day of the month following his warrant being quashed. The only other validation procedure that Ruehman points to is comparing original case files to SPWA's list of active warrants. Such a procedure would be consistent with LEADS procedures. It would have shown that Ruehman's warrant had been recalled because the warrant was marked with a large R and the warrant having been recalled would have also been evident from seeing that the bond forfeiture had been vacated. Ruehman points to no evidence as to how often such a validation would be conducted. Certainly it would not be conducted on a daily or weekly basis. It might also be unreasonable to conduct such a validation on even a monthly basis. *fn18" On the other hand, it might be a reasonable practice if the Sheriff limited such validations to warrants that have been pending for certain lengths of time or longer. Nothing that Ruehman submits supports that a reasonable validation practice based on comparisons to case files would have resulted in Ruehman's warrant being removed from the system a little over a month after it had been recalled. Therefore, the Sheriff is entitled to summary judgment on Ruehman's claim because the deficient practices supported by plaintiff's submissions have not been shown to be causally related to Ruehman's arrest.

 In sum, the injunctive claims against the Sheriff are dismissed as moot and all other claims against the Sheriff are dismissed except plaintiff Miller's damages claim against the Sheriff in his official capacity. On that claim, summary judgment for liability is granted for Miller. At the next status hearing in this case, Miller and the Sheriff shall report on what additional procedures will be necessary to resolve the issue of Miller's damages.

 III. VILLAGE OF DOLTON

 The only plaintiff with a claim against the Village of Dolton is Miller. *fn19" In February 1989, Miller was arrested by Dolton police for driving on a revoked license. When arrested in January 1990 on the incorrectly listed warrant, Miller was turned over to the Dolton police who verified that an active warrant was listed on LEADS and SPWA. Both Miller and Dolton have moved for summary judgment on Miller's claim against Dolton.

 As is discussed in § I, supra, any claim for injunctive or declaratory relief is now moot in that Miller no longer has any quashed warrants still listed as active on LEADS or SPWA. The claim for injunctive relief against Dolton will be dismissed as moot.

 Dolton argues that it is not responsible for Miller being arrested on a recalled warrant. It argues that it relies on information supplied by the Sheriff and that it cannot be responsible for the Sheriff or Clerk of the Circuit Court failing to provide Dolton with information that Miller's warrant had already been recalled. While Dolton had certain validation procedures in place, Miller argues that Dolton did not have adequate procedures for independently verifying the information provided by the Sheriff. Miller argues that Dolton should have periodically compared its list of active warrants with the records of the State's Attorney and that it also should have periodically checked the records of the Circuit Court Clerk. *fn20"

 In light of the deficiencies of the Clerk's and the Sheriff's warrant records, it may be appropriate for Dolton to more rigorously validate the active warrant cases it has listed on LEADS. But even assuming this would be an appropriate precautionary measure, Miller's claim against Dolton does not support a constitutional violation. In order to be a constitutional violation, Dolton's conduct must be deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of citizens. It must be shown that "the need for more or different" procedures "is so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).

 Miller argues that Dolton's knowledge of the following shows that Dolton was deliberately indifferent.

 

1. [Dolton's] responsibility for warrants it enters into LEADS;

 

2. The need to validate warrants it enters into LEADS in compliance with LEADS regulations; and

 

3. An invalid warrant appearing as active in LEADS will cause a violation of citizens' constitutional rights.

 Miller's Memorandum in Response to Dolton at 6.

 This statement of factors purportedly sufficient to support deliberate indifference is both incorrect and insufficient. The third item is legally incorrect. A warrant being incorrectly listed on LEADS does not cause a constitutional violation until the person is actually arrested based on the incorrect listing. Moreover, deliberate indifference cannot be shown unless the Village is also aware that persons are being arrested on incorrectly listed warrants or, at a minimum, it is shown that such arrests are so likely to occur that failure to have additional validation procedures represents a substantial risk of having persons arrested on invalid warrants. It is uncontested that no Dolton official had knowledge of any person, other than Miller, being arrested because of incorrectly listed LEADS information entered by Dolton. Additionally, Miller can point to no evidence that would be a basis for finding that Dolton's failure to implement further procedures was deliberately indifferent to any substantial risk of persons being arrested on incorrect warrant information. There is not even any evidence of incorrectly listed active warrants generated by Dolton, let alone there being evidence of high numbers of such warrants remaining listed for substantial periods of time. The facts presented do not support that Dolton was deliberately indifferent to any substantial likelihood of arrests on incorrectly listed warrants occurring. Therefore, Dolton is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Miller's damages claim against it.

 The injunctive relief claim against Dolton will be dismissed without prejudice as moot and the damages claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

 IV. VILLAGE OF LA GRANGE

 In November 1987, a Village of La Grange police officer arrested plaintiff Joseph Brown for traffic offenses. Brown was placed on court supervision for a year, but failed to appear for a January 9, 1989 hearing at the end of the one-year period. A warrant for his arrest was issued that day. He appeared two days later and the warrant was recalled on January 11, 1989. More than two years later, the warrant was still being listed on LEADS as being active. On February 27, 1991, Brown was arrested based on the LEADS listing. When he appeared in court, an order recalling the warrant was again entered. After the filing of the present lawsuit, the computer printout from the Sheriff informing La Grange of the January 11, 1989 recall order was found in a desk drawer. Due to an inadvertent clerical error of the responsible La Grange employee, the recall order had never been entered into LEADS. It is uncontested that: "No evidence exists of any instances other than Joseph Brown, during the twenty-five plus years that the Village of La Grange has participated in LEADS, of individuals having been arrested on previously recalled warrants emanating from arrests by Village of La Grange police officers." La Grange Rule 12(m) Statement P 12 (admitted as true in plaintiff's Rule 12(n) Statement).

 Brown argues that La Grange's validation procedures are deficient in that lists of active warrants are not compared to La Grange's own case files; lists are not requested from SPWA for comparison; and no attempt is made to obtain information directly from the Clerk of the Circuit Court. *fn21"

 As with the Village of Dolton, see § III supra, there may be additional validation procedures that should be implemented. However, the deliberate indifference standard is not satisfied because there is no showing that the procedures in place were so inadequate and so likely to cause an arrest on a recalled warrant that the failure to implement additional procedures would be deliberate indifference to citizens' constitutional rights. No other person whose warrant was entered on LEADS by La Grange police has ever been arrested on an invalid warrant. Also, there is no showing that any other clerical error or incorrect listing on LEADS has been caused by La Grange. La Grange is entitled to summary judgment on the damages claim against it.

 The injunctive relief claim against La Grange will be dismissed without prejudice as moot and the damages claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

 V. CITY OF CHICAGO

 In August 1988, an order for bond forfeiture was entered and a warrant was issued for plaintiff Dean Hyde's arrest. That warrant was recorded at the Chicago police Department's Computerized Warrant Desk (the "Hot Desk"). Hyde appeared in court on October 13, 1988. The bond forfeiture was vacated. The warrant was no longer valid, but no written quash and recall order was entered by the Clerk of the Circuit Court. Hyde's supervision terminated in December 1989. Over three years after the bond forfeiture and almost two years after his case had been closed, the August 1988 arrest warrant was still listed as active on the Hot Desk.

 On October 26, 1991, Hyde was involved in an automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol and was arrested by a Chicago police officer. Hyde was charged with following too close, driving on a suspended license, driving without automobile insurance, and driving while under the influence. At the police station, a check of the Hot Desk revealed the August 1988 arrest warrant and indicated that it was still active. Hyde was detained overnight. He appeared in Holiday Court and the judge released him on separate bonds for the new arrest and the old arrest warrant. When he subsequently appeared on the 1988 arrest warrant, that warrant was quashed and recalled. *fn22"

 During the relevant time period, the City relied on the Clerk of the Circuit Court for information concerning warrants. Warrants remained listed in the Hot Desk for as long as seven years with there being no periodic audits of the information or comparisons to other data sources. The City did periodically review the entries it had made into LEADS, but did not conduct any similar validation for the Hot Desk. Hyde contends that the City should have conducted regular audits of the Hot Desk information and that the City should not have relied solely on information supplied by the Circuit Clerk.

 Factual disputes exist that preclude the granting of either Hyde's or the City's motion for summary judgment. Factual disputes exist as to the extent of inaccuracies in the Hot Desk database and how often that might result in persons being arrested on warrants that are no longer valid. It is undisputed that the City had a policy of not verifying information listed on the Hot Desk, but it remains for the finder of fact to determine whether the risk of arrests on invalid warrants was high enough and obvious enough that the City's failure to have such procedures would be deliberate indifference to the rights of its citizens.

 Factual disputes also exist as to whether any deficient policy that may be proven was the cause of Hyde's overnight detention following his October 1991 arrest. *fn23" The City presents some evidence from which a factfinder might conclude that Hyde would have been detained overnight on the October 1991 traffic offenses even if the August 1988 warrant had not been found in the Hot Desk. On the other side, that evidence is far from conclusive; the City is not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that it is undisputed that Hyde would have been detained regardless of the listing on the Hot Desk.

 Hyde's claim for injunctive relief will be dismissed without prejudice. His claim for damages remains pending.

 VI. VILLAGE OF WHEELING

 Plaintiff Rahmin Alamin made a claim against defendant Village of Wheeling. Alamin's attorneys subsequently lost contact with him. The attorneys finally located Alamin at an Illinois prison. At that time, Alamin informed his attorneys that he no longer wished to pursue his claim. Alamin's claim thereafter was voluntarily dismissed. Still pending is Wheeling's motion for sanctions. It seeks sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 or, alternatively, fees to a prevailing defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1988. Sanctions or fees are only sought from Alamin's attorneys, not from Alamin himself. Wheeling contends that there was no basis for claiming that a warrant for Alamin's arrest was based on charges brought by Wheeling.

 Alamin argues that the motion is untimely because not brought within the time limits of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). That argument is without merit. Sanctions and fee petitions are collateral proceedings that need not be brought prior to the entry of judgment and therefore are not limited by the time limits of Rule 59(e). In any event, no judgment has ever been entered in this case so the time limit of Rule 59(e) could not be applicable.

 Alamin's attorneys provide affidavits supporting that they interviewed Alamin and examined the case file that Alamin's public defender had. They represent that the case file and interview of Alamin supported that he was arrested on an invalid warrant. Neither affidavit expressly states that there was any basis for naming Wheeling as the defendant to Alamin's claim. Wheeling, however, provides nothing in support of its motion to show that Alamin's arrest was caused by another law enforcement agency.

 Section 1988 only permits fee awards from opposing parties, not from counsel for the opposing party. Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 276-77 (3d Cir. 1990). It will only be considered whether Wheeling is entitled to sanctions under Rule 11.

 In their affidavits, Alamin's attorneys state that they interviewed Alamin and his public defender attorney who both stated that he had been arrested on an invalid warrant. Counsel also states that she reviewed the court file and that on the basis of her review and knowledge at that time, she concluded that the warrant was invalid and Alamin had a valid cause of action. This presentation was not contradicted by Wheeling and is sufficient to overcome a Rule 11 charge.

 VII. MOTIONS TO COMPEL

 Motions to compel against various parties were pending. In light of today's ruling, however, all those motions are moot except as regards the City of Chicago. Plaintiff Hyde apparently still seeks further statistical information regarding arrests on invalid warrants. This issue will be addressed at the next status hearing. In the meantime the parties should seek to resolve the discovery dispute.

 VIII. CONCLUSION

 All remaining claims are dismissed except for Miller's damages claim against the Sheriff and Hyde's damages claim against the City of Chicago. Summary judgment on liability is granted for Miller against the Sheriff. At the next status hearing, Miller and the Sheriff shall report on the possibility of settlement or otherwise resolving this case without a trial. Hyde and the City of Chicago shall report on any remaining discovery dispute and whether their dispute can be resolved short of a trial. In the meantime, a date has been set for the filing of a final pretrial order.

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

 (1) Plaintiffs' motions to compel [218, 219, 239] are denied as moot. Plaintiffs' motion to compel [259], as brought by Hyde against the City of Chicago, is continued to December 8, 1993 at 9:15 a.m. That motion to compel [259] is denied as moot as brought by the other plaintiffs or against other defendants.

 (2) The Village of Wheeling's motion for sanctions [246] is denied.

 (3) The City of Chicago's motion to strike [365] is denied. Plaintiff Hyde's motion for leave to file objections [367] is granted. Defendant Dolton's motion to strike [351] is denied.

 (4) Plaintiff Miller's motion for summary judgment against the Sheriff [279] is granted. Defendant Michael Sheahan, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, is held to be liable to plaintiff Alan Miller.

 (5) Plaintiffs Hyde's [285], Brown's [323], Miller's (as against Dolton) [338], Sitar's, and Ruehman's motions for summary judgment are denied.

  (6) Defendants Sheahan's [292] and the City of Chicago's [302] motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part.

  (7) Defendants La Grange's [296], Pucinski's [311], and Dolton's [305] motions for summary judgment are granted. Defendant Pucinski's motion for judgment on the pleadings [309] is denied without prejudice as moot.

  (8) All remaining claims for injunctive relief are dismissed without prejudice as moot. All other remaining claims of plaintiffs Brown, Sitar, and Ruehman are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs Brown, Sitar, Ruehman, and Curtan are dismissed from this case. Defendants Pucinski, Village of Dolton, and Village of La Grange are dismissed from this case.

  (9) Status hearing set for December 8, 1993 at 9:15 a.m. On January 12, 1994 at 9:15 a.m., the remaining parties shall file, in open court, an original and copy of a topbound final pretrial order in full compliance with Local Rule 5.00.

  ENTER:

  William T. Hart

  UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

  Dated: NOVEMBER 22, 1993


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