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June 8, 1993

USHA VAKHARIA, M.D., Plaintiff,


The opinion of the court was delivered by: JAMES B. MORAN


Before us now are three motions by plaintiff. In her first motion she asks the court to reconsider its ruling dismissing her discrimination claims against several defendants named for the first time in her amended complaints (detailed in count V of her second amended complaint). In her second motion she asks the court to reconsider its dismissal of portions of her antitrust claim (detailed in count VI). In her third motion, submitted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), plaintiff asks for leave to conduct depositions of certain individuals prior to responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment. Her first and third motions are granted in part and denied in part. Her second motion is denied.


 Count V

 This court has dismissed plaintiff's Title VII claims against several defendants because plaintiff failed to charge them within the applicable limitations period. See Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital, 90 C 6548, slip op. at 6 (N.D.Ill. March 31, 1993). Invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling, plaintiff argues that she should not be barred from suing the dismissed defendants because they participated in various administrative proceedings at the hospital and thereby misled her into thinking that her medical staff privileges might be restored. Her argument is unpersuasive. Although, as a general rule, the doctrine of equitable tolling is applicable to Title VII cases, Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982), the decision by potential adversaries in a Title VII case to participate in administrative proceedings does not trigger it. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-Cio Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236 (1976); Lever v. Northwestern University, 979 F.2d. 552, 556 (7th Cir. 1992), pet. for cert. filed, 61 USLW 3732 (April 8, 1993).

 In its order of March 31, 1993, this court noted that plaintiff's amended complaints were filed within the applicable limitations period to the extent that they alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against members of the hospital's board of directors for impeding plaintiff's efforts to form new contracts with patients. Vakharia, 90 C 6548, slip op. Plaintiff now indicates that two defendants who were named in the amended complaints, Arthur Peterson and Edward Cucci, were dismissed erroneously from count V because she neglected to identify them as board members. Because defendants do not deny that Peterson and Cucci were board members, and because both have received adequate notice of the § 1981 claims against them, plaintiff's motion to reconsider must be granted with respect to them. However, plaintiff may proceed under count V against them only to the extent that they may be liable under § 1981, along with other named members of the board of directors, for impeding her efforts to form new contracts with patients.

 Count VI

 In the same memorandum and order this court held that plaintiff could proceed with part of her antitrust claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Several distinctions were drawn, however, that significantly restricted the scope of her surviving claim. Id. at 17-20. Most of the defendants were dismissed from count VI because they could not be considered co-conspirators, and plaintiff's claim was a conspiracy claim. And, while the portion of the claim based on the hospital's decision to terminate plaintiff was spared, the portions of her claim based on the hospital's other acts, including its establishment of a "multi-tiered" system for assigning patients, were dismissed. Now plaintiff asks the court to allow her to pursue her antitrust claim against all defendants named in the second amended complaint and, in addition, she tentatively seeks permission to pursue an independent antitrust claim based on the multi-tiered system for assigning cases. As this court has indicated, the results plaintiff desires are foreclosed by several supreme Court and Seventh Circuit decisions (cited in the March 31, 1993 order). Intra-corporate dealings of the sort alleged cannot constitute conspiracies, and claims premised on the restriction of competition within a single hospital are not cognizable under the federal antitrust laws.

 Perhaps the hospital's establishment of a multi-tiered system of assigning cases was, as plaintiff says, a "step in the process that culminated in Dr. Vakharia's total loss of privileges." Even if true, however, that fact cannot justify granting plaintiff's motion to reconsider the partial dismissal of count VI, although it might constitute probative evidence concerning her antitrust claim based on the hospital's hindering her efforts to find placement elsewhere. Because trial is a long way away, the court need not resolve that evidentiary issue at this time.

 Motion Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f)

 Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on the first four counts. That motion is supported by three affidavits, from Dr. James B. McCormick, president of the hospital; Dr. Nancy Loeber, former chairman of the anesthesia department; and Dr. Alan Rogin, chairman of the ad hoc hearing committee. The thrust of that motion is that Dr. Loeber was brought in because of concerns about the quality of anesthesiological services, that she performed a performance audit of plaintiff and had concerns about a number of cases, that those concerns were not satisfactorily resolved but in the meantime plaintiff chose to go on part-time status, that thereafter the department was reorganized so as to have senior anesthesiologists for the more serious cases and junior anesthesiologists for the less serious cases, that (apparently) plaintiff was classified by Dr. Loeber as a junior anesthesiologist, that thereafter plaintiff sought to return to full-time status as a senior anesthesiologist, that Dr. Loeber then determined that the caseload would not support another full-time anesthesiologist in either classification and that plaintiff had not demonstrated sufficient proficiency for "senior" cases, that plaintiff objected, and that led to a review of the performance of Dr. Vakharia and ultimately of the entire department. That review began with Dr. Loeber, who came up with approximately 66 cases of plaintiff's in which Dr. Loeber believed the total care had been in one way or another inadequate. Plaintiff then requested the Medical Executive Committee (MEC) for return to full-time status. The MEC appointed a committee which considered the situation and reported to the MEC. The MEC concluded that another full-time position was not justified, but did not take a position on the quality-of-care issues. It decided, rather, to retain an independent consultant to evaluate plaintiff's work, and later that review was expanded to include the entire department. It was performed by two doctors selected by the ASA and under the auspices of that organization. The review, as it pertained to plaintiff, included 43 cases involving major complications and 24 randomly selected cases, material submitted by plaintiff, and various interviews at the hospital, including extensive interviews of plaintiff. The report, issued in June 1989, included the recommendation that the medical staff privileges of Dr. Vakharia, as well as those of two other anesthesiologists, should not be renewed.

 The hospital then gave plaintiff the option of resignation or summary suspension. Since plaintiff did not resign she was summarily suspended, and that triggered a hearing before an ad hoc committee of the MEC consisting of five physicians and a hearing officer. Attorneys were involved, for the most part, only in an advisory capacity. The hearings spanned 17 days and generated 3130 pages of testimony and argument, 38 exhibits from the hospital and over 200 from plaintiff. Dr. McCormick, Dr. Loeber, Janice Anderson and Dr. Wender (one of the ASA reviewers) testified at length, and plaintiff had 21 witnesses. The committee upheld the suspension and the MEC adopted the recommendation on May 9, 1990. That decision was appealed to the hospital's board, which appointed a review committee. That committee reviewed the lengthy submissions and the record and, on September 7, 1990, issued a 21-page report recommending that the MEC decision be adopted by the board, and it did so on September 12, 1990.

 We recite the defendants' summary judgment contentions at some length because they have a bearing on the pending motion. Plaintiff wants to take the depositions of at least 19 persons prior to responding to the motion. Defendants do not see why any are necessary but, in any event, they should not extend beyond the three affiants. We begin by noting that plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to conduct necessary discovery on her claims prior to responding to the summary judgment motion. At the same time, we note that this court has the obligation, pursuant to Rule 26, to control discovery so that it is not unduly burdensome and expensive. That obligation has been increasingly emphasized of late and concerns about discovery abuse underlie both the Civil Justice Reform Act direction that district courts adopt plans and the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those proposed amendments, specifically Rule 30, would establish a maximum of ten depositions by a party as the norm for civil cases and that a witness once deposed should not normally be deposed again. Here the plaintiff seeks 19 depositions just for starters, including depositions of witnesses who were questioned at length in the ad hoc committee hearing. It is an ambitious program to depose virtually everyone who had or may have had some relationship to the process during which plaintiff's practice was curtailed and (considerably more significant in terms of the amount in controversy) thereafter suspended. And it goes too far in light of the position advanced by the defendants and the rather weak justifications advanced by plaintiff.

 The motion relates primarily to the employment discrimination claims. Defendants say that plaintiff's troubles up to the suspension time stem from decisions made by Dr. Loeber. Janice Anderson was, it appears conceded, involved in securing information leading up to some of those decisions. Dr. McCormick was also knowledgeable about that period. Dr. Loeber and Dr. McCormick are affiants and plaintiff may depose them, but with due regard for the fact that they previously testified before the ad hoc hearing committee. Janice Anderson also testified there and plaintiff has presented no substantial reason why she must be questioned again. Plaintiff has presented no substantial reason to question that Dr. Loeber was the ultimate decisionmaker during that period or that others tainted the information upon which Dr. Loeber claimed she replied. We therefore see no reason to depose Karen Filopowski at this time. Dr. McCormick was familiar with hospital needs during that period. Judith Borenstein participated in the May 7, 1988 discussion of needs and assisted in providing information for the ASA review. We think plaintiff is entitled to depose her, but we are unconvinced that there is sufficient justification, for now, to take the depositions of Dr. Paulissian (who, after all, testified for plaintiff before the ad hoc committee) regarding the May 7, 1988 meeting or for any other purpose.

 Plaintiff seeks the depositions of Dr. Blancato, Dr. Vacanti and Dr. Wender. Defendants contend that the ASA report was a significant matter in the ultimate suspension. Plaintiff is entitled to depose Dr. Blancato. We are not persuaded that the deposition of Dr. Vacanti is needed. He may have appointed the other two to be the surveyors, but the issues here relate to Dr. Vakharia, not ASA in general. Plaintiff has already, apparently, explored general procedures in her questions to Dr. Wender at the ad hoc committee hearing, and those can be explored adequately with Dr. Blancato as well. We do, moreover, permit the deposition of Dr. Wender. Defendants contend that plaintiff deliberately failed to explore quality-of-care issues with Dr. Wender. Because she was acting pro se at the time, we think her attorney is now entitled to make that inquiry.

 Five physicians comprised the ad hoc committee. One, Dr. RPogin, is an affiant, and his deposition may be taken. She may also depose two of the four others, thus giving her access to a majority of a unanimous committee. We see no reason, however, to depose counsel (Callahan and Scott), absent some compelling evidence that they influenced the result and acted other than as attorneys. Further, if, as plaintiff claims, Scott prevented her from having witnesses testify she has knowledge about that matter, she can, herself, bring it to the attention of the court, and, if the hearing officer, Hannafan, was unfair, plaintiff can point that out from the 3130 pages of transcript. Finally, we are not persuaded that the depositions of Dr. Shah, Dr. Yelda or Dr. Larson have been reasonably justified.

 We are somewhat uncertain how plaintiff is proceeding. Ordinarily depositions are for the purpose of getting information from non-parties or pinning down parties. It is the rare plaintiff who expects the defendants, or those allegedly in league with them, to make the case for her when the charges are of unsavory conduct, unless plaintiff has evidence to present to the defendants that requires an admission. Here the claims are of purposeful discrimination against her, claims that plaintiff has consistently presented for a number of years. To the extent she has personal knowledge of these claims, she can present that evidence by affidavit. To the extent she has evidence from others, she can also present it by their affidavits. Even with such evidence she must still address, now or ultimately, the quality-of-care issues raised by defendants.

 Defendants are now scheduled to complete production of documents by June 23, 1993. The permitted depositions should be completed within the following 60 days, or by August 23, 1993. Plaintiff shall file her responsive brief by September 23, 1993 and defendants shall file their reply brief by October 14, 1993.

 Liability of Defendants in Their Individual Capacities

 At a recent status conference the parties expressed some confusion about the implications of this court's March 31, 1993 order on the personal liability of some of the defendants. Apparently the order requires some elaboration.

 As this court noted in its opinion of May 22, 1991, a defendant may be liable under Title VII and § 1981 even if the defendant is not the plaintiff's employer. Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital, 765 F. Supp. 461, 463 (N.D.Ill. 1991). The same is true, presumably, of defendants sued under the ADEA, though the issue has not been raised in this case. Under all three statutes, if a defendant discriminatorily impedes a person's access to employment opportunities with third parties, the defendant may be liable. That much follows from the May 22, 1991 memorandum and order. The question the parties now raise is whether such a defendant may be liable in his or her individual capacity when the defendant was acting as an agent for someone else. The answer is yes.

 Under the ADEA, Title VII and § 1981, individuals may be held personally liable for civil rights violations they commit while working as agents of larger institutions, provided that their individual liability is based on individual acts distinct from institutional policy set by their superiors. When a manager at a company terminates an employee on account of that employee's race or age, the company is liable, *fn1" as is the manager, unless the manager's decision was mandated by company policy set by someone else. Thus, decisionmaking employees who discrimination the basis of age may be held liable in their individual capacities under the ADEA. See e.g., Strzelecki v. Schwarz Paper Co., 92 C 6668, slip op. (N.D.Ill. May 27, 1993); House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Price v. Marshall Erdman & Associates, Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing personal liability of decisionmaker). Decisionmaking employees also may be held liable in their individual capacities under Title VII. See Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1527 (M.D.Fla. 1991); Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 F.2d 312, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing personal liability of decisionmaker); E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing personal liability of decisionmakers). And decisionmaking employees may be held liable under § 1981. Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 518-19 (3rd Cir. 1986), aff'd, 481 U.S. 604, 95 L. Ed. 2d 582, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987); Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 753 (7th Cir. 1985); Manuel v. International Harvester, Co., 502 F. Supp. 45, 50 (N.D.Ill. 1980).

 Courts around the country seem to be in complete agreement with respect to personal liability of decisionmaking employees under § 1981. As indicated, this court believes that individual defendants should be treated the same way under the ADEA and Title VII as they are under § 1981. This court recognizes, however, that other courts have treated ADEA and Title VII defendants differently. For example, in Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc., 61 USLW 2649 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit held that a supervisor could not be held personally liable under the ADEA for a discriminatory decision made on behalf of an employer corporation. In this district, Judges Duff and Aspen have reached a similar conclusion with respect to Title VII. See Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 772 F. Supp. 407, 411 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enterprises, 816 F. Supp. 476, 481 (N.D.Ill. 1993). Judge Duff's opinion reflects the reasoning of the courts that have rejected personal liability of corporate agents: the only remedies available under Title VII, he points out, are remedies that "an employer, not an individual, would generally provide." *fn2" Id. While granting the premise, this court respectfully disagrees with the conclusion.

 Title VII always has served two purposes: to compensate the victims of discrimination (at least with back pay, if not with full compensatory damages), and to deter discrimination in the future. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280, 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975). To conclude that personal accountability of supervisory employees is unnecessary to reinstate victims or to award them their back pay is to neglect Title VII's broader goal of eradicating discrimination.

 Moreover, while ordinarily personal liability is not of great consequence either to the plaintiff or to the individual defendant (and perhaps that is why the issue is seldom considered), there are cases, like Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, in which the defendant company goes bankrupt and the plaintiff is forced to seek recovery from the supervisory employees who committed the discriminatory acts. As this court noted in Strzelecki, if the people who make discriminatory decisions do not have to pay for them, they may never alter their illegal behavior and the wrongdoers may elude punishment entirely, while the victim may receive no compensation whatsoever. That outcome is incompatible with the broad remedial purposes of the ADEA and Title VII, which were intended to provide all "necessary relief" and to ensure "complete justice." Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418.


 Plaintiff's motion to reconsider the court's partial dismissal of count V is granted in part and denied in part. Her motion to reconsider the court's partial dismissal of count VI is denied. Her motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) is granted in part and denied in part.


 Chief Judge, U.S. District Court

 June 8, 1993.

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