of disease. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, Appendix 1, § 5.00. These complications must be shown to persist on repeated examinations, despite therapy, in order for the ALJ to conclude that the impairment will last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Id.
There was no evidence that Mang had a major disease complication of the digestive tract, and he was not malnourished despite his reports of constant nausea. R. at 122, 130, 132-33. None of the medical professionals who treated Mang determined that Mang's discomfort was at a disabling level of frequency, severity, or duration. Furthermore, there is evidence that Mang did not have an intestinal obstruction that would induce vomiting, R. at 130, and a report from the Mayo Clinic where he was examined indicates that Mang rarely vomited, R. at 122.
The ALJ concluded that Mang could perform light work and could thus return to his previous employment as a carpet salesman or radio dispatcher. The ALJ found that the carpet salesman position requires Mang to walk about three hours per day, to stand about two hours per day, and to carry carpet samples, which weigh on average up to ten pounds per sample, for a short distance. R. at 73, 83. The radio dispatcher position was found to be exclusively sedentary. R. at 74. The ALJ determined that Mang had the residual functional capacity to frequently lift up to, but not more than, ten pounds at a time, and occasionally lift up to, but no more than, twenty pounds. R. at 96. The ALJ determined that Mang could not walk or stand more than six hours in an eight-hour workday. Id. The evidence showed that Mang was able to stand, move about, and carry various objects. R. at 130. Another examining physician noted that Mang appeared healthy and in good physical shape. R. at 133. Mang had normal bowel movements, R. at 130, 132, and a normal abdomen, R. at 106, 130, 132-33, 136. Mang's daily routine involved domestic chores like lawn mowing, and reading and watching television up to five hours per day. R. at 50, 81. These activities additionally support a finding that Mang could perform light work. See Orlando v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 209, 215 (7th Cir. 1985) (claimant whose daily activities included normal household chores and watching television could perform light work); cf. Reynolds v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 1988) (claimant who watched five to six hours of television per day, helped with household chores, and on occasion operated a lawnmower, possessed the ability to perform sedentary work).
In finding that Mang was able to perform his former occupation, the ALJ also made a credibility determination. Based on his observation of Mang during the hearing, and on the reported medical findings, the ALJ charged that Mang exaggerated his symptoms and the extent of his functional loss. R. at 16. The ALJ found that the medical evidence did not support Mang's subjective claims. R. at 16. The grounds for the ALJ's finding that Mang was not entirely worthy of belief are well articulated. Accordingly, the ALJ's credibility findings are given considerable weight. Cheshier v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 1987).
The Secretary did not file a motion for summary judgment as is usual in cases requesting a review of a decision of the Secretary. Yet the court's finding that the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence entitles the Secretary to judgment as a matter of law. There is simply nothing left to do in the case. This court has determined that in appropriate circumstances a district court possesses the power to move for and grant summary judgment on its own initiative. See Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co. v. APCOM, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 389, 394 (N.D. Ill. 1992). In the present circumstances, the court finds it suitable to "cut through . . . procedural niceties" in order to achieve the same decision it would make if the Secretary had filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). Judicial economy compels the court to forego the need to grant the Secretary leave to file a motion for summary judgment, thus further stalling the case and generating more legal fees, as the court has already determined that there are no genuine issues of fact remaining. Mang has had ample notice and ample opportunity for response. See Dayton Elec., 782 F. Supp. at 395 ("The [movant] asked this court to decide the case as a whole. When the court does just that, the [movant] cannot claim unfair surprise"). Accordingly, the court sua sponte enters judgment in favor of the Secretary and affirms the decision to deny Mang benefits. The ALJ considered all of the relevant medical evidence of record and the decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence.
For the reasons stated above, Mang's motion for summary judgment is denied. The decision of the Secretary is affirmed. Judgment is entered in favor of the Secretary accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR., Judge
United States District Court
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