The opinion of the court was delivered by: MARVIN E. ASPEN
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:
In an order dated December 21, 1992, this court denied defendant Bombardier-Rotax GmbH's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reasoned that, because Rotax had waived the defense in state court by entering a general appearance prior to removal, Rotax was precluded from contesting personal jurisdiction in this court. Rotax now moves for reconsideration of that order.
It is settled law that motions for reconsideration "serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Publishers Resource, Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Keene Corp. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665-66 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). As such, this court will not entertain a motion for reconsideration that merely reiterates arguments previously raised. In re Stotler & Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17938, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983); see also Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("This Court's opinions are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure."). Further, a motion for reconsideration may not be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been produced prior to the entry of judgment. Publishers Resource, 762 F.2d at 561. "Nor should a motion for reconsideration serve as the occasion to tender new legal theories for the first time." Id.
The gravamen of Rotax's present motion can be summarized as follows. Rotax contends that its general appearance in state court was filed by mistake. As such, citing Hahn v. Wiggins, 23 Ill. App. 2d 391, 163 N.E.2d 562 (1st Dist. 1960), Rotax maintains that the Illinois courts would allow it to withdraw the general appearance and substitute in its place a special appearance, thereby enabling it to contest personal jurisdiction. As it happened, however, Rotax was never afforded this opportunity in state court because by the time it discovered its mistake, the case had already been removed to this court.
Assuming that the Illinois courts would have allowed Rotax to withdraw its general appearance, Rotax nonetheless is not entitled to the relief it presently seeks. Admittedly, Rotax knew about the mistake prior to its motion to dismiss filed in this court. Indeed, in both its memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss and its reply brief, Rotax opted to ignore the presently advanced argument, acting under the erroneous assumption that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afforded it a means to contest personal jurisdiction. This omission was Rotax's second mistake. Recognizing the lapse, Rotax appeals to the court not to punish it for its attorneys' errors. However, to the extent that capital defendants are bound by the mistakes of their attorneys, see Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566-68, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) ("Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not 'cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must 'bear the risk of attorney error.'"), we see no inequity in holding Rotax to the same standard. Accordingly, Rotax's motion for reconsideration is denied. It is so ordered.
United States District Judge
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