Boston, 581 F. Supp. 478, 484 (D.Mass. 1984) (City Council lacks legal identity apart from City of Boston and therefore is not a suable entity in redistricting challenge).
Although the Chicago City Council has been a defendant in prior redistricting litigation, the court is not aware of any case or statutory authority supporting a direct action against the Chicago City Council in this context.
Furthermore, both the Chicago Police Department and the Chicago Department of Streets and Sanitation have been found to lack a separate legal existence from the City, and have thus been held non-suable. Jordan v. Chicago Dept. of Police, 505 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement Inc. v. Chicago, 435 F. Supp. 1289, 1294 (N.D.Ill. 1977). Moreover, although the Illinois Cities and Villages Act does not specifically address the City Council's amenability to suit, it does provide that the Chicago Corporation Counsel is the legal adviser to both the City and the City Council:
The head of the law department of the city shall be the corporation counsel. The corporation counsel shall be and act as the legal advisor of the city council and of the several officers, boards and departments of the city.
Ill.Rev. Stat. Ch. 24, § 21-11. This provision strongly implies, at the very least, a commonality of legal interest between the City and the City Council. This is particularly true given that other statutorily mandated "clients" of the Corporation Counsel (i.e., the police and sanitation departments) were held to lack a separate legal identity from the City.
Accordingly, the court concludes, based upon the applicable statutory scheme, that the City Council is not a suable entity for purposes of the case at bar. The motion to dismiss the City Council as a defendant is therefore granted.
F. Paragraph (e) of the Prayer for Relief.
In paragraph (e) of their prayer for relief, the Bonilla Plaintiffs make the following request:
An order scheduling special election to be conducted after adoption of the map to be proposed by plaintiffs. In the alternative, if this Court does not find the current aldermanic map unconstitutional, plaintiffs request that this Court order special elections in the newly created Hispanic majority wards on the already scheduled November 3, 1992 election day, or on a date this Court may deem appropriate.
As discussed above, in PACI, the Seventh Circuit recently upheld the validity of the 1991 aldermanic elections, and expressly held that the aldermen elected in 1991 could serve their full four-year terms. PACI, 976 F.2d at 335. Moreover, this court, supra, dismissed count 2 of the Second Amended Complaint, in which the Bonilla Plaintiffs requested special elections to fill ward "vacancies". Accordingly, as a matter of law, the Bonilla plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief requested in paragraph (e) of the prayer for relief. It is therefore stricken pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(f) as an immaterial matter.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that: (1) the motion to dismiss count 1 of the Second Amended Complaint is granted in part and denied in part; (2) the motion to dismiss count 2 of the Second Amended Complaint is granted; (3) the motion to dismiss count 3 of the Second Amended Complaint is denied; (4) the motion to dismiss the City Council as a defendant is granted; and (5) the motion to strike paragraph (e) of the prayer for relief is granted.
BRIAN BARNETT DUFF, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
December 21, 1992