Pedersen's affidavit, however, is insufficient to challenge ITT's allegation of an amount in controversy in excess of $ 50,000. Specifically, Pedersen's affidavit is silent as to the value of the vehicle, either retail or wholesale, on May 21, 1992. True, it is probable that Pedersen's estimate of the vehicle's value on May 21, 1992, would likely fall between his estimates for February 28, 1992 ($ 15,000 wholesale) and September 10, 1992 ($ 40,000 fair market value). Nonetheless, any attempt to extrapolate the vehicle's value on May 21, 1992, would be nothing more than pure guesswork, as no evidence exists as to its condition on that date.
This court, however, takes judicial notice that Kelley's Blue Book is an authoritative guide to the valuation of recreational vehicles. See In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1992) (using Kelley's Blue Book to estimate value of vehicle), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303, 121 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1992); In re Miller, 4 Bankr. 392, 393 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (same). That publication indicates that, in May of 1992, a "typical" 34 1/2 foot 1986 Airstream Motor Home had a retail value of $ 59,100 and a wholesale value of $ 44,500. Were this court to accept the retail value as the most appropriate valuation, or even the average of the retail and wholesale estimates as employed by many bankruptcy courts, ITT surely would meet the amount in controversy requirement. However, as did the Ninth Circuit in In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559-61, we believe that the wholesale value should apply to the valuation of vehicles. Significantly, ITT is a creditor seeking to gain possession of collateral. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the creditor's interest in a vehicle is equivalent to what the creditor could receive upon a reasonable disposition of the collateral. Id. at 560. The vast majority of the difference between retail and wholesale price represents overhead, i.e., costs necessarily incurred by dealers to realize the retail price. Without such expense on the part of a creditor,
the wholesale price best approximates a reasonable disposition. Id. With a wholesale value of $ 44,500, it is apparent to a legal certainty that ITT's claim in Count III of its second-amended complaint is for less than the jurisdictional amount.
The object of litigation in Count IV of ITT's second-amended complaint is the Messenger vehicle, a 1977 Airstream Motor Home. ITT commenced this action against Messenger on July 24, 1992, thus fixing July 24, 1992 as the relevant date of valuation. In support of his motion, Messenger has attached a check and purchase agreement indicating that he paid $ 10,500 for the Messenger vehicle in June of 1991. Based on this evidence, he concludes that the vehicle cannot be valued in excess of $ 50,000 on July 24, 1992. In response, rather than pointing to any evidence that the Messenger vehicle was valued in excess of $ 50,000 on July 24, 1992, ITT argues we should strike Messenger's evidence for lack of foundation. Messenger has since laid a proper foundation in an affidavit attached to his reply memorandum. More significantly, apart from Messenger's evidence, the wholesale value listed in Kelly's Blue Book for a "typical" 1977 Airstream Motor Home is far short of $ 50,000. As such, it is apparent to a legal certainty that ITT's claim in Count IV of its second-amended complaint is for less than the jurisdictional amount.
In that neither Count III nor Count IV may be sustained under this court's diversity jurisdiction, we turn to consider the propriety of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the claims. With limited exceptions, a federal district court "shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within [the court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . ." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (Supp. 1992). Significantly, "such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties." Id. Section 1367(a) overrules previous case law, specifically Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 104 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1989), and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 2413, 49 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1976), prohibiting "pendent party jurisdiction." American Pfauter, Ltd. v. Freeman Decorating Co., 772 F. Supp. 1071, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citing Practice Commentary, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367, at 221).
Whether Counts III and IV form part of the same case or controversy as a claim within the court's original jurisdiction (i.e., Counts I or II), is to be determined under the standards governing the exercise of pendant jurisdiction as announced in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966). Roe v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 800 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1992); Corporate Resources, 774 F. Supp. at 506. In Gibbs, the Supreme Court held that federal courts may exercise pendant jurisdiction over a state claim if the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S. Ct. at 1138. Moreover, the Court ruled that pendant jurisdiction may properly be exercised if "plaintiff's claims are such that he ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." Id.
In the instant case, Counts III and IV of ITT's second-amended complaint derive from a common nucleus of operative fact as Counts I and II. Contrary to defendants' assertions, Counts III and IV stem from the same contractual relationship as that alleged in Counts I and II. ITT maintains that Fox Valley breached a written financing agreement. As a result of that breach, and given the fact that the Bank One and Messenger vehicles were taken on consignment, ITT claims entitlement to those vehicles. In this regard, Counts III and IV are nothing more than an attempt to enforce a contractual remedy, such remedy flowing from the breach detailed in Counts I and II. Where multiple remedies (one of which falls in the court's original jurisdiction) stems from a single wrong (in this case Fox Valley's breach of contract), the court should find that the claims against all of the defendants comprise the "same case or controversy." See Roe, slip op. at *3.
As a final effort to derail Counts III and IV of ITT's second-amended complaint, defendants contend that we should decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), which provides:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection(a) if--(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) (Supp. 1992). Of the four above listed exceptions, only the third arguably applies to this case. As defendants point out, this court has awarded ITT the relief requested in Counts I and II against Fox Valley. Though recognizing that those counts were not "dismissed," defendants contend that the practical result is the same, i.e., no claims remain within this court's original jurisdiction. Nonetheless, we believe that the interests of judicial economy and efficiency are best served by retaining supplemental jurisdiction over Counts III and IV of ITT's second-amended complaint and, hence, we refuse to invoke § 1367(c). Accordingly, we deny Bank One and Messenger's motions to dismiss.
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Bank One and Messenger's motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is so ordered.
MARVIN E. ASPEN
United States District Judge