any back-up assistance needed from the Emergency Response Team.
Brewer Deposition, Exhibits 2B-2D (Institutional Directive, Health Care Services for Inmates). Accordingly, if Williams required emergency care at the time of his requests and such need was apparent to Banks, we could properly infer deliberate indifference on the part of Banks provided he did not contact the CMT on duty. These are questions of fact properly left for a jury, and Banks' motion for summary judgment is denied.
D. Wardens Fairman and O'Leary
Respecting Wardens Fairman and O'Leary, the crux of defendants' argument in support of summary judgment is that neither warden had the personal involvement necessary to be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Indeed, a defendant sued in his individual capacity can only be held liable under § 1983 for his individual wrongdoing. Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 273 (7th Cir. 1986); Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 650. As stated in Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983): "Section 1983 creates a cause of action based upon personal liability and predicated upon fault. An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional violation." Thus, § 1983 does not recognize the doctrine of superiors' liability, McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1390 (7th Cir. 1984), or the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).
Williams, however, does not seek to hold wardens Fairman and O'Leary liable by virtue of the acts of their employees. Rather Williams contends that the wardens were charged by law to provide adequate medical services and that they personally breached that duty. Indeed, under appropriate circumstances, supervisory personnel with the power and duty to ensure adequate medical care may be held liable under § 1983 for breaches of their legal obligations resulting in constitutional violations. See Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209, 1213 (6th Cir. 1992); Miranda v. Munoz, 770 F.2d 255, 260-61 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Ford v. Lane, 714 F. Supp. 310, 315 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (allegations that Warden Fairman "failed to monitor his responsibility and duty to delegate appropriate medical personnel" sufficient to show personal involvement). Nonetheless, assuming that Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, P 1003-2-2(a), (r) (Supp. 1992), and the consent decree entered in Cook v. Rowe, (No. 76-2224, N.D. Ill.), support Williams' contention that Fairman and O'Leary were obligated by law to provide adequate medical care, their failure to do so in the instant case cannot be considered anything more than simple negligence. Significantly, Williams does not contend that either Fairman or O'Leary (unlike Drs. Brewer and Kurian) possessed personal knowledge of his medical condition. As such, despite the personal obligations on the part of the wardens, Williams' Eighth Amendment claims against Fairman and O'Leary cannot stand. See Ford, 714 F. Supp. 310 at 315-16 (although plaintiff's complaint reveals personal involvement on the part of Warden Fairman, absence of personal knowledge of plaintiff's medical condition precludes recovery under Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment as it relates to Wardens Fairman and O'Leary is granted.
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. It is so ordered.
MARVIN E. ASPEN
United States District Judge