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ROE v. LITTLE CO. OF MARY HOSP.

August 21, 1992

RICHARD ROE Plaintiff,
v.
LITTLE COMPANY OF MARY HOSPITAL, a Corporation, PRABODH SHAW, M.D., ARMOUR PHARMACEUTICAL CO., a Corporation, BERINGWERKE AG, HYLAND DIVISION OF TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC., a Corporation, HYLAND DIVISION OF BAXTER HEALTH CARE CORP., a Corporation CUTTER BIOLOGICAL DIVISION OF CUTTER LABORATORIES, INC., a Corporation, CUTTER BIOLOGICAL DIVISION OF MILES, INC., a Corporation, ALPHA THERAPEUTIC CORP., a Corporation, PORTION SPEYWOOD LTD., a Corporation, BLOOD SYSTEMS, INC., a Corporation, AMERICAN RED CROSS BLOOD SERVICES, INC., a Corporation, AMERICAN RED CROSS, a Corporation, MID-AMERICA REGION OF AMERICAN RED CROSS, a Corporation, JOHN O'DONOGHUE, M.D., MICHAEL O'DONOGHUE, M.D., and MARY ROSENOW, M.D., Defendants.


PARSONS


The opinion of the court was delivered by: JAMES B. PARSONS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 I. Background

 In 1984, the plaintiff, Richard Roe, *fn1" underwent a surgical procedure at the Little Company of Mary Hospital for treatment and removal of an enlarged spleen. Prior to and subsequent to the splenectomy, Roe received transfusions of multiple units of blood, apparently some of which was contaminated with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") - the virus that causes AIDS.

 Roe filed the instant lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County. His complaint asserted causes of action for negligence against the doctors involved in the splenectomy, the hospital and the suppliers of the blood that he received. One of those blood suppliers, the defendant American Red Cross ("Red Cross"), then removed the case to the federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1991).

 Roe then filed an objection to the removal of the instant case to the federal court. He asserted that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the state negligence claims between these non-diverse parties. Roe also asserted that the simple fact that the Red Cross was created by federal statute does not mean that the instant case presents a question "arising under" federal law, so as to confer original jurisdiction in this Court. See, 18 U.S.C. § 1331 (1991). *fn2"

 Under the Supreme Court's decision in S.G., the claim against the Red Cross in the instant case is properly within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Under this condition, the Court must exercise jurisdiction over Roe's case insofar as it attempts to assert a claim against the Red Cross.

 Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that the Court properly has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against the Red Cross, Roe moves the Court to exercise its discretion under the statute governing the removal of cases to the federal courts codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1991) and remand the entire case, including that portion which relates to the claim against the Red Cross, back to the state court. Subsection (c) of that statute reads:

 Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.

 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). Roe asserts that this court does not properly have jurisdiction over the non-Red Cross defendants *fn4" and must remand the case back to state court as it relates to them. But, in order to avoid piecemeal litigation, Roe insists that this Court should also transfer the case against the Red Cross as well. *fn5" Thus the Court must determine first whether it can properly assert jurisdiction over the non-Red Cross defendants, and second, even if it can, whether the Court can and should exercise its jurisdiction under the removal statute to remand the case back to the state court in which it was first filed.

 II. Analysis

 Roe asserts that the entire action should be tried together before one court. In support of his position to remand the entire case, he explains that the claims between Roe and the different defendants are so "factually interrelated . . . that concurrent litigation in the state court and federal court would be impractical and unduly burdensome on all parties." Thus in the interest of judicial efficiency, Roe asks that the entire case be returned back to the Circuit Court of Cook County. To determine whether and to what extent this case should be and can be remanded, the Court must determine: (A) the ability of this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the non-Red Cross defendants; and (B) whether it can exercise discretion and remand the case as a whole, even though it may have original jurisdictional authority over the Red Cross.

 A. Supplemental Jurisdiction

 In order to promote his position that the instant case should be remanded, Roe first asserts that this Court does not actually have adequate jurisdiction over the negligence claims filed against the non-Red Cross ...


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