State are to be made to the federal government, and not to the program beneficiaries. 31 U.S.C.A. § 6503(c)(1) (West Supp. 1992). Plaintiff school districts have not shown that Congress intended that they should recover interest earned on the reimbursements; consequently, Defendants' motions to dismiss should be granted.
6. Plaintiffs' Rights to Immediate Payment of Claims
Plaintiffs also allege a right under the federal statutes and other legislation to Defendants' prompt, immediate disbursement of federal funds. They point out that the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, for example, requires minimization of the time lapse during transmission of advances of grant funds to program providers.
Additionally, they again cite to 7 C.F.R. § 210.5(a), which provides that state agencies shall limit requests for funds for reimbursement to participating school food authorities to such times as will allow "prompt payment of claims or authorized advances." Since federal regulations such as § 210.5(a) require prompt application of reimbursement funds for the purpose for which drawn, Plaintiffs urge that any accruing interest must be forwarded to the school boards. (Plaintiffs' Response to Motions to Dismiss, at 9-10).
While the provisions cited by Plaintiffs reflect a general policy urging states to disburse federal funds as quickly as possible, they hardly provide support for Plaintiffs' sweeping assertion that there is an "unambiguous Congressional intent to require immediate disbursement of funds for program purposes." Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The regulations and legislative history cited by Plaintiffs here simply do not acknowledge any right to "immediate" disbursement of federal funds.
Plaintiffs' reference to the provision concerning school food authorities, in fact, is misplaced; Congress has specifically established administrative procedures that school food authorities must comply with in order to qualify to receive federal money. The federal regulations require a school food authority to first provide a "proper request for reimbursement" to the state agency, which "ordinarily" will make payment within thirty days after receipt of that request. 7 C.F.R. § 3015.104 (1992).
Notably, none of the other federal regulations cited by Plaintiffs impose specific time requirements on the state for the payment of reimbursement claims. Had Congress intended to bestow upon Plaintiffs an enforceable right to immediate payment of federal funds, it could have done so expressly and unambiguously, for example through the imposition of a mandatory timetable. In the absence of any reference in federal law to a payment schedule or time frame within which states must pay claims for reimbursement of federal funds, this court should not impose upon the state agency a payment schedule that is not grounded in federal legislation. Plaintiffs have no enforceable right to "prompt payment' of reimbursements.
B. Counts III, IV, and V: Pendent State Law Claims
In Counts III, IV, and V, Plaintiffs bring pendent state claims against Defendant Regional Superintendent Richard J. Martwick for alleged breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of the Public Funds Investment Act and the Public Funds Deposit Act,
and for unjust enrichment.
Defendant Martwick moves to dismiss all three counts on the ground that the court no longer retains pendent claim jurisdiction over these state law counts once the § 1983 action is dismissed.
In determining whether to retain or dismiss pendent state claims, the district judge has broad discretion in making a managerial judgment on whether to allow plaintiff to bring one case in federal court or force him to litigate his state claim in state court. Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish its pendent claim jurisdiction. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Landstrom v. Illinois Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 892 F.2d 670, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1990); Graf v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1344 (7th Cir. 1986). Since Plaintiffs' § 1983 action should be dismissed against Defendants, Plaintiffs' state law claims should also be dismissed.
The lack of an enforceable right on behalf of the school districts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in each of the four federal funding statutes requires the conclusion that Congress neither expressly nor impliedly intended to create such protectible rights through this legislation. The motion to dismiss of Defendants Leininger, Burris, and Cosentino should be granted. The motion to dismiss of Defendant Martwick should also be granted. Since Plaintiffs' federal claims should be dismissed, the court can and should decline to take jurisdiction of the pendent state law claims.
Date: July 22, 1992
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States Magistrate Judge