activities in installing or incorporating" their product into the real property, or, alternatively, if they custom make their product away from the construction site specifically for a particular project and then install this product at the site. Id. at 837-38.
We find this analysis useful and believe that the Illinois Supreme Court would as well. Indeed, such an analysis is consistent with the underlying purpose of section 13-214(b) which is to protect the "design, construction, and supervision of construction" that "architects, engineers, and others in the construction industry" are responsible for. Adair, 541 F. Supp. at 1124 (applying Illinois law); cf. St. Louis, 581 N.E.2d at 95-96 (focusing on the entire nature of defendant's work in concluding that defendant fell within the class of individuals protected under the statute of repose and disregarding the characterization of the item in question as a "product"). As such, we reject Herriott's suggestion that principles of the law of fixtures should be used for distinguishing between products and improvements to real property. Illinois courts have consistently rejected any reference to the law of fixtures. See, e.g., Hilliard, 834 F.2d at 1355; Cross, 557 N.E.2d at 913; St. Louis, 581 N.E.2d at 95-96.
In applying the activity analysis, it becomes clear that Allied's Larry-Car constitutes an improvement to real property. It is beyond doubt that Allied substantially participated at the construction site and indeed was primarily responsible for the construction of the coke processing system of which its Larry-Car was an integral part. As such, contrary to Herriott's contention, Allied's conduct was more akin to that of an architect or general contractor who designs a specialized product than that of a manufacturer whose generic product is incorporated into a construction project. Thus, we also reject Herriott's argument that Hilliard is distinguishable because the defendant's role there was "very similar to that of an architect or a general contractor." Thus, the Larry-Car is not a "product" for purposes of this case but rather falls squarely within the definition of improvement to real property.
We also find Herriott's reliance on Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Systems, 118 Ill. App. 3d 520, 455 N.E.2d 142, 74 Ill. Dec. 112 (1st Dist. 1983), to be misplaced. In Boddie, an Illinois Appellate Court reversed an Illinois circuit court decision that found a conveyor system to be an improvement of real property within the meaning of section 13-214(b). Boddie, 455 N.E.2d at 145. The court held that the conveyor system was "a product subject to the doctrine of strict products liability." Id. at 149. The court reasoned that only those items which were "an indivisible part of the building structure itself, such as the bricks, supporting beams and railings" fall outside the products liability doctrine and could constitute an improvement to real property. Subsequent decisions by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Seventh Circuit, however, have tacitly rejected Boddie. See Hilliard v. Lummus Co., Inc., 834 F.2d 1352, 1354 (7th Cir. 1987); St. Louis v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, 220 Ill. App. 3d 704, 581 N.E.2d 93, 96, 163 Ill. Dec. 142 (1st Dist. 1991); Billman v. Crown-Trygg Corp., 205 Ill. App. 3d 916, 563 N.E.2d 903, 150 Ill. Dec. 776 (1st Dist. 1990); Cross v. Ainsworth Seed Co., 199 Ill. App. 3d 910, 557 N.E.2d 906, 913, 145 Ill. Dec. 927 (4th Dist. 1990); Calumet Country Club v. Roberts Environmental Control Corp., 136 Ill. App. 3d. 610, 483 N.E.2d 613, 91 Ill. Dec. 267 (1st Dist. 1985). As such, reliance on Boddie is misplaced. Therefore, we grant Allied's motion for summary judgement.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge
Dated: July 21, 1992