could not establish a prima facie case for compensation because it failed to adequately demonstrate that it had produced a ready, willing, and able buyer. The court also dismissed Counts II and III of the plaintiff's complaint because the agreement between Progressive and Great-West at issue in these counts was void under Illinois law. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to adequately establish a prima facie case for recovery under the theory of quantum meruit. The court also dismissed Count IV of the plaintiff's complaint because the plaintiff again failed to adequately allege a prima case for recovery under quantum meruit.
This case is currently before the court on plaintiff Progressive's motion for reconsideration of the court's December 12 order. For the reasons stated below, the court denies the plaintiff's motion.
The Motion for Reconsideration
Motions for reconsideration are not a matter of routine practice in this jurisdiction. Settino v. City of Chicago, 642 F. Supp. 755, 759 (N.D. Ill. 1986). They are not cognizable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor authorized by the local rules of this district. Fisher v. Samuels, 691 F. Supp. 63, 74 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Despite their generally restricted role, such motions are appropriate in rare instances are where "applicable law or the known facts have changed since an issue was submitted to the court." National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Continental Illinois Corp., 116 F.R.D. 252, 253 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Motions for reconsideration are not appropriate, however, to introduce new legal theories or new evidence which could have been adduced during the pendency of the prior motion. Keene Corp. v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1982). Moreover, they are not appropriate when the moving party simply advances arguments which the court has already rejected. Fisher, 691 F. Supp. at 74.
In this case, the plaintiff contends that reconsideration is appropriate because the court improperly determined that the sale offers obtained by the plaintiff did not have to be accepted by the defendant and that since the plaintiff was not the procuring cause of various sales, Progressive was not entitled to recover broker's commissions. However, the plaintiff does not provide the court with any reasons to reconsider the court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff does not assert that changes in the law have occurred since the motion to dismiss was presented to the court or that the known facts of the case have changed.
Rather, the plaintiff merely takes issue with the court's decision and repeats arguments raised in its briefs on the motion to dismiss. For example, the plaintiff contends that it produced a ready, willing, and able buyer for the defendant's properties because the pertinent sales contracts demonstrate that the offers should have been acceptable to the defendant. In our December 12 order, the court thoroughly explained that the defendant was entitled to reject the offers at issue for a failure to meet its asking price for the properties. See Kenilworth Realty Co. v. Sandquist, 56 Ill. App. 3d 78, 371 N.E.2d 936 (1977). Contrary to the plaintiff's unsupported assertion in its current motion, the court also determined that industry custom and practice should not be considered when determining whether the offers procured by the plaintiff conformed to the defendant's listing agreements.
In its motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff also repeats its argument that it established a prima facie case for recovery under a theory of quantum meruit. However, following thorough consideration of this claim, the court, in our December 12 order, determined that the plaintiff failed to establish that it was the procuring cause of the defendant's property sales. As these examples suggest, the plaintiff clearly moves for reconsideration merely because it disagrees with the court's prior decision. As already noted, disagreement with a court's earlier decision is not an appropriate basis for a motion for reconsideration. See Fisher, 691 F. Supp. at 74. The court therefore denies the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration in this case.
For the reasons stated above, the court denies plaintiff Progressive's motion for reconsideration.
Ann Claire Williams, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: FEB 12 1992
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