CITYWIDE DISPATCHER: Heading towards the school, eastbound, Browning, towards the school.
SCHLEDER: He's running towards Cottage.
CITYWIDE DISPATCHER: Heading towards Cottage.
BEAT 224: 224
SCHLEDER: He just tossed the gun.
CITYWIDE DISPATCHER: He just what?
210: He just tossed the gun.
CITYWIDE DISPATCHER: Alright, he tossed the gun. Alright, what unit's got?
CITYWIDE DISPATCHER: 214.
SCHLEDER: He's in custody, but he just tossed the gun.
CITYWIDE DISPATCHER: You have him in custody?
SCHLEDER: He's in custody, but he just tossed the gun. might need a piece of fire equipment over here.
* * *
CITYWIDE DISPATCHER: Alright, you said you might need a piece of fire equipment. What do you want -- a light, a light, you want it on the roof or what?
SCHLEDER: I need to get on the roof.
CITYWIDE DISPATCHER: Alright, we'll get the truck over there. Where do you want em?
SCHLEDER: 525 East 35th Street, in the rear.
(Government's Consolidated Response Ex. A, at 3-4.)
The statements of Officer Schleder in the course of chasing and eventually arresting defendant also satisfy the three conditions necessary to application of the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. See supra, at 3. First, Schleder's statements describe or explain the events prompting those statements. In fact, the police officer is describing to the citywide dispatcher exactly what he is doing and what he is observing as it happens. He describes the direction defendant is headed and the fact that defendant tosses his firearm onto an adjacent building. Thus, there can be no doubt that Schleder is perceiving the event he is describing and that his statements describe or explain the event. Finally, because the officer's statements are made as the events are occurring, that description was substantially contemporaneous with the events described. Thus, finding that all conditions for application of the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule are satisfied, the Court will permit introduction of Schleder's statements as present sense impressions.
Alternatively, the Court finds that the hearsay exception for excited utterances also provides a sound basis for the admission of Schleder's statements. A startling event or condition did occur here. After hearing the description of a shooting suspect broadcast over his police radio, Schleder came upon an individual who matched that description. The individual attempted to flee from the officer, and the officer observed that the suspect was carrying a gun. Even for a police officer who presumably is trained to react in such potentially dangerous situations, involvement in a chase with an armed suspect would be an exciting and startling event. See Obayagbona, 627 F.Supp. at 339 ("Law officers are subject to strain and excitement, much like people in other walks of life."). Similarly, the second condition also is satisfied in that Schleder made his statements while under the stress and excitement of the startling event. He made the statements as the events unfolded; they surely were spontaneous reactions to those events, rather than the product of conscious reflection. Finally, Schleder's statements also relate to the startling events he was witnessing. Accordingly, because the statements satisfy the three conditions for application of the excited utterance exception, they also will be admitted pursuant to that exception.
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion in limine to bar introduction of the police tape recording is denied.
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: December 5, 1991