requires too narrow a reading of Garmon. Garmon acknowledged:
At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 244 at 244-45, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 783, 79 S. Ct. at 779. Garmon set the standard to be applied in labor preemption cases by stating that "when an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245, 3 L.Ed 2d at 783, 79 S. Ct. at 780.
In an attempt to buttress its argument that Section 900D is outside the scope of the NLRA, IDES points to New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 59 L. Ed. 2d 553, 99 S. Ct. 1328 (1979), where the Court held that the NLRA does not prohibit the State of New York from paying unemployment benefits to strikers. Justice Stevens, in writing for a plurality, rejected the employer's argument that the state was interfering with the bargaining process by stating that "the general purpose of the program is not to regulate the bargaining relationships between the two classes but instead to provide an efficient means of insuring employment security in the State." New York Telephone Co., 440 U.S. at 533, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 564, 99 S. Ct. at 1337.
IDES would apparently read New York Telephone Co. to hold that all legislation related to unemployment compensation is exempt from preemption because they are laws of general applicability. Just as IDES reads Garmon too narrowly, New York Telephone Co. is being interpreted too broadly. New York Telephone Co. merely acknowledges the legitimate interest of the state to award unemployment compensation to a general class of unemployed workers, without regard to any pending labor dispute between an employer and their respective bargaining unit. Similarly, Illinois may award unemployment benefits to strikers if it so chooses. The NLRB has not argued, and rightfully so, that Illinois may no longer effectuate the goal of serving its unemployed, or that its interest in recouping unemployment benefits is irrational. The NLRB merely desires that IDES' efforts to recoup these benefits be directed at the discriminatee after he or she receives the full amount of the prescribed backpay award.
Since IDES' overall objective of administering unemployment benefits is not being frustrated, this court cannot say that Section 900D, in and of itself, is "so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 782, 79 S. Ct. at 779. This is especially true when, as here, the local interest is met with the countervailing national public interest that is furthered when the NLRB exercises its remedial authority. See Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 309 U.S. 261, 267-70, 84 L. Ed. 738, 742-44, 60 S. Ct. 561, 564-66 (1940); NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 128 F.2d 188, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1942).
As cited by the NLRB, the most instructive case is NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 95 L. Ed. 337, 71 S. Ct. 337 (1951), where the Court recognized the NLRB's power to refuse to deduct unemployment compensation from backpay awards. The only difference between Gullett Gin Co. and the instant case is that in the former the employer sought to have the paid-out unemployment compensation deducted from the backpay award before the check was sent to the NLRB. Here it is the state seeking to effectuate a deduction of paid-out unemployment benefits by being included as a party to the award. Contrary to IDES' argument, this is merely a mechanical distinction that does not warrant a different result. Indeed, the Gullett Gin Co. Court, in an 8-0 decision, based its holding on the broad discretion given the NLRB in its authority, "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act . . . ." Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. at 362, 95 L. Ed. at 341, 71 S. Ct. at 339 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)). "Because the relationship of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy." Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. at 362, 95 L. Ed. at 341, 71 S. Ct. at 339. (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194, 85 L. Ed. 1271, 1283, 61 S. Ct. 845, 852 (1941).
As noted in Gullett Gin Co., the NLRB's decision not to consider any collateral losses or benefits when it fashioned its remedy, was in line with past precedent. Congress impliedly approved of this precedent when it amended the NLRA in 1947 without making any changes in this area. See Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. at 366, 95 L. Ed. at 343, 61 S. Ct. at 340-41 (citing H.Rep. No. 255, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.). Finally, the cases cited by IDES, where recoupment of unemployment benefits was allowed from the backpay award, are all distinguishable. None of the cases involved an unfair labor practice proceeding where the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction was invoked. See Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1984) (Title VII case); Gelof v. Papineau, 829 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1987) (age discrimination); and Certified Midwest, Inc. v. Local Union 738, 686 F.Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (arbitral award).
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant is enjoined from seeking to enforce Section 900D of the State of Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, para. 490(d)) as it pertains to Special Mine Services, Inc., with regard to the payment of backpay due to the settlement of NLRB Case, No. 14-CA-20897. Further, Section 900D is hereby preempted to the extent that it involves regulating or restraining conduct, as in this case, which is governed exclusively by the NLRA. The NLRB is also awarded cost.