issues: (a) whether plaintiff needs a receiver for this property; (b) whether the proposed receiver is qualified to manage the property; (c) the fees to be charged by the receiver and whether those fees are reasonable; (d) whether an appointed receiver should be required to post a bond; and (e) whether the mortgagor and its agent are qualified to remain in possession of the property. (Defendants' Mem. at 2.) The Court does not agree that a further evidentiary hearing is required in this case. Such a hearing would only serve to delay the inevitable resolution of plaintiff's motion.
The statutory provision relied on by defendants to establish their right to a hearing, § 15-1706(c), provides as follows:
After reasonable notice has been given to all other parties, the court shall promptly hold a hearing and promptly rule on a request that a mortgagee be placed in possession or that a receiver be appointed, except that, if no objection to the request is made prior to the time specified for the hearing, the court shall rule without a hearing.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 15-1706(c). This provision does not require a further evidentiary hearing in this case. Plaintiff filed its motion for appointment of a receiver on September 16, 1991, and the Court conducted a hearing on that motion on September 19, 1991. At that hearing, defendants objected to the appointment of a receiver and sought the opportunity to show good cause why they should remain in possession of the property. Therefore, the Court set a briefing schedule on plaintiff's motion to provide defendants that opportunity. The Court has concluded above that defendants failed to establish good cause either in the September 19 hearing or in their brief before this Court. A further hearing would not alter this determination.
In particular, the Court concludes that a hearing is not required with respect to any of the five issues delineated by defendants above. First, plaintiff's need for a receiver is not a relevant consideration under the IMFL. A hearing, therefore, is not required on this issue. Similarly, the Court previously has determined that any exemplary qualifications of defendants and their agent U.S. Equities are insufficient to establish good cause. As to the qualifications of the proposed receiver and the fees that it will charge, defendants have not established their need for a hearing on these issues. Defendants have not suggested that Rubloff is unqualified to manage the property or that its fees will be excessive. Pursuant to § 15-1702(b) of the IMFL, the mortgagee is entitled to designate the receiver to be appointed, and the Court should reject that designation only when the mortgagor objects to the designation and shows good cause, or if the Court itself does not approve of the designee. The Court has no objection to the appointment of Rubloff, and defendants have not shown good cause why Rubloff should not be appointed in this case. Thus, there is no need for a hearing on Rubloff's qualifications or the fees that it will charge.
Finally, defendants contend that a hearing is required on the issue of whether the receiver should post a bond. No hearing is required on this issue, however, because plaintiff makes no objection to the posting of a bond. (Plaintiff's Reply Mem. at 5.) Therefore, the Court concludes that a bond would be appropriate in this case. Accordingly, plaintiff's receiver will be required to post a bond pursuant to § 15-1705(b) of the IMFL, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 15-1705(b), and § 2-415(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 2-415(a). Once such a bond is posted and approved by the Court, an order will enter appointing Rubloff as receiver.
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's motion for the appointment of a receiver is granted. Once plaintiff posts an appropriate bond and that bond is approved by the Court, the Court will appoint Rubloff, Inc. as the receiver of the 300 North Michigan Avenue property.