in Consolidated cleaning work. Moreover, there was no proof Consolidated discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin even if she had testified to her national origin.
The EEOC next presented the testimony of David Wilkerson, another witness who did not testify to his national origin.
Mr. Wilkerson also applied for a job with Consolidated in 1985 based on a newspaper advertisement. (Tr. 236.) The court infers it was the same March 1985 Chicago Tribune ad (Pl. Ex. 140) to which Ms. Carthen responded and from which Consolidated hired no one because it had no jobs to fill because it did not receive the contract. (Tr. 737.) Consolidated did not offer Mr. Wilkerson a job. (Tr. 237.) The court found Mr. Wilkerson's testimony incredible. For example, Mr. Wilkerson testified that he was unemployed when he applied to Consolidated in 1985. (Tr. 237.) Mr. Wilkerson later testified, however, that he in fact was employed by the Salem Service Company between 1984 and 1986. As with Ms. Carthen, Mr. Wilkerson never testified about acts of discrimination by Consolidated. He simply stated that he applied to but was not hired by Consolidated. (Tr. 236-237.) Consolidated's credible legitimate business reasons for not hiring him was that it had no open positions.
The EEOC's third anecdotal witness was Ricardo DeJesus. Mr. DeJesus was from Puerto Rico and testified that he found out about Consolidated through word-of mouth--namely, from a non-Korean gentleman. (Tr. 249, 260.) That testimony was hardly evidence of the discriminatory impact of Consolidated's word-of-mouth recruiting methods. Moreover, the court found Mr. DeJesus' testimony inconsistent as well. Like the other witnesses, Mr. DeJesus applied to but was not employed by Consolidated. (Tr. 251.) However, Mr. DeJesus testified that he quit a job paying $ 6.50 an hour because his employer refused to give him a raise. (Tr. 263.) The court does not believe Mr. DeJesus was truly interested in a job that paid even less, such as the low-paying positions available at Consolidated.
The EEOC's final anecdotal witness was George Brown. He testified his nationality was black. (Tr. 264.) Mr. Brown testified he applied to Consolidated after reading a Chicago Sun-Times newspaper ad, but was not hired. (Tr. 265, 266.) Mr. Brown's testimony contained several inconsistencies. He was not credible. For example, Mr. Brown was adamant that he had learned about job openings at Consolidated through an advertisement in the Chicago Sun-Times newspaper--a newspaper in which Consolidated never placed any advertisements. (Tr. 273.) Moreover, Mr. Brown testified that he wanted a position paying $ 200.00 per week. (Tr. 273.) Again, the EEOC failed to demonstrate that Consolidated had a position paying that kind of money at the time Mr. Brown applied.
What is most striking about the EEOC's anecdotal witnesses is not their testimonial inconsistencies. Most telling is that the EEOC presented no evidence whatsoever through these witnesses evidencing any acts by Consolidated which prove it discriminated against them because they were non-Korean. Unlike the Teamsters case, none of Consolidated's anecdotal witnesses testified to any specific acts of discrimination by Consolidated. The EEOC's anecdotal evidence simply establishes that Consolidated did not offer jobs to these four individuals. This is not evidence of an intent by Consolidated to discriminate against people seeking employment because they were not Korean.
In summary, then, the court finds that the EEOC has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that national origin discrimination was Consolidated's "standard operating procedure." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S. Ct. at 1855. The EEOC's proof fails under both the disparate impact and the disparate treatment methods of proof. The EEOC failed properly to demonstrate disparate impact because its statistics did not properly consider the relevant labor pool--those individuals both qualified and interested in the janitorial positions available at Consolidated. The EEOC failed to prove disparate treatment because none of its evidence demonstrated that Consolidated intentionally discriminated against non-Koreans. Accordingly, judgment must be entered in favor of Consolidated.
For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order: (1) JUDGMENT is entered in favor of defendant Consolidated and against plaintiff EEOC; (2) this case is DISMISSED in its entirety.