The opinion of the court was delivered by: Richard Mills, District Judge:
This case is a model for abuse of the judicial process.
Daniel Los brought this civil rights action against twenty-six
named and unnamed Defendants — including various law enforcement
officials, state's attorneys, a judge, and University of Illinois
He claims that the Defendants violated his constitutional
rights by expelling him from law school, by denying him access to
University of Illinois property, by depriving him of his liberty
without due process, and by refusing him medical care.
Over three years have elapsed since this suit was filed, yet
the underlying facts still remain somewhat nebulous. The court
gleans the following basic facts from Plaintiff's second amended
complaint, his related habeas action, and from other pleadings:
As a result of several unspecified problems which arose in late
1985 and early 1986, Los was expelled from the University of
Illinois College of Law on or about March 27, 1986. (Apparently,
he had developed an obsessive infatuation with a law school
classmate toward whom he made unwelcome advances.) On April 4,
1986, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with the offenses of
Battery and Criminal Trespass to State Supported Land. He was
accused of having entered the law school after being forbidden to
do so; he was also accused of having choked a university worker.
On July 8, 1987, Los filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Danville Division of the Central District of
Illinois, claiming that his guilty plea had not been voluntary.
He also argued prosecutorial misconduct. The court (Chief U.S.
District Judge Harold A. Baker) denied the petition; the court of
appeals affirmed the district court.
In March, 1988, Plaintiff commenced the instant civil rights
action, seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his
claims. By order of October 6, 1988, this Court conducted a merit
review of Plaintiff's claims, see Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil
Division, County Court, Milwaukee County, State of Wisconsin,
510 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1975), and found the complaint
factually deficient. However, the Court allowed Plaintiff the
opportunity to submit a more definite and certain statement of
his claims. In response, the Plaintiff filed motions for
rehearing and to vacate "judgment," which the Court denied.
Plaintiff Los eventually submitted an amended complaint.
Unfortunately, the amended complaint was nearly identical to the
original pleading, consisting essentially of unsupported legal
assertions of constitutional violations. The Court again found
the complaint factually insufficient to state an arguable claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but again granted the Plaintiff leave to
file a more definite and complete factual statement of his
On August 28, 1989, Plaintiff submitted a maundering second
amended complaint. However, before the Court could review the
merit of the amended pleading pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the
Plaintiff paid the statutory filing fee. Consequently, the Court
filed the complaint and entered a scheduling order; the petition
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis was denied as moot.
Plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of
pauper status. (He has also filed multiple motions for
reconsideration of virtually every adverse ruling.)
On December 4, 1990, upon motion, the Court entered judgment in
favor of the State's Attorney defendants. Plaintiff's appeal has
now been dismissed,*fn1 and the matter is again before this
court for consideration of the remaining Defendants' motions to
dismiss the complaint. For the reasons stated in this order, the
motions will be allowed.
It is well established that pro se complaints are to be
liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct.
594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948, 92
S.Ct. 963, 30 L.Ed.2d 819 (1972). See also Tarkowski v. Robert
Bartlett Realty Company, 644 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1980). They can
only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears
"beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
Haines, 404 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 596. When considering
whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the Court takes the allegations in
the complaint as true. See LaSalle National Bank of Chicago v.
County of DuPage, 777 F.2d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1170, 106 S.Ct. 2892, 90 L.Ed.2d 979 (1986).
Dismissal should be ...