under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Again, like all of the Plaintiff's
claims, the facts surrounding the expulsion hearing remain murky.
The Court will not concoct a cause of action for the Plaintiff;
in the three years this suit has been pending, Plaintiff Los has
had ample opportunity to articulate the specific alleged
Due process in the academic setting requires some formal
procedures before a student may be disciplined. Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 584, 95 S.Ct. 729, 741, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)
(context of school suspension cases). The minimum requirements
established for school expulsions in Goss are "oral and written
notice of the charges against [the student] and, if he denies
them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story." Goss, 419 U.S.
at 581, 95 S.Ct. at 740; see also, Newsome v. Batavia Local
School Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 927 (6th Cir. 1988). However, due
process may be satisfied by something less than a trial-type
hearing. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963,
41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97
S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977).
In Paragraph 4, Plaintiff alleges that his expulsion was based
on an unidentified false statement by another student. Los
contends that each of the Defendants either "voted for or failed
to veto expulsion;" in addition, he claims that the Defendants
failed to discipline the student or students who gave false
information. The use of purportedly false information in the
administrative proceedings, however, is not actionable. While the
knowing use of perjured testimony would have violated due
process, see U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 and nn. 8, 9, 96
S.Ct. 2392, 2397 and nn. 8, 9, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (criminal
context), here the Plaintiff makes no allegation that the
Defendants knew the testimony to be false. In fact, Plaintiff
pled guilty to criminal charges. (See Los v. D.P. Weatherford,
et al., Danville Case No. 87-2358). See also Hanrahan v. Lane,
747 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1984) (in prison disciplinary proceedings
allegations of false charges do not state a claim where due
process is afforded). Plaintiff's vague claim that false evidence
was used against him does not state a claim.
In Paragraph 5, he makes the same claim against the
University's vice-chancellor and against two University doctors.
Plaintiff further claims that no hearing was held before or after
expulsion. This assertion contradicts Plaintiff's claims
regarding deficiencies in the expulsion proceedings: apparently
some hearing took place during which Defendants considered
allegedly false testimony. In any case, Plaintiff does not state
that he requested and was denied a hearing, or that he had no
opportunity for a hearing.
Furthermore, due process does not require elaborate
pre-deprivation procedures in all cases, see, e.g., Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-45, 105
S.Ct. 1487, 1493-95, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Barry v. Barchi,
443 U.S. 55, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979), particularly
where, as here, the deprivation is based on important State
needs. "The very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81
S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). Here, the Plaintiff's
criminal record (attached to the States' Attorneys' Motion for
Summary Judgment) indicates that Plaintiff Los threatened suicide
and attempted to strangle Defendant Wardell on March 17, 1987.
Additionally, the Court has gleaned that the Plaintiff harassed
and later physically assaulted a classmate. Ample cause for
immediate expulsion of the Plaintiff, an apparently violent and
disturbed individual, existed.
In Paragraphs 6 and 7, Los asserts that the Defendants and
University police officers have denied the Plaintiff "lawful
right of access to any University property anywhere in the
state." As discussed supra, however, if the Plaintiff wished to
challenge Judge Ford's injunction barring the Plaintiff from
entry on University property (presumably the law school), he must
seek review of that matter in state court. It also appears quite
reasonable that police
were summoned when Plaintiff attempted to conduct a Bar Journal
editorial meeting in a parking lot. In any case, employees of the
university cannot be held liable for police officers' allegedly
The remaining counts of the complaint which pertain to the
University Defendants are all state tort claims: intentional
infliction of emotional distress, unlawful restraint, and
battery. In light of the dismissal of Plaintiff's federal claims,
the state tort claims will be dismissed as well. United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130,
1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Freedom From Religion Foundation,
Inc. v. Zeilke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1471 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1988).
In sum, this case has followed a three-year, tortuous and
meandering path to nowhere. The vague and conclusory second
amended complaint raises many previously litigated issues and
fails to state a cause of action against any of the Defendants.
Judge Ford is absolutely immune from damages for his judicial
actions; Plaintiff must seek appellate review if he wishes to
challenge Ford's rulings. Los has also stated insufficient facts
to support a cause of action against Sheriff Brown. Finally, the
second amended complaint fails to state a colorable claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against University of Illinois faculty members.
Although Plaintiff was allowed several opportunities to amend his
complaint and to respond to Defendants' motions for dismissal, he
has never provided facts from which the Court could infer that
any constitutional violation took place.
Ergo, it is therefore ordered that Judge Ford's motion to
dismiss is ALLOWED; on the Court's own motion, the complaint is
DISMISSED as to Sheriff Brown; and the University Defendants'
motion to dismiss is ALLOWED.
Because this order effectively disposes of all remaining
claims, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
Cause stricken and case dismissed.
The parties are to bear their own costs.