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August 8, 1991

FLOYD ABRAMSON and JANE ABRAMSON, individually, Defendants

Ann Claire Williams, United States District Judge.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLIAMS


 This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court grants defendant's motion as plaintiff's law suit is barred under the applicable statute of limitations.


 Plaintiff, Paul Joseph Abramson, brings this action against his parents, the defendants, Floyd and Jane Abramson ("Abramsons"), alleging in Count I, that on two separate occasions they caused him to be "incarcerated" in mental institutions without justification when he was a minor. Plaintiff alleges that he was abused and neglected in these institutions and, that as a result, he has suffered, and continues to suffer, from emotional and physical disabilities.

 Plaintiff alleges that he was first "incarcerated" on or about June 7, 1967, when he was approximately six years old. Defendants placed plaintiff in the University of Chicago affiliated Pritzker Mental Health Center where he resided for approximately three years, until he was discharged on June 27, 1970. Until September 14, 1970, plaintiff was treated at the health center on an out-patient basis. On December 5, 1975, plaintiff was "incarcerated" a second time in the Wilson Center, a residential treatment center in the Minneapolis, Minnesota area, and was not released until 1978. Plaintiff claims that the defendants, his legal guardians, caused him to be placed in these institutions even though they knew that the plaintiff was never evaluated for any mental, emotional or psychiatric problems which would justify his detainment. Plaintiff further claims that while he was "incarcerated" he was neglected and emotionally abused by the treatment staff, involuntarily and wrongfully kept in the institution against his will, and separated from friends and family without any justification in law or fact.

 Two years after his release from the Wilson Center, plaintiff suffered from emotional problems. In 1980, he began seeing Dr. Helen Warren Ross, Ph.D. on a weekly basis until 1984, and with less frequency after 1984. Beginning in 1980, Dr. Ross attempted to procure plaintiff's medical records from his two periods of incarceration as a child. Affidavit of Dr. Ross para. 2. Plaintiff and his doctors obtained the records from the two mental health centers in late 1988 and learned the facts surrounding his treatment and alleged injuries on December 22 or 23, 1988. *fn1" Id. at para. 6, 7. Plaintiff claims that on that date he learned the cause of the physical and emotional injuries which continue to affect him to this day.

 Finally, it is important to note that the plaintiff was born on August 5, 1961, and thus turned eighteen on August 5, 1979. This complaint was filed on December 24, 1990, more than eleven years after the plaintiff reached the age of majority and at least the same number of years after the events alleged in Count I of the Complaint occurred.

 Motion to Dismiss

 Count I of the complaint asserts a claim under the common law of Illinois to recover for plaintiff's alleged "physical and emotional injuries" as a result of his incarcerations. Thus, Count I is governed by Illinois' two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims for damages for injury to the person. *fn2" The matters alleged in Count I all occurred during the plaintiff's childhood. The statute of limitations governing these injuries would not begin running until the plaintiff turned eighteen on August 5, 1979. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 110, para. 13-211. By applying these statutes, the plaintiff's suit would have had to have been commenced within two years of August 5, 1979 to be allowed under the statute of limitations. *fn3" Since this action was not filed for more then nine years following the expiration of the limitations period on August 5, 1981, Count I fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Sports Bar, Inc. v. Village of Downers Grove, Ill., 129 F.R.D. 161, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1989).

 There is no conceivable basis pled in Count I for tolling the statute of limitations or excusing the plaintiff's failure to have commenced the suit within the applicable limitations period. Plaintiff suggests that for the past 18 years he has been emotionally scarred in some way, however, there is no allegation that plaintiff was under a legal disability at any time after he reached eighteen. A showing of legal disability would be required to toll the running of the statute once he reached eighteen. See Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 110, para. 13-211. *fn4"

 Plaintiff suggests that the statute of limitations should be tolled in this case under the "discovery rule" because he was not aware of the cause of his injury until he received his medical records in 1988. The discovery rule means that "the statute [of limitations] starts to run when a person knows or reasonably should know of his injury and also knows or reasonably should know that it was wrongfully caused." Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156, 52 Ill. Dec. 6, 10, 421 N.E.2d 869, 874 (1981). This rule only applies in cases where the plaintiff was not consciously aware of an injury and, not consciously aware that the injury was caused by wrongful conduct. See e.g., Franke v. Geyer, 209 Ill.App.3d 1009, 568 N.E.2d 931, 154 Ill.Dec 710, slip op. at 3 (Ill. App., 3d Dist., March 6, 1991). The injured person does not need to be completely informed about the circumstances regarding his injury, nor does he need to know that the wrong is legally actionable. Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when "the injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning his injury. . . to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved. . . ." Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 430 N.E.2d 976, 58 Ill. Dec. 725 (1981). See also Franke, 209 Ill.App.3d 1009, 568 N.E.2d 931, 154 Ill.Dec. 710, slip op. at 4 (a plaintiff need not know all of the facts or circumstances in order for the statute of limitations to begin running); Bates v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 137, 140-41, 63 Ill. Dec. 887, 890, 438 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1st Dist. 1982); Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 171, 52 Ill. Dec. 1, 4-5, 421 N.E.2d 864, 869; Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156, 52 Ill. Dec. 6, 11, 421 N.E.2d 869, 874 (the burden is on the injured party to investigate a cause of action). *fn5"

 The determination of whether one is possessed of sufficient information about the injury to investigate whether actionable conduct was involved "is usually a question of fact unless the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion may be drawn from them." Bates v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 137, 141, 63 Ill. Dec. 887, 890, 438 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1st Dist. 1982). In the instant case, the only inference which can be drawn from the undisputed facts is that the plaintiff had sufficient information to put a reasonable person on inquiry and, therefore, the statute of limitations has run. Although plaintiff asserts that he did not, and could not, have "discovered" his cause of action against the Abramsons until December, 1988, when he obtained and reviewed his childhood medical records, the facts discussed below reveal that the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of his injury many years prior to the initiation of this case.

 First, the plaintiff's two periods of "incarceration" and the alleged abuse and neglect which followed are the sort of "sudden, traumatic events which should prompt some investigation by the injured party" and start the running of the statute of limitations. Lutes v. Farley, 113 Ill. App. 3d 113, 115, 68 Ill. Dec. 695, 697, 446 N.E.2d 866, 868 (3d Dist. 1983). Furthermore, the allegations in the Complaint establish that the plaintiff was consciously aware of having suffered an injury. The Complaint specifically states that the plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer from emotional and physical injuries as a proximate result of his incarcerations. Complaint, paras. 8, 11, 13. The plaintiff states in his brief that he was "aware of the symptoms of what he was suffering which includes to date, extreme depression, paranoia, compulsive ...

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