copyright for the four sculptures in question. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Stylex and Beauty Brokers had direct access to the copyrighted goods, having purchased them from plaintiff in May of 1989 through their president, defendant Laurence. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Stylex and Beauty Brokers copied and sold copies of plaintiff's copyrighted sculptures. Plaintiff thus clearly states a claim for copyright infringement against these two defendants. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Laurence is liable for these alleged infringements as a corporate officer because he was the dominant influence in both Stylex and Beauty Brokers and because he personally determined the corporate policies which resulted in the alleged infringement. Plaintiff thus also states a claim against Laurence. Burwood Products at 1219.
Propriety of Venue in Illinois
Venue in a copyright infringement action lies in the district where the defendants "reside or may be found." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a). It is undisputed that defendants do not reside in Illinois. The issue then is whether defendants "may be found" in Illinois. A defendant "may be found" in any district in which he is subject to personal jurisdiction. Burwood Products at 1217; Kogan v. Longstreet, 374 F. Supp. 47, 50 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Thus, if a court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants in a copyright infringement action, venue in that court's district is proper. Since, for the reasons stated supra, all three defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district, venue is also proper in this district.
Transfer of Venue
In order to show that a transfer of venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the moving party must show: (1) that venue is proper in the transferor district; (2) that venue is proper in the transferee district; and (3) that transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the interest of justice. General Accident Ins. Co. v. Travelers Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1203, 1206 (N.D. Ill. 1987). As discussed supra, venue is proper in this district. It is undisputed that venue is also proper in the proposed transferee forum, Massachusetts, because all three defendants reside or can be found there. Thus, the resolution of this motion depends on whether or not defendants have carried their burden of proving that a transfer would "clearly" serve the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and the interest of justice. Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219-220 (7th Cir. 1986). In considering these factors, the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to "substantial weight", Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Brown, 587 F. Supp. 1067, 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1984), especially where, as here, the plaintiff is a resident of the district in which it filed suit. Bodine's Inc. v. Sunny-O, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 1279, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1980). If transfer would simply shift the inconvenience of litigation from the defendants to the plaintiff, transfer is not warranted. Coffey at 220.
Plaintiff argues, and defendants do not dispute, that there is one potential witness for each party: defendant Laurence for defendants, and plaintiff's president, Aaron Sonnenschein, for plaintiff. Plaintiff's documentary evidence is located in this district and defendants' documentary evidence is located in Massachusetts. Transfer is not warranted for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.
With regard to the interest of justice factor of a transfer motion, the factors which a court should consider include: (1) the location of the alleged wrongdoing, and (2) the forum in which prospective witnesses are subject to compulsory process. See e.g. Wilmot H. Simonson Co. v. Green Textile Associates, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1983). As explained supra, at least some of defendants' alleged wrongdoing in this case occurred in Illinois. All potential witnesses, including defendant Laurence, are subject to compulsory process in this district. Thus, the interest of justice also would not "clearly" be best served by a transfer of venue.
This court has personal jurisdiction over all three defendants. Plaintiff states a claim for copyright infringement against all three defendants. Venue is proper in this district and a transfer of venue to the District of Massachusetts is not warranted. Accordingly, defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2),(3), & (6) and for transfer of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) are denied.