considering the circumstances of the lockdown. But, without specific evidence, the state's case rests merely on an assertion. Summary judgment, therefore, is not appropriate with respect to this claim.
Martin's remaining claims are based on the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" as well as punishment that is "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime" for which the prisoner was imprisoned or punishment "totally without penological justification." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981). Conditions either singly or in their totality may serve as the basis for an eighth amendment claim.
Martin begins his eighth amendment claims by challenging his lack of access to the institution's educational and work programs. It is true that these facilities and programs were closed during the lockdown. The lockdowns, though, only lasted for a short while. The Eighth Amendment does not require that educational programs be provided to prisoners. Peterkin v. Jeffes, 661 F. Supp. 895, 917 (E.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817, 93 L. Ed. 2d 32, 107 S. Ct. 77 (1986). Nor are prisoners entitled to work or vocational programs. Even if what Martin alleges is true, this claim does not rise to the level of an eighth amendment violation. Summary judgment on this claim is granted.
Martin also alleges that he was denied access to fresh air, sunshine and exercise. Some form of regular outdoor exercise is necessary to the well-being of inmates. However, denial of recreation for a short period, per se, is not a constitutional violation." Knight v. Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989). For instance, in Rust v. Grammer, 858 F.2d 411, 414 (8th Cir. 1988), the Eighth Circuit found that the denial of yard privileges for eleven days during a lockdown period did not constitute an eighth amendment violation. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir. 1988), found that the deprivation of yard privileges for four weeks did not rise to the level of an eighth amendment violation. The Seventh Circuit noted that "this was a short-term situation" and, in any event, the inmate was not deprived of all exercise. Id.
In this case, Martin claims that he was confined to his cell and denied outdoor exercise during lockdown periods. The lockdowns usually lasted from one to three days to a maximum of eighteen days. The eighteen-day maximum falls within the range of days without exercise that courts have permitted. Moreover, there is no hint in Martin's complaint he was not able to exercise within his cell. For these reasons, the court finds that this claim cannot be sustained on the basis of Martin's allegations. Summary judgment on this claim is appropriate.
Next, Martin brings a host of claims attacking the lack of hygienic conditions. Martin reels off a list of necessities that he lacked:
For the entire periods of these lock-downs plaintiff was confined to his cell and denied access to showers, clean laundry and linen, [and] soap. . . . All hot food was clogged and served cold while all cold food was served warm and both coated with the grease of the food. . . . No spoons or forks were passed out with the food. . . . No toilet paper was passed out nor soap to clean the cell, toilet or sink nor tooth paste or brooms.