on the morning of March 2, 1986, within thirty-three hours of his arrest.
Defendants arrested Hickombottom without the benefit of a warrant. The County issued an arrest warrant against him on March 2, however, because he had violated his parole. All court records date Hickombottom's first court appearance on this matter as March 2, 1986.
Hickombottom moved to suppress his statement in a hearing before the Circuit Court of Cook County, arguing that it was coerced because, among other things, he was denied food and water, he was not allowed to sleep and he was subjected to threats and misrepresentations. During the hearing, however, he admitted that he was given food and water once during his detention. The court rejected all his claims and denied the motion to suppress.
A jury found Hickombottom guilty of felony murder and armed robbery. The court sentenced him to forty years in prison, and Hickombottom is presently serving that sentence at Danville Correctional Center in Danville, Illinois.
Hickombottom's amended complaint, the one presently pending before the court, alleges that the defendants arrested him without probable cause; that they failed to promptly bring him before a neutral magistrate for a probable cause determination; that they violated his right to due process by denying him food and water for an unreasonable length of time; and finally, that they violated his right against self incrimination by coercing his confession.
The court already dealt with Hickombottom's first claim, in Hickombottom v. City of Chicago, 739 F. Supp. 1173, 1178-79 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Hickombottom I), in which it granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the false arrest claim, holding that the facts clearly demonstrated that the defendants' arrest of Hickombottom was "reasonable" as that term is understood in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The facts set forth above serve only to further demonstrate the appropriateness of the arrest. The defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on that claim. That is the only claim that could reasonably be understood to be against Detectives Murphy, Kierse and O'Connell, since, according to the facts set forth above and admitted by Mr. Hickombottom, they were not involved in the interrogation or processing after Hickombottom's arrest.
McGuire and Tansey, however, are left with Hickombottom's remaining claims. The court will address each in turn. First, Mr. Hickombottom claims that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt hearing by delaying his appearance before a magistrate. The defendants did question Hickombottom for about eleven hours after his arrest, but had nothing to do with him after that time. Eleven hours is not an unreasonable period in which to delay an appearance before a magistrate. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991) (holding that period of up to forty-eight hours between arrest and initial appearance before judicial officer is presumptively reasonable). Whatever happened afterward is not, or at least has not been shown by the facts before the court to be, attributable to the defendants' conduct. Furthermore, as the court discussed in its earlier decision in this case, Hickombottom has offered no facts supporting his claim that the unlawful detention somehow caused him compensable injury. See Hickombottom I, 739 F. Supp. at 1181. The court therefore grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment on that claim.
Next are Hickombottom's claims that the defendants deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by denying him food and water for an unreasonable length of time while he was in their custody and that they violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right not to incriminate himself when they coerced his confession. For two reasons, those claims are inappropriate here. First, as the court noted in Hickombottom I, claims which are indirect attacks on a plaintiff's confinement, as is the claim that the confession which, at least in part, landed Hickombottom in jail, was coerced, are better pressed in a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). Hickombottom has not demonstrated to this court that he has exhausted that avenue of attack. Furthermore, to the extent that his claims would be proper in a § 1983 proceeding, they are barred by the Circuit Court's determination that the confession was not coerced. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-105, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980), in which the court confirmed the applicability of the common-law doctrine of issue preclusion to § 1983 actions. Thus, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment on each of the claims raised in Count 1 of Hickombottom's first amended complaint. Count 2 is a conspiracy claim, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on that claim as well, since if there is no unlawful act, there can have been no unlawful conspiracy. See Hickombottom I, 739 F. Supp. at 1181, and cases cited therein.
The court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment on both counts of the First Amended Complaint.