alleged solicitation for murder occurred on November 16, 1984, the indictment is timely if it is governed by the federal limitations period but is untimely if it is governed by the state limitations period.
The Court has found only one modern case which addresses the issue of which statute of limitations to an offense criminalized by state law and incorporated into federal law by § 13. In United States v. Johnston, 699 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Cal. 1988), the court held that § 13 incorporates only the state's definition of, and penalty for, the offense, and does not incorporate the state's statute of limitations. Cf. United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1988) (state procedural defenses are not incorporated into federal law for RICO purposes), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067, 109 S. Ct. 1345, 103 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1989); United States v. Bertman, 686 F.2d 772, 774 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1982) (although a substantive state law defense may be asserted in a Travel Act prosecution, court doubts that "non-substantive state law defenses, such as the running of the statute of limitations, are cognizable"). This Court agrees. Section 13 defines a federal crime; it is not merely a procedure whereby state criminal statutes are enforced by the federal government. See Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 388-89, 64 S. Ct. 622, 625, 88 L. Ed. 814 (1944); United States v. Sain, 795 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kiliz, 694 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1982). As a federal crime, it is governed by federal procedures. Indeed, courts have consistently held that § 13 does not assimilate state laws which are inconsistent with federal policies expressed in federal statutes. See Sain, 795 F.2d at 891; Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. State of Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665, 668 (10th Cir. 1980).
Accordingly, § 13 proceedings are governed by federal law with respect to the sufficiency of the indictment, see United States v. Fesler, 781 F.2d 384, 392 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1118, 106 S. Ct. 1977, 90 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1986), the right to a jury trial, see Sain, 795 F.2d at 891, application of the exclusionary rule, see Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981, 86 S. Ct. 555, 15 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1966), admission of evidence, see United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004, 107 S. Ct. 1626, 95 L. Ed. 2d 200 (1987), and parole terms, see United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pinto, 755 F.2d 150, 154 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Vaughan, 682 F.2d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 946, 103 S. Ct. 261, 74 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1982). Similarly, because § 13 creates a federal crime, this Court agrees with Johnston that it is governed by the federal statute of limitations. The motions to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds are therefore denied.
VI. OTHER BAD ACTS
Defendant Parades has moved for an order requiring the government to give notice of any intent to use evidence of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts. Specifically, he seeks advance notice of both the government's intent to introduce evidence covered by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the government's intent to introduce evidence of covered by Rule 608(b). With respect to Rule 404(b), the government states that it is providing such notice sufficiently in advance to allow defendant to file any appropriate motions in limine. Accordingly, there is no dispute and Parades' motion is denied pursuant to Local Rule 2.04. However, the motion is denied without prejudice to defendant's right to renew it twenty-one days prior to trial if notice has not then been provided.
With respect to Rule 608(b), Parades' request is denied because he is only entitled to notice of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to be used in the government's case-in-chief, not evidence used in cross-examination or rebuttal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(d) (2); United States v. Savides, 661 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1030, 110 S. Ct. 3286, 111 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1990).
For the reasons described above, the Court denies the motions in limine, the motions to strike references to Illinois law, the motions to dismiss on the basis of the statute of limitations, Parades' motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights, and Parades' motion for an order requiring notice of evidence of other acts.